MICHELE TRIMARCHI

Ideologia, informazione e rent-seeking: 

la relazione  principale-agente nel mercato elettorale e il ruolo dei partiti politici

N. 157

Summary — The paper analyses the informational and monitoring role carried out by political parties within the principal-agent relationship occurring between voters and legislators, and some of its implications. The political parties are assumed to have an incentive to monitor the performance of their members elected in legislative institutions, due to the need to protect and strengthen their ideological identity. This introduces the possibility of a sanction for those elected members who shirk.

It is argued that the monitoring role of political parties is weakened not only when the incumbent legislators have a high probability to be reelected (as some empirical studies have shown), but also when, in a non-dualistic political system, ideology is not the most relevant signal conveyed towards voters; in this case, political parties have an incentive to monitor their members’ performances, due to the need to support the ruling coalition.

The conclusion is drawn that in a non-dualistic system strong parties make the principal-agent relationship between voters and legislators loosen, and the opportunities for rent-seeking increase, since no monitoring is aimed at the ideological performance of parties’ elected members.