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PRESENTAZIONE


I contributi raccolti nel presente volume, « combinando » le impostazioni precedenti, affiancano a saggi che hanno per oggetto rapporti fra i due Paesi, in prospettiva sia bilaterale sia europea, lavori « unilaterali » ma su temi di reciproco interesse.

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EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY: TOWARDS CONVERGENCE?

by MAURIZIO FERRERA

1. Introduction.

Despite the enormous successes of its century-long experience, the welfare state has entered the 1990s with a significant number of serious problems, which seem to put many of its principles and practices into question. To a large extent, these problems are of a functional nature, i.e. they arise from the pressure of “new” needs and challenges on “old” solutions. European societies are in the middle of a profound socio-economic transformation, affecting their occupational, demographic and family structures and requiring a thorough revision of the traditional approaches to social protection. As with all such institutional changes, this revision encounters many obstacles and is further hindered by a persisting economic crisis and severe fiscal constraints. To some degree, however, the current problems of the welfare state are also of a socio-political nature, i.e. they are connected to a growing diversification of citizens’ preferences on the social responsibilities of government and to a break (or at least a substantial dilution) of that uncontroversial consensus which accompanied welfare developments until the mid-1970s. Once almost unanimously supportive of an ever-expanding public provision of benefits and services, European populations have increasingly mixed feelings about the subject, addressing their attention also to the fiscal and bureaucratic implications of this type of provision. In many countries tax and welfare issues have assumed great prominence in the political arena during the last ten years (also in the wake of various “austerity” experiments), thus causing policy conflicts and occasional social confrontation. If the 1990s must be a decade of functional re-adaptation of social protection to a changed socio-economic environment, this re-adaptation will have to take into serious consideration not only the objective situation, as de-
fined by emerging problems and available resources, but also the subjective context, i.e. the overall mood and specific orientations prevailing among the European citizenry.

Having in mind this general context, this article has two objectives: 1) to illustrate some ongoing transformations of the socio-economic structure of European society — transformations which have already started to pose significant problems and challenges to social protection systems; 2) to show how these problems and challenges are perceived at the mass level, discussing the preferences/expectations which are expressed by Europe’s public opinion regarding possible solutions to these problems (1).

2. The demographic challenge.

During the 1980s European social protection systems witnessed an increasing exposure to a number of serious socio-economic challenges. The first and most prominent challenge concerns the demographic structure and is constituted by population ageing. Table 1-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>0-19</th>
<th>20-59</th>
<th>60 +</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


gives the orders of magnitude of this development at the aggregate EC level. The ageing of the European population is already quite visible if we compare the 1990s with the 1960s; and it will become even more visible in the next three decades, during which the proportion of young people below 19 will decline from 25% to 20%, while the elderly will grow from 20% to 26% of the total EC population (and it must be noted that within the elderly at large — the so-called third age — there will be a growing proportion of very elderly — i.e. people above 80).

Population ageing poses at least three sets of interrelated problems: more demands for benefits and services; more financial burdens; a concentration of these burdens on a shrinking (or, at best, constant) pool of contributing active workers, thus possibly originating intergenerational tensions. The old age dependency rate (i.e. the percentage of elderly with respect to the population aged 20-59) will mount from the current 35.9% to 48.1% in the year 2020, with the highest increase in Italy and the lowest in Ireland.

These scenarios have already prompted many countries to undertake institutional reforms of some social protection programmes with a view to containing costs, on the one hand, but also to adjusting these programs (most notably health care and social services) to the growing needs of the elderly (2).

What has been the impact of demographic changes and, more particularly, of their cost implications on European public opinion?

Let us concentrate on pensions, i.e. the sector in which population ageing is deemed to exert the most immediate and visible impact. As chart 1 indicates, in most countries people do have “contractionist” expectations when they are encouraged to reflect on the consequences of population ageing. At the EC12 aggregate level, the idea that “the welfare state will continue to grow and that retired people will be better taken care of than they are now” is supported by a minority of 32%. Only in the UK, Portugal and Spain is this idea supported by convinced majorities. In the other countries percentages are around or below the EC average of 32%, with peaks of pessimism in Belgium, France, Germany and especially in Denmark and the Netherlands.

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(2) For a detailed discussion of the problems posed by population ageing, cf. Social Protection in Europe, cit., and the reports of the European Observatory on Ageing and Older People, various years.
Despite these rather widespread contractionist expectations, people do not however expect to retire later in the future. At the EC12 aggregate level only 35% of respondents have agreed with this prospect (column c). The Dutch, Germans and to a lesser extent the French seem more convinced, probably reflecting national proposals (or actual measures, as in Germany) in this direction. The influence of public debates and restrictive proposals does not always produce, however, pessimistic expectations. This is witnessed by the Italian case: at the time when the survey was conducted a pension reform was impending (which became a law in the Fall of 1992) aiming at introducing a phased increase of the pensionable age between 1994 and 2004. Yet the majority of Italian respondents did not reveal to expect an elevation of the pensionable age. As this reform had been on the agenda for almost 15 years, apparently the Italians did not really count on its eventual approval by the government...

The prospect of “getting less pension for one’s contributions” (column b) as a consequence of demographic developments seems more plausible to the European public. One half (50%) of the interviewed agrees with this idea at the EC12 level, thus indicating in this respect a good understanding of the constraints posed by demographic and budgetary trends. This understanding is not however homogeneous across countries, reflecting, again, both national debates and the objective conditions (the degree of maturation) of the pension system.

Reductionist expectations clearly prevail in Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, in Germany. These are the member states with the most mature and established pension systems. Reductionist orientations are clearly minoritarian, on the contrary, in Greece, Portugal and Spain, i.e. in those countries where the pension system is objectively less developed.

These data indicate the presence of “mixed feelings” concerning the consequences — especially the financial consequences — of population ageing on the welfare state. There seems to be a general pessimism (probably realistic) in most countries about further expansion given demographic prospects, coupled with a certain readiness to make sacrifices regarding the generosity of benefits, but not regarding the pensionable age. The data also reveal a rather marked contrast between the North and the South of the Community.

3. The occupational challenges.

A second relevant transformation concerns the occupational structure of European societies. The slowdown of growth and the overall transition to a postindustrial labour market have significantly lessened in all member states the available pool of stable jobs charac-
terized by relative continuity — some sociologists call them “fordist jobs” —, giving rise to more unordered work trajectories involving high sectorial mobility, alternation between employment and unemployment (with possible experiences of long term unemployment), between “typical” and “a-typical” work trajectories etc. (3). Thus the social protection systems of the member states now find themselves in the position of adjusting their parameters to new social risks such as “life without much work” (to use the expression coined by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions) (4), or a-typical employment or even chronic unemployment.

