Fausto
Pocar
Brevi
note sul terrorismo e diritto internazionale
216
Settembre-Dicembre
2007
Anno
LXXII n. 3
Summary
- The legal
response to terrorism in international law had been represented for decades only
by the adoption of both regional and global conventions to improve co-operation
between States to react to and prevent single and specific acts of terrorism,
without giving a global answer to the phenomenon, as the facts occurred on
September 11th 2001 would have more appropriately required. Despite
the ratification of such international instruments, there is still no common
legal definition of terrorism even if such a definition is essential to assess
the commission of an international crime and thus to satisfy the principle of
legality (‘nullum crimen sine lege’).
Nevertheless, after the attack on the
Twin
Towers
, different principles of international law have been questioned, such as
legitimate self-defence and the prohibition of the use of force, to which the
two basic concepts of ‘armed attack’ and ‘indirect aggression’ are
strictly linked in the UN Charter system. In the recent practice of the Security
Council an evolution toward an ‘acceptance’ of the use of force as a
response against terrorism can be detected, even when the aggression is not
actual but only potential and a State feels to be exposed to a possible
terrorist attack to be committed not by another State but also by an organised
group of persons. Thus terrorism has become relevant to define the modern ‘jus
ad bellum’, which traditionally comprises the rules governing the starting
phase of armed conflicts as well as the legitimacy of war operations and conduct.
At the same time, some important consequences as to the rules applicable during
military operations (the so called ‘jus in
bello
’) could arise. The fundamental questions to be addressed are, firstly,
whether the captured terrorist is to be considered ‘war prisoner’ (under the
Geneva Conventions) or ‘illegitimate combatant’ (following the US approach),
and secondly, whether the definition of terrorism elaborated in a different
context by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (followed
by the
Special Court
for
Sierra Leone
) can be applied to determine the responsibilities of States and individuals
committing this kind of acts. Finally, the question of the identification of the
more appropriate authority for the punishment of these crimes remains still open
to the opposite solutions of affirming the jurisdiction of international courts
or of national judges.
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