Summary - Based on the original unpublished documents of the Italian ambassador in Ankara, the article refers to the difficult situation in which Turkey found itself when the Suez crisis of 1956 produced such an unpredictable breaking off as the clash between anglo-french powers and the Usa.

Since its entry into Nato in 1952, the Turkish government had been active in completing the western defensive system in the Middle East working for the implementation of the Baghdad.

After the disappointing Middle East Command and the Medo, which had to see Egypt as a main pillar, the U.S. Secretary of State saw in the Northern Tier line the real base for the building up of the Baghdad Pact.

Great Britain, of course, had to be the "glue" of the structure. Pakistan would be a new element, an Arab country as Iraq was most welcome and Iran joined too.

Turkey tried from the beginning to get Washington into the Pact. She had to measure itself against the irresistible rising of Nasseriam and the strong dissuasive action in exerted on Hussein of Jordan and Nuri Said of Iraq.

When Nasser's ascendancy gained ground in Beiruth, Jordan, Syria and Iraq, Turkey tried in vain to connect the Baghdad Pact to Nato, Cairo and Damascus, the two main centers of Arab nationalism, succeding in isolating Iraq, would strenghten those links with the Ussr that would suddenly threaten Turkey both from Communism in the North and Arabism from South.