Again we may wonder: how are European citizens reacting to these trends and problems? The main indications emerging from the Eurobarometer survey are:

— a widespread fear of unemployment at the mass level; especially among the young and in countries such as Greece, Spain, the UK and the Eastern part of Germany;
— a high dissatisfaction (especially, again, in the South, but also in the UK and Ireland) with respect to the adequacy of public protection against unemployment;
— a high demand for training programs and a relative openness to work mobility (especially territorial mobility);
— a clear demand for long, even if not very generous cash benefits. This is an interesting indication, which perhaps deserves a more detailed illustration. A question of the Eurobarometer proposed two different approaches to unemployment compensation (chart 2):

“it is better that the unemployed receive a higher amount but for a limited period, so that they are more inclined to look for work” or
“it is better that the unemployed receive a lower amount for a longer period, so that they are protected if they do not find another job quickly”.

As can be seen, at the EC aggregate level and in all countries except Portugal and Belgium the preference goes to lower, but longer benefits. People thus show a good awareness of the fact that current unemployment levels in the Community have structural and not only conjunctural roots and that the risk of unemployment is difficult to contrast at the individual level even if armed with good will. If we were to translate all these indications regarding unemployment in a summary policy recommendation we could say: the emerging demand

among EC citizens and workers is for basic, but if necessary long lasting cash support, coupled with quick and flexible active interventions to re-train and re-insert those out of job. A recommendation which is already being widely discussed in the ongoing debate on how to deal with unemployment at both the EC and national levels.

4. The problems of working women.

A third important transformation affecting the functioning of social protection in the Community is related to the increased participation of women to the labour market. As is well known, the traditional welfare state — especially on the European continent, inspired by the Bismarkian approach — was based on the assumption that most women were “inactive”, i.e. primarily involved in unpaid family work. This situation allowed a relatively smooth conciliation between “production”, “reproduction” and “social protection” based on the following package: paid male employment with direct social protection entitlements plus unpaid female family work with derived entitlements. Now, female participation rates have witnessed a significant increase in all member states during the last two decades. Female activity rates have come to surpass the 50% threshold in virtually all countries and in the majority of member states they are attested well above the 60% mark.

The increased female activity rates have started to strain the relationship between the professional and family sphere: not only because family work still tends to fall on women’s shoulders, especially in the Southern countries, but also because social protection regulations, geared as they are on the profile of male breadwinners, tend to penalize the typical pattern of female careers under the profile of social entitlement maturation. As we know, female workers are often compelled (or choose) to interrupt temporarily their career for family reasons — especially in those contexts where public services for the family are underdeveloped — and these interruptions have negative implications for their social protection career. Let us take career interruptions due to childcare responsibilities, possibly the most typical occurrence. As table 2 documents, career interruptions due to childcare may result in a considerable loss of pension in some countries. It must be noted that even where the table reports no loss in theory, e.g. in countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal or Italy, an actual loss is very likely to occur in practice, as labour market re-insertion may be difficult for not-so-young mothers, especially re-insertion in the so-called institutional labour market, covered by social insurance.

(3) For a detailed analysis of the transformations of European occupational structures, cf. the Commission’s reports on Employment in Europe, various years.
Table 2. — Career interruption due to childcare responsibilities and its impact on pensions.

Case definition: A female manual industrial full-time worker on average earnings, married to an average industrial wage earner in regular employment, who was in regular employment between 16 and 25, at home caring for two children between 26 and 33 and in regular employment from 36 to retirement age.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% of standard pension</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>89.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>101.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GR(i)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRL(i)</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>80.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NL</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: (i) most favourable; (ii) least favourable.

The prospect of losing income, losing pension entitlements, of not finding adequate support in terms of childcare services etc. undoubtedly exerts a negative effect on childbearing propensities and thus contributes to a worsening of demographic disequilibria.

The Eurobarometer survey reveals a great awareness of these problems (especially, as expected, among women) and a great demand for institutional reform. For example, as shown by chart 3, the vast majority of respondents agrees with the idea that pension entitlements should continue to increase if someone gives up work temporarily for family reasons, such as bringing up young children, taking care of a handicapped family or taking care of elderly members. Reforms in this direction are being discussed or have been recently introduced in some countries.
It is true that a change of institutional regulations aimed at removing penalties for career interruptions due to family care would imply higher financial burdens. But it is also true that the restoration of a systemic equilibrium between the professional and family spheres appears as a prerequisite for halting the worrying and costly decline of fertility and the ensuing process of population ageing.

5. The future of social protection.

The presence of similar challenges, similar pressures for readaptation and similar popular perceptions certainly constitute a potential stimulus for future "convergence" of the EC social protection systems. This potential should not however be overestimated. The objective, "structural" dissimilarities between the various countries remain wide. And the Eurobarometer data indicate in their turn that subjective, attitudinal dissimilarities are also quite noticeable. The best way to highlight these dissimilarities is to summarize the Eurobarometer's results regarding citizens' satisfaction vis-à-vis social protection and their preferences on the future of social protection.

Chart 4 reports the percentage of respondents that have declared themselves as fully satisfied or fully dissatisfied with respect to the social protection programmes of their respective countries. As may be seen, the discontent largely outnumbers the contents in most countries (from Greece to Denmark). In two countries, however (Luxembourg and the Netherlands) the opposite is true. It must be remembered that these are the two countries with the highest social expenditure per capita. What is really striking is the massive discontent in the four Southern countries, once again underlining the marked territorial divide in European social protection. Southern discontent is certainly associated with welfare underdevelopment, at least in Portugal, Spain and Greece. It is probably also associated, however, with inefficient and ineffective performance. Italy's experience for social protection is around the EC average, about the same as Great Britain. The huge dissatisfaction of the Italians thus probably stems from negative evaluations of the organizational aspects of welfare (rather than, limitatively, its quantitative size), as well as of its uneven and inequitable distribution.

Regarding the future of social protection, the picture is also variegated, but it displays a less clear territorial pattern. First we must say that the vast majority of EC citizens (92%) — with insignificant country variations — recognize that social security is a major achievement and certainly ought to be maintained. There are no signs of a legitimation crisis or of a generalized backlash against the European welfare state. However, above this common floor of basic approval, citizen's orientations appear as greatly diversified along national borders. The Eurobarometer presented a "minimalist" and a "maximalist" option for the future of social protection. As shown by chart 3, the maximalist option, in favour of a continuing broad protection, has received the greatest support. Each country displays however a specific balance between maximalists and minimalists. The Netherlands stands out, again, in a rather eccentric position of almost perfect balance between the two contrasting options. Perhaps too much satisfaction produces a certain ennui regarding welfare (following a sort of "law of declining marginal returns", as suggested by Inglehart) (5) and a wish for new "minimalist" departures. It is interesting to note that Luxembourg is this time located quite far from the Netherlands, whilst Italy is much closer to Northern than Southern inclinations. It is also interesting to note that the vast majority of British respondents — a majority which is second only to the Portuguese — support the maximalist/continuist approach, suggesting a possible mismatch between mass and elite orientations regarding welfare in this country.

More generally, these data attest to the fact that the various social protection systems are characterized by different popular moods, linked with past experiences, specific policy syndromes and the overall socio-political climate. Looking only at Portugal and Greece at one end and at Denmark and the Netherlands at the other end we could say that Southern populations clearly expect an upgrading of their social protection whilst rich Northerners seem ready for a downgrading. But this rather naïve conclusion is immediately disproved if we consider that Spain has many more minimalists than Luxembourg and Ireland more than Germany.

Country-specific moods and preferences will certainly condition future institutional adjustments and the overall process of EC wide convergence. Convergence is likely to be a more complicated journey than a simple matter of upgrading the South and downgrading the North.


Il secondo ordine di sfide deriva dalla crescente diversificazione delle preferenze dei cittadini riguardo al ruolo dello stato sociale e dalla rottura di quel vasto “consenso socialdemocratico” che ha accompagnato l’espansione del welfare sino alla metà degli anni ’70. La presenza di analoghe sfide “sistemiche” apre spazi per una maggiore convergenza fra i paesi europei nel terreno sociale. Questo potenziale di convergenza non deve tuttavia essere sovra-illuminato: le diverse eredità istituzionali e le diverse culture politiche costituiscono serri ostacoli ad una omologazione della protezione sociale comunitaria.
PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS IN ITALY:
THE CASE OF FEMINISM AND THE PCI

by MARIA ANTONIETTA CONFALONIERI

1. Introduction.

In an article of 1990 on Italian social movements and political parties in the 1960s and 1970s Sidney Tarrow (1) has argued that the set of relations between these actors in the Italian case has been complex and interpenetrating, and cannot be reduced to the opposition between "old politics" and "new politics". According to Tarrow, this oversimplification underestimates three prominent features of the Italian case: first, that a new generation of movements in Italy emerged from the realignments of the early and mid-1960s rather than from 1968 (2); second, that "rather than arising directly as a "new political paradigm out of the structural development of advanced capitalism, they first appeared as an insurgency within the party system — a heritage that they never fully transcended" (3); third, that Italian parties responded actively to the challenge of new movements. Particularly the Communist Party engaged itself in competition with them for support among the newly mobilized social actors and managed to gain both organizational and electoral strength at the end of the cycle of protest of the late Sixties and early Seventies. Understanding new social movements in Italy requires therefore a focus on the relations between movements and parties.

This article attempts a reconstruction of these relations with reference to Italian feminism: the new feminist movement shared with other new movements the context of its emergence, which can be described as a crisis of representativeness of the Italian established par-

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(2) Ibidem, p. 251.
(3) Ibidem.
ties, namely of the traditional Left; the organizations of the feminist movement have been carrying on continuous, although troubled, relations with the parties of the Left for some twenty years and influenced Italian political Left both at the ideological and at the organizational level in a far from negligible extent. Especially in the transition from the old Communist Party to the Democratic Party of the Left, feminist ideology and organizational practices have had a considerable impact on the new party. Though it may seem paradoxical — a familiar one for women’s studies — this role has received little attention in studies on the change of the Italian extreme Left (4).

The impact of the feminist movement on the Communist Party was largely mediated by the interaction which developed between the two types of feminism which co-existed in Italy in the Seventies. Analysing British and U.S. feminism Joyce Gelb (5) has proposed a distinction between two faces of feminism: a “young” and more radical branch — whose main features are emphasis on life-style change, provisions of alternative services, de-centralization, anti elitist values — and one operating within the traditional policy-making structure, participating in parties and unions which play a dominant role in the political system. Regarding the Italian case, the first face of feminism can be identified with neo-feminist organizations which emerged in the late Sixties — early Seventies along with other new social movements; the second face may be associated with U.D.I. (Union of Italian Women), the traditional female mass association of the Left, basically a projection of the Communist Party, and with the female membership of the parties of the traditional Left. For a number of reasons, pertaining both to political culture and to the structure of political opportunities, the “two faces” of feminism came considerably close to one another in Italy. The existence of a common political culture and of a common communication network of the Left and the mobilization for specific policy goals (abortion, laws against sexual abuse) favoured exchanges between the two segments of Italian feminism with a contamination of political identities and organizational ideologies and mutual cooptation of membership: the result was that the women organizations inside the traditional Left adopted the culture of new, radical feminism. In the crisis which led to the transition from PCI to PDS the communist feminists managed to renegotiate women’s role inside the party’s organization to a considerable extent, both at the symbolic level and at the level of access to positions of leadership and to establish feminism as a component of the new party’s complex identity. This paper proposes a schematic reconstruction of this process, from the Sixties to 1991.

2. Social Movements and their Organizations. Some preliminary definitions.

Until now, I have used the term social movement in a rather loose and general sense. Before turning to the case under consideration, it seems useful to introduce some concepts from the literature on social movements as analytic tools. Feminism, ecology, pacifism, are generally referred to as social movements. But the notion of “social movement” is generally vague. According to Zald and McCarthy, it can be defined as “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society” (6). Stated in these terms, it is clear that a social movement can hardly be considered as an unitary actor. Instead, when studying social movements, one finds a number of Social Movement Organizations or groups (SMO), linked in various ways to segments of the supporting constituencies, that compete for resources, coalesce for the pursuit of common goals or conflict bitterly with each other (7). The term “organization” should not be overstated: SMOs may exhibit coherent organizational structure and combine several local units; but SMOs may also be decentralized, segmented, reticulate, centreless and with a simple division of labor (8); the movement can be characterized by weak ties between the organizational core and the movement at large, with no well-defined membership but only activists. This has been the case for “new” feminism in most European countries, including Italy; when I refer to Italian “new” feminism I mean SMOs which generally are of the second “informal” kind and a movement which presented a loose structure and ill-defined borders.

Another point evidenced by the literature on social movements is that a social movement generally exists in the context of other move-

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(7) Ibidem

ments, as was clearly the case of those of the Sixties and Seventies (9). A number of concepts have been proposed to account for these webs of relations. Garner and Zald introduced the notion of Social Movement Sector (SMS), referring to the structure of competing and/or co-operating movements (10), further re-elaborated by Tarrow as "the configuration of individuals and groups willing to engage in disruptive directive action against others to achieve collective goals, and which includes the formal SMOs, but also sporadic participants and even ordinary interest groups when they engage in tactics of disruptive action, and can move in and out the SMS" (11). The notion of SMS is particularly useful for the Italian case, which was strongly characterized by both the emergence of a plurality of related movements and the participation of institutional political actors or pressure groups (such as the PCI and its flanking organizations, the trade-unions) to collective action.

Literature on social movements, particularly the "Resource Mobilization Approach" treats the social movement organizations as strategic actors, whose emergence, forms of actions and outcomes are influenced by the set of constraints and opportunities provided by the political environment. The concept of "structure of political opportunities", first proposed by Eisinger (12) and further developed in more elaborate models by other scholars (13), encompasses the set of political variables which provide the relevant political context for social movement politics. Although, as noted by Tarrow, "we have no theory of the structure of political opportunities of participants in collective action" (14), studies on social movements give a number of accounts of the features of the political context which help explaining their rise, life-cycle and the prospects for the attainment of their goals. Tilly (15) stresses on potential access to the polity, through the formation of coaltions between the polity members and the challenging actors, which decrease the risk of repression and enhance the prospect of success. Divisions in the polity, regime crises, or, in liberal democracies, broad electoral shifts or changing government coalitions produce shifts in the opportunities for a social movement (16). Piven and Cloward identify the pre-conditions for the rise and success of social movements in the following: divisions in the ruling elite; potential legitimation of the goals of the social movement by sectors of the elite; actual or potential changes at the electoral level which can produce a shift in the balance of power from one party to another (17). Divisions inside the elite and its toleration for protest were spelled out as facilitating conditions for protest movements also in Jenkins and Perrrow study of farm workers movements (18).

The concept of political opportunity structure can help understanding the difference among national versions of similar social movements: for feminism, Joyce Gelb, in her comparative analysis of women's movements in Britain, the United States and Sweden (19) suggests that the respective political opportunity structures (identified with institutions, political alignments and political ideology) have patterned the development, goals and values of feminist activists in each country, which, although sharing many objectives, differ significantly in their style of political activism, leadership orientation and organizational values. While the pluralist nature of the policy-making process in the United States produced a type of "interest group feminism", focused on equal rights and the creation of lobbying groups, in Britain the dominance of the executive and the declining role of Parliament and the exclusive nature of policy-making, with access granted to a limited number of key economic groups, forced British feminism out of the system, fostering rigid ideological orthodoxy, organizational fragmentation and sectarian politics (20).

5. The political context of the emergence of social movements in Italy.

Research on social movements in Italy has spelled out some relevant features of the political context. First, the centre-left coalitions...
enhanced the prospects for access to the polity and stimulated collective action. The entry of Socialists in government coalitions since the early Sixties prospected a wider tolerance for protest action, since the Socialists were unwilling to become identified with repression (21); further, it placed new issues in the political agenda — regarding the country’s civic modernization, social reforms, and economic planning — which could not be solved given the internal divisions of the coalition, thus attracting new actors in the political debate. Under this respect, the notable backwardness of the legislation on issues concerning civil rights (divorce, equality of the sexes in criminal and civil law, rape and sexual violence etc.) in Italy as compared with other Western democracies allowed the mobilization of ampler coalitions of political and social actors, which reached far beyond the constituencies of new social movements.

Second, the implementation of the constitutional provision for regional autonomy in 1970, as a result of the depolarization of the party system and of Socialist participation to the government, multiplied the opportunities of access to policy-making. Although regional lawmaking in Italy is limited by the Constitution, by national laws and by the lack of financial autonomy, regions may legislate in a number of important matters, including welfare, health services, environment, urban planning. Regional and local government became an important target for social movements, allowing the mobilization of policy clienteles: the fact that local government came under control of the Left in many areas of the country, particularly after the administrative elections of the mid-Seventies, enhanced their opportunities for access.

The legislation that enabled implementing the constitutional provisions for referenda (which in Italy can be called only to abrogate existing laws) offered further opportunities in the Seventies to force issues in the political agenda, and to build coalition between old and new political actors. The same is true for the constitutional provision for popular proposals of law, which can be presented to parliament when subscribed by 50,000 voters.

The key feature of the Italian party system when compared with those of other Western European countries was the strength of the Italian Communist Party. PCI was the second largest party and scored in 1963 25% of the vote. The Centre-left coalitions, intended by the DC to strengthen the exclusion of Communists from political power, encouraged PCI’s aggressive opposition and politics of overbidding, in order to profit from the coalition’s difficulties: this strategy produced some electoral increases the Sixties, mainly at the Socialists’ expense,

but didn’t help the party to overcome political insulation. Despite electoral success, the party’s organizational strength declined throughout the Sixties, although remaining quite considerable: the party membership dropped to 1,500,000 in 1968, with the loss of some 300,000 members since 1960; moreover the composition of the party’s membership denounced the party’s difficulties in generational turn-over — as is shown by the increasing incidence of pensioners — and its incapacity of recruiting outside the traditional working class: manual workers amounted to 40% of the party’s membership against a mere 2.3% of clerical workers and 6.4% of artisans and shopkeepers (22).

If political stalemate and organizational crisis explain the Communists’ attention for the challenge of new movements, their reactions were legitimated by the party’s strategy aimed to expand its support among the middle classes in order to build broad social alliances. In short, in the party’s line, the goal of socialism through the democratic conquest of power could be realized through the construction of an ample political and social front: the role assigned to the party was one of “hegemony”, i.e. political and ideological direction of this front. The party’s line, together with political and organizational stalemate, explains why the PCI was more open to new social movements than the French Communist Party and why ultimately party structures and flanking organizations became involved in the social movement sector on a number of issues; yet the goal of hegemony produced unavoidable conflicts between PCI and the organizations of social movements, which claimed autonomy in the definition of political identities and in goal articulation.

4. “Old feminism”: PCI and the UDI.

The UDI originated from the Groups for the Defence of Women and for Aid to the Volunteers for Liberty, created in 1943 to support the struggle against Nazi-fascism, which recruited some 70,000 female members from the whole anti-Fascist front, and was originally formulated for the mobilization of all democratic women. But after the withdrawal of Christian Democratic women, who in 1945 formed the CIF (Centro Italiano Femminile) UDI quickly evolved into a flanking organization of the PCI (23). Strongly supported by Togliatti, the UDI was designed as an instrument for realizing the party’s hegemony, and assigned the role “to educate non communists and attract them into the


(22) See Peter Lange, Il PCI e i possibili esiti della crisi italiana, in Luigi Graziano e Sidney Tarrow (a cura di), La crisi italiana, Torino, Einaudi, 1979, pp. 667-668.

sphere of influence of PCI” (24). Despite its asserted autonomy from the party, UDI depended on the PCI for funds and other organizational resources, recruited overwhelmingly among Communist women, and its leaders mainly came from the party. Its membership, which peaked to 1,000,000 in 1950, lagged behind the PCI’s female membership and was strongly concentrated in the regions of the “red belt”, which indicates that it was missing its task of recruiting outside the red subculture. Although in the Fifties and Sixties the UDI’s role was one of the party’s “transmission belt”, the question of autonomy remained an unresolved component of the UDI’s identity, which helps to explain why it reacted more promptly and positively than the PCI to the challenge of new feminism.

Regarding the Communist Party, although Togliatti had placed the women’s question at the top of the party’s political agenda, PCI did not do much to promote the role of women inside the party. The proportion of women among the party’s representatives in Parliament had dropped from 11% in 1948 to 5.7% in 1968: as to the party’s organization during the Fifties and Sixties the percentage of women in Central Committee was under 7% while women representation in the Directorate remained negligible or non-existent. Even at the provincial level women were only 10% of the members of the federal committees (25). The Commissioni femminili (Women’s committees), the women structures of PCI at the local and central level, had an uncertain status: it was unclear whether their role was to take up only women’s issues or to serve as the structure for women to be socialized and debate the issues of concern to the party (26). Despite the party’s rhetoric and the institutionalization of structures for women, women’s politics did not enjoy much prestige inside the party, and women who were assigned offices in the Commissioni femminili or UDI tended to regard them as second rate as compared to involvement in general politics and as a sort of “ghettoization”.

The silence the PCI accorded to the women’s question (“questione femminile”) reflected the experience of fascism and the consciousness of the role of women for the consolidation of democracy: the party’s line had shifted from the “workism” of pre-war Socialism to full recognition of the role of women in the family. The party therefore stressed equality of rights for women and men and on the recognition of the “social value of motherhood”, which required specific protective legislation for working women, but did not go as far as questioning the division of work of care, or identifying in the family the main locus of the oppression of women. Moreover, as has been noted (27), the mobilization of the female masses was largely instrumental to the goal of maintaining high levels of mass political mobilization (the “piazza” politics): women were to participate in the general mobilization, no matter what the issue, whether or not women’s specific problems were touched: connections between the latter and the issue at stake were often found ex-post (the pacifist “nature” of women and so on.). The PCI stance on the women question therefore legitimized women issues, but was to become an easy target for the feminist critique of ignoring the “specificity” of women’s oppression and for vindication of autonomy of women in politics.

5. “New” feminism.

A feature of Italian post-war political development has been the supremacy of “political society” over “civil society”, that to say the dominance of political parties in articulation of political demands. Political participation was channeled through either political subculture, the network of organization (trade-unions, farmers leagues, women’s unions etc.) established or controlled by the Communist Party or Christian Democracy. The process of modernization and secularisation of the late Fifties and Sixties, which generated new demands and diffuse political resources, and the changes in the political context, set the preconditions for a crisis of representativeness of the parties which culminated in a “cycle of protest” considerably longer than in other Western Democracies (28). This cycle of protest was anticipated in the mid-Sixties by the formation of splinter parties (the PSIU, from the Left-wing of the Socialist Party in 1960), dissenting currents inside the Communist Party and a number of nonconformist reviews which challenged the strategy of the Old Left. The first group of Italian neo-feminism, DEMAU (De-mistification Patriarchal Authoritarianism), formed in Milan in 1966 as a small group of young female intellectuals committed to ideological critique, emerged in this context (29). In 1967 this group committed itself to overt confrontation with the U.D.I.

(24) Judith Herrmann, cit., p. 36.
(26) Judith Herrmann, cit., p. 36.
(28) For the notion of “cycle of protest” and the case of Italy see Sidney Tarrow, National... cit., p. 432 and Ix, Proteste e riforme istituzionali in Italia: movimenti, even- ti e cib politici, in Alberto Melucci (ed.), Movimenti sociali e attimi politici, in Quaderni della Fondazione Feltrinelli /32, Milano, Angeli, 1986, pp. 59-95.
(29) See Anna Rita Calabro, Laura Grassi, I gruppi si raccontano, in Anna Ri-
on the issue of women's social security (the "Bosco Bill" a law concerning maternity leave), labelling as paternalistic the Communists' approach of "tutelage" to the problems of the working women.

"New feminism" as a social movement developed alongside with other new collective movements in the early Seventies. Its organizational units consisted in small groups of female militants inside the students movement and in particular inside the political organizations of the New Left which formed and tried to institutionalize after the peak of student protest in 1968-69. The membership of the "feminist collectives" consisted mainly of young women who had acquired political competence through higher education and participation in student protest. In Yasmin Erbas' convincing account of the origins of new Italian feminism (30) the "motive for" women's protest was the role conflict in the condition of the young women "in such a way that their expectation and behaviour were polarized between emancipation... and family centered feminine models" (31), a role conflict which reached its peak in the university context. While involvement in the student movements provided them with political resources hitherto unavailable (political skills, participation to the associational network of the New Left and some access to its organizational resources), the process of precocious evolution of the movement in a set of organized, often ferociously sectarian micro-parties (32), quickly reproduced the traditional sexual division of political work and female subalternity (33).

The recruitment in the organizations of feminism was of "block type", with groups of women inside single organizations of the New Left forming collectives at the local level: the resulting structure was thus "segmented and polychephal" (34), allowing for significant local variations in culture and type of activity; coordination would be produced through the movement's press and the national meetings and conventions (the first held only in 1973): boards at the central level emerged only in 1974, in connection with the campaign for abortion.

The formation of feminist collectives was stimulated by the diffusion through the network of the New Left of the ideas of the American

Women's Lib (35) but these ideas were re-interpreted or adjusted in terms of the political culture which permeated the political organizations from which feminism recruited. Debates in the press of the new Left show criticism of the limits of Anglo-saxon feminism in its emphasis on sexuality and reproduction; Italian feminism, instead, tried to make Marxism and feminism compatible through focusing rather on women's oppression inside the family and on the family function under capitalism, in the frame or reference of Marx and Engels: feminist theorization was intended as a complement rather than a falsification of Marxism. As it has been noted, in an early phase Italian feminists spoke in terms of "the great Marxist metaphor" (36) where the role of emancipation of the humankind was attributed to the female gender rather than to the working class.

When neo-feminism tried to preserve compatibility with Marxism at the ideological level, its organizational practices were quite heterodox. A movement oriented to the formation of a new collective identity (37), feminism developed organizational forms characterized by rejection of hierarchization, flexible membership, emphasis on interpersonal relations, expressivity, which were hardly compatible with the Leninist model of the party as a revolutionary vanguard which inspired the political organizations of the New Left. Claims to autonomous organization of women were indeed advanced by feminist groups in the new Left as soon as 1973 (38).

In 1973-74 feminism rapidly grew into a web of autonomous organizations connected in a close associative network by a common culture transmitted by a booming press (39), a culture which was less and less tributary to Marxism. Although one could hardly speak of an ideology of new Italian feminism, due to the diversity of the organizations which composed it, feminism developed a distinctive political culture, which borrowed from Anglo-saxon and, more definitively, from French feminism (particular influence became the theorization of the French group Psychanalyse et politique and its essentialist notion of gender); its core value was gender difference, with emphasis on the specificity of women's culture and on the priority of gender conflict

(39) EJFE, the most read among feminist reviews, was founded in 1971 and reached a circulation of around 50,000 copies.
over class conflict. Regarding feminists' orientation to politics, focus on gender difference justified organization into separate groups, priority to women's issues and an offensive stance against the political system of male dominance (40) and the forms of male-dominated politics, such as authority and hierarchy, the principle of representation and the role of ideology in interest aggregation. Most groups carried on activities aimed to personal liberation through self-awareness and the development of a privileged set of relations among women, and refused, as a question of principle, to orient their action according to the priorities set in the political agenda of the groups of the New Left. However, and despite of significant local variations, sectarian feminist ideologies and practices never fully prevailed in Italian feminism. Research on feminist groups in Italy shows rather that the debate inside the organizations was dominated by a fundamental conflict over the "practice of feminism": this conflict opposed the women who supported the thesis that the groups should devote themselves exclusively to activities of consciousness raising and cultural critique, to the women who pushed for engagement in activities of protest and pressure to win legislation for women (41). Although the first position was maintained by some of the most prestigious groups of the movement, the militant background of most feminists led the majority of groups to active participation, once issues such as divorce and abortion became a part of the political agenda. The need for sustained political action in nationwide campaigns to gain legislation exposed all the weaknesses of the feminist rejection of conventional organizational models and the need for some stronger coordination: "the non-institutional, non-organizational feminists began to feel the attraction of alliance with groups with a more structured, conventionally political nature" (42).

6. Women's politics and the Left: the campaign for abortion.

In coincidence with the campaign for abortion in 1975-1976 a crisis broke out in the relationships of neo-feminism with the new parties of the Left and of the more traditional feminism of the U.D.I. with the Communist party. In 1973 the MLD (Movement for Women's Lib-

(40) Heldan defines this type of women's orientation to politics as "oppositionist", contrasting with the "party woman" orientation which combines active engagement in recruiting and supporting other women with acceptance of the norms of the political system. See GOM HELDAN, Women's Interest in Local Politics, in KATH LEES B. JENKTS, ANNA O. JOMANSTOTT (eds.), The Political Interest of Gender, London, Sage, 1988, pp. 83-87.

(41) See HELLMANN, Women..., cit., p. 69.

(42) J. HELLMANN, cit., p. 99.

(43) On the abortion campaign see YASMINI ERGAS, Feminism..., cit.

PCI’s leadership in its official discourse always paid tribute to the female masses (masse femminili) rather than to the feminist movement (movimento femminista) (45). The position of the PCI on feminism, as expressed in the VI Conference of Communist Women in February 1976, considered it the symptom of the contradictions of the process of modernization and a positive mobilizing force for promoting political participation of women; but at the same time the feminists’ allegedly narrow focusing on issues of sexuality and motherhood was criticized as contrasting with the goal of emancipation, and the feminist movements was stigmatized as an eminently middle-class phenomenon, basically estranged from the culture and needs of working-class women, who should take the lead of the struggle for emancipation (46).

The re-assertion of the communist orthodoxy on gender contrasted with the “unorthodox” positions the UDI was elaborating. Although expressing dissent with neo-feminism on a number of questions, UDI from its conference of 1975 onwards outwardly criticized the party’s stance on the issue of abortion and the party’s proposals for legislation, which accorded the ultimate power of decision on abortion to doctors; in the conflict between PCI and new feminism on this question, the UDI rallied with new feminism for woman’s self-determination, and in 1975-77 its militants marched with neo-feminists in demonstrations that excluded men from supporting parties; in the campaign for the elections of 1976 UDI and neo-feminists called together for “a vote for the Left”, without indication of which party (47).

7. Communist women between party and movement.

Two factors explain the change in relations between new feminism and PCI in the late Seventies. The first is that the inclusion of women’s issues in the political agenda exposed the cultural and organizational weakness of new feminism, when confronted with institutional politics. The debate of proposals of legislation for abortion; the problems concerning the implementation of the law approved in 1978; the elaboration of a popular proposal of law on sexual violence to be presented to Parliament; participation in the institutions of participatory democracy introduced in the late Seventies (particularly the conselte femminili, at the regional and municipal level, consulting bodies

which privileged institutionalized organizations): all these issues produced strong conflicts among feminist organizations, which had to face the trade-off between political influence and maintaining a non-negotiable political identity. Feminist political culture refused the very principle of representation by one woman of the opinions and demands of other women, and some feminist groups went so far as theorizing that women’s freedom of choice couldn’t be promoted by any form of legislation whatsoever: in short, the organizations of neo-feminism could not easily adapt to pressure politics and lobbying activities.

The second factor is the new position of the PCI in the political system: the spectacular electoral growth in the local elections of 1973 and in national elections of 1976, led to conquest of many local governments and to enter the parliamentary coalitions which supported the cabinets between 1976 and 1979: now the PCI claimed legitimate representation of new social movements and intended to mediate their demands in the policy-making arena. In the transition from protest to reform, while the feminist collectives faced difficulties in recruiting and increasingly directed themselves towards “life-style” politics (48), the lead in the articulation of women’s questions passed to the organizations of “old feminism” and to the major party of the Left. In this aspect, feminism shared the fate of other social movements, with “old” political actors reaffirming their primacy once the wave of mobilization declined. But this is only one side of the story: the other regards the penetration of neo-feminist values and organizational practices in the Communist Party (49).

Two phenomena originated it: the first was the recruitment of PCI from the social movements as the cycle of protest inaugurated in the late Sixties declined; the second was the increasing assimilation by UDI, and, to a lesser extent by the PCI’s commissioni femminili, of feminist thought and practice.

