Summary — Although the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 falls into the Fascist era, one cannot say the results Italy achieved in the Conference were the fruit of a specific Fascist foreign policy.

Recent Italian historical studies concur in saying that to talk of a more typical fascist foreign policy one has to wait for the end of the twenties, when, after 1929 "great crisis", a more dynamic foreign policy could join the financial one in search of new markets for Italy in the Danubian-Balcan region.

Nevertheless the new national spirit embodied in Mussolini, who had just come to power, was much granted for the success the Italian government achieved in Lausanne.

This was represented mainly by the acquisition of the sovereignty over the Dodecannese Islands (already decided by the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920) which the new Turkey, eager not to let them to Greece, would easily concede to Italy.

A sort of cooperation then took form between the two delegations, the Italian and the Turkish ones, in spite of the question of Castellorizo, the small island near the Turkish shore which both of them wanted to acquire respectively for prestige and strategic reasons.

Benevolent Turkish attitude towards Italy was also the reason why Great Britain changed its position towards Italian foreign policy: London looked for Italian help in the important question of the Straits which she could then arrange so as to achieve a privileged standing in the Mediterranean.