It has soon become clear that the legalistic approach to power-challanging issues undertaken by the major component of the movement, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), was not going to represent a breakthrough in the largely unexplored field of nonviolent practice, in spite of the initial period of enthusiastic activity.

In fact, with its use of conventional tactics of persuasion never exceeding the boundaries of moderation traced by the leadership, the Campaign has missed the chance of unifying the dissenting voices of the radical fringes operating under its ‘ umbrella ‘.

On the other hand, both the Direct Action Committee (DAC) and the Committee of Hundred (C. 100) have failed to identify and therefore correctly apply the basic principles governing nonviolent practice. While the former insisted on the concept of ‘personal responsibility’ to the point of suggesting a distorted view of each individual’s role in the application of direct action, the latter shifted the emphasis on the mass character of its demonstrations, thus over-rating the would be decisive influence of basically unprepared small crowds.

It has also been shown that the lack of a concerted strategy and the fatal confusion between ‘means’ and ‘ends’ could not but undermine the short-lasting and adventurous attempts by groups of willing activists to bring about a new way of managing politics by means of direct, nonviolent intervention.