After the organizational stagnation of the Sixties, the PCI membership in the Seventies grew noticeably and peaked to 1,814,000 in 1976. Due to membership and electoral growth, the party had to recruit new functionaries and party leaders, thus experimenting a significant generational turn-over. The CESPE research conducted at the time of the XV Congress of the party, in Spring 1979, found that 2/3 of the party apparatus had been recruited after 1970, and that up to 50% of these young functionaries had previously militated in the new social movements: as noted by Sebastiani, high scholarship and participation in movements replaced in part the role of party schools as

(45) Karen Beckwith, Feminism and Leftist Politics in Italy: the Case of UDI-PCI Relations, in “West European Politics”, vol. VIII, 1985, n. 4, p. 27.
(47) See Yasmin Ercoles, Tra sesso..., cit., and...
(48) See Yasmin Ercoles, Feminismo..., cit.
(49) With reference to movements in general this process is emphasized by Tarrow, The Phantom..., cit.
the key formative experience of the new party apparatus (50). Generational turn-over regarded the dirigenti (leaders) too; most of the members of federal (provincial) and regional committees had entered the party after 1969; 29% of the dirigenti and 22.5% of militiants had experienced participation in new social movements and among women the 6.3% of dirigenti and 7.4% of militiants came from feminism (51). The PCI had therefore managed to overcome organizational stalemate by offering movements militants opportunities for political activism once the cycle of protest declined, thus importing new political cultures into the party.

The second source of influence was the participation of female militants of the Communist Party or the UDI (which largely overlapped) to the various activities of the women’s movements. The attitude of the UDI towards the feminist movement in the Seventies has been described by Judith Hellmann (52) as one of “being present in every phase and type of activity that unfolded among women” in two ways: acting as the leading organization in activities oriented towards specific policy goals (abortion, women’s clinics, legislation against sexual violence) and getting involved in the wide range of activities which characterized new feminism, thus “providing a clearing-house and a base of moral and possibly organizational support to every type of autonomous women’s initiatives” (33). This was much in line with the role assigned to flanking organization: but the result was that “old feminism” was profoundly influenced by neo-feminism.

The process is one which has been described in the sociology of organizations: the organizational actors which deal with relevant sectors of an organization’s environment, in order to gain legitimation, information and resources, tend to identify with the values of the environment and ultimately adopt its culture and constitute themselves as subcultures internal to the main organization (54). The position of these actors, that Crozier (55) identifies as relais of the organization within the environment, tends to be dilemmatic: as speakers of the organization in the environment and at the same time representatives of the environment in the organization, they are assigned a contradictory, although crucial, role. Old feminists found themselves participating in two very different political cultures, since the neo-feminists rejection of institutional party politics represented a radical challenge to the model of women’s mass organizations of the traditional Left. The strain generated by this role — thematized as the issue of “double militancy” — is documented by the interviews collected in the late Seventies by Valentini and Lilli (56) with UDI members and “responsabili femminili” (heads of commissione femminili): for instance, the Communist female responsible for women in Veneto complains that feminists in the party had to submit to “the party’s organization merciless rules” (57) while feminists outside the party were free to go their own ways and maintains that the commission femminili should evolve into “a sort of authorized party fraction, the only authorized party fraction in the party” (58). Communist women’s participation to the feminist movement produced thus demands for change which were far from moderate, considering that the XV Congress of the party in 1979 had reasserted the principle of democratic centralism.

A breakdown with the role of “flanking organizations” came from the Congress of UDI in 1982. The resolution of the Congress lamented a loss of representativeness of the women by the organization, and put the blame on the failures of PCI in relating with new social movements; but more important than formulating a feeling that was becoming widespread in the party in a very explicit form, was the decision to break with the model of “external legitimation” of the UDI by the party (59) both at the ideological and at the organizational level: funding the party at the national level was rejected, to be substituted through self financing by means of decentralized fund-raising by the local units of the organization; the UDI’s functionaries were to be dismissed; it was also proposed to change the name of the organization from UDI to UD: the deletion of the reference to Italy was meant as a symbolic break with the strategy of broad social alliances led by the party of the working class as theorized by Togliatti, which included women and their organization in a subordinate position. The new features of the UDI, as proposed in the Congress and later defined in the Carta di Intenti approved in 1983, designed quite a new form of organization: the structure was territorially diffuse in units

(52) Judith Hellmann, Journeys..., cit., p. 215.
(53) Ibidem, p. 216.
(57) See interview with Denis Frigato, in Chiara Valentini, Laura Lilli, cit., p. 101.
(58) Ibidem, p. 100.
which were both locally and issue-specifically oriented; those units were to include both members and non-members, overlapping with the multitude of groups carrying on activities of cultural production, service or issue promotion which constituted feminism; a General Assembly at the national level was to be the only legitimate board to elaborate the organization’s line, while coordination among the units was to be provided by a “service centre” at the national level; communication was to be assured only by the organization’s journal “Noi donne”.

The official position of the Communist Party refused to recognize the challenge posed by the evolution of UDI: in the speech he gave at the VII Conference of Communist Women in 1983, Enrico Berlinguer complained about what he labelled the “dissolution” of the old mass organizations of women; yet from the conference onwards the demands of Communist women for greater autonomy inside the party grew, and the role of the “commissioni femminili” role started changing: from one of elaboration of the party’s policy for women into one of focus for the articulation of women’s identity and interests inside the party (60): the idea that women’s loyalties should be primarily directed towards other women (la “relazione tra donne”, the relation among women, as it was defined by party’s feminists), an idea borrowed from neo-feminism, increasingly became the key of women’s politics inside the party. In brief, the orientation of Communist women to the party evolved from acceptance of party organization and culture to one of increasingly conflictual integration.

8. The crisis of PCI and the formation of a feminist faction.

The impact of feminist politics on the party, which was to become visible after 1986, was facilitated in the early Eighties by the mounting crisis of identity of the party. The reasons for it were in the stalemate in the process of ideological revision after the choice of eurocommunism and in the loosening of democratic centralism, which made divisions and critique less latent (61). The crisis of PCI became apparent in 1985, after the defeat in the referendum of 1985 called on the law which reduced the protection of wages from inflation and the poor performance in local elections of 1985. Failure at the electoral level aroused strong debate inside the party regarding the adequacy of its strategy of representation, the value of the Marxist framework in understanding political change and the effectiveness of party organization. The need for greater attention to new movements and post-materialist values was one of the issues of the debate, gaining feminism the potential of legitimation in the party it lacked in the Seventies.

The XVII Congress, called in April 1986, produced only moderate innovation: the value of dissent and of the right to dissent while maintaining roles of leadership in the party were recognized; the party acknowledged the role of new social movements for political change; an explicit option for Socialdemocracy (62) was expressed. Yet there was neither a break with the past nor a significant turnover in the party’s leadership. With reference to the positions of women in the party, the Congress acknowledged the need for stronger representation of women in the party leadership, establishing a minimum 25% threshold for women in the executive bodies (63).

