PASQUALE CATANOSO

Una nota sulla teoria economica della burocrazia

N. 145

Summary — Bureaucrats appear, according to Weber’s view, as neutral and efficient operators, who correctly interpret social welfare and the tools to be operated to maximize it.

But, after the development of the economic analysis of bureaucratic behaviour, preference has to be given to an interpretation according to which the bureaucrats appear to be influenced by self-interest, and introduced within a bargaining pattern which also includes the politicians (i.e. the financial sponsors of bureaucracy) and the citizens (both individually considered and organized in pressure groups).

Data on the dimensions of the bureaucracy, measured through the number of civil servants, in six industrialized countries, bear evidence of a constant growth (except in the U.S.A.) in the percentage of civil servants over the total number of employees.

The main task of the paper is to investigate whether the growth in bureaucratic employment is to be considered a "normal" effect of the hierarchical structure or, rather, the consequence of inefficiency and of internal bureaucratic bargaining.

As possible, "impartial" answer is to be found in the capability of the bureaucratic employment to upkeep a certain degree of social consensus, due to the income and safety benefits that it implies.

In this interpretation, bureaucracy is no more interpreted as opposed to the politicians in the political market model, but as a useful means for its sponsor in order to "freeze" social discontent; it is therefore no more comparable to a supplier operating in a bilateral monopoly.