The mobilization of women inside the party would soon produce further changes. In November 1986 the “Committee on Women’s Emancipation and Liberation” of the Central Committee of the Party approved the “Chart of Women”, a programmatic text which was to become the orthodoxy of women in the PCI and whose implications for the communist organization and identity were rather radical, particularly when compared with the careful avoidance of discontinuities of the resolutions of the Congress. The Chart of Women, which was discussed and elaborated by women at all levels of the party, theorized the autonomous organization of women inside the party on the basis of the priority of the identification in terms of gender, and the establishment of a privileged network of exchange among women. They were therefore expected to adopt a specific gender perspective, and to give priority to the representation of women’s interests and to the articulation of women’s views and to actively support and recruit other women. This strategy was defined as one of bringing the contradiction of gender inside the political institutions in order to change them (64).

Its theoretical justification was borrowed from feminist theorizations concerning the “politics of gender difference”, a body of rather eclectic political thought that nevertheless shared estrangement from Marxism. Yet the strategy implicit in the Chart of Women was less radical than its political rhetoric: the emphasis on achieving equality between genders in terms of access to decisional arenas (both in Parliament and in...

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(60) See Grazia Zoppa, cit., p. 47.
(61) Piero Ignazi, Dal PCI..., cit., p. 51.
tried to associate them to the reforming coalition. Livia Turco, who led the “feminist march” inside the party, was the only leader who kept a post since 1986 in the party's Secretariat, whose members changed completely between 1986 and 1989.

The inclusion of feminists in the coalition which led the process for reform granted them both symbolic rewards and power benefits. The Document prepared for the XVIII Congress, convoked for March 1989, explicitly admitted “the sense and value of sexual difference” (67) and declared as fundamental aims of the party “to overcome the sexual division of labor and to achieve a new balance in the sexes' representation in institutions” (68). The incoming Congress was envisaged as “an opportunity for... taking a great step forward towards an equal presence of men and women in the governing bodies of the party” (69); in this connection, the procedures for the XVIII Congress (70) reserved to women a minimum of 1/3 of posts in the party's directive bodies at the provincial level (federal committees) and at the central level (central committees) (71) plus a quota in the federal delegations to the Congress at least proportional to the number of women in each federation. This result was to be attained by means of an electoral system based on double lists, one for women and one for men. The provisions of quotas for women's representation in the directive bodies, beside responding to claims advanced in the Charter of Women, was further legitimated by the establishment of quotas for women in the statutes of Socialist parties across Western Europe, in particular by the SPD, which was held as a model by the party's leadership and cadres (72).

The XVIII Congress held in Rome in March 1989 ratified these successes of women: they were granted a 30% quota, but a 50% one was envisaged for the near future; as a result of the new regulations,


(68) Ibidem.

(69) Ibidem.


(71) Although with the restriction that “the quota should not be applied mechanically, but bearing in mind specific conditions in the area”.

(72) A survey of CESPE on attitudes of the delegates at the XVII Congress of the party, in March 1986, showed that the SPD was the party mostly referred to as the model for the PCI. See STREINZ GERHARD, Surveying Italian Communism: The Ideals and Aspirations of Delegates to the Seventeenth PCI Congress, in “The Journal of Communist Studies”, III, 1987, pp. 195-199. The SPD voted to incorporate women's quotas for all party's offices in the party's statute at its Münster Congress in 1988: it was established that by 1994 women should hold no less than 40% of party's offices, and that by 1998 this quota should be applied to candidate lists and parliamentary representation. Eva Kohlskij, Party Change and Women's Representation in Unified Germany, in KONNEXUS, Pippa Norris, cit., p. 130.


66) MARIA GIAMMARRA, cit., pp. 190-191.
the number of women in the Central Committee (enlarged from 215 to 300 members) passed from 40 to 93, the 52% (see table 1). Women’s achievements at the symbolic level were even greater: the Preamble to the new statute of the party, defined PCI “a party of women and men”, a formula which was intended as explicitly incorporating gender difference in the party’s reformed identity (73). Moreover, “the affirmation and valorization of sexual difference” was included along with “solidarity, liberty, justice, ... rejection of violence and the safeguarding of nature and the environment” among the inspiring values of the PCI (74).

| TABLE 1. — Women’s representation in the Communist Party Central Committee (1986-1990). |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| XVII Congress 1986             | XVIII Congress 1989 | XIX Congress 1990 |
| n. | 40 | 93 | 133 |
| %  | 18 | 32 | 38 |
| Total | 215 | 300 | 353 |

9. From PCI to PDS.

The events which followed the XVIII Congress are well known (75): the breakdown of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which contrasted with the graduality of the PCI in making a break with its name and traditions, precipitated the party’s transition: on November 12th, a few days after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Occhetto at a gathering of veteran partisans in Bologna, declared the proposal for dissolution of the PCI and for opening a “constituent phase” which would lead to the formation of a new party of the Italian democratic Left. Occhetto’s proposal was ratified by the party’s Direzione (Executive Committee) but met fierce opposition at the Central Committee by the Left and by some older leaders of the Centre (Pajetta, Tortorella, Natta), who had previously endorsed the Secretary’s effort towards reform; it was finally approved by approximately e two thirds of CC members. An extraordinary Congress was summoned for early

1990 in Bologna; the regulations for the Congress provided competing motions to be submitted to it and granted each motion a representation among the delegates proportional to the support obtained at the Congresses of the federations.

In the months which preceded the XIX Congress (March 1990, Bologna) and the foundation of the PDS at the XX Congress (Rimini, March 1991) women showed remarkable political activism and tried to play a leading role in the transition. The XIX Congress, where Occhetto’s proposals were subscribed by two thirds of the party’s delegates, confirmed the legitimisation of feminism: all three motions presented — the first of the supporters of Occhetto’s proposals, the second by Ingrassia’s Left and the third by the nostalgic communists of Cosetta — paid tribute to women’s politics; the Secretary’s motion in particular recognized in feminism a crucial component of the identity of the new party: the rejection of any “temptation to hegemony” (76) was phrased through the reference to the notion of “partiality” (“we too want to recognize ourselves as a partiality” (77)), a notion dear to the political discourse of gender difference. The representation of women in the Central Committee grew to 38% and a second woman, Giulia Rodano, entered the Secretariat. The strategy of inclusion of women in the founding coalition of the new party at the Rimini Congress of March 1991 consolidated the success of the transitional phase. Women were 34% of the delegates and the majority of them supported the creation of the PDS (78). The identity of the new party as emerged in the XX Congress (the first of PDS) fully assumes what the PCI had borrowed from feminism since 1988, beginning with the first lines of the statute defining PDS “a party of women and men”. Besides re-affirming the quotas for representation of women in directive boards at all levels, moreover, the statute granted women full autonomy of organization and recognized women’s demands that such gender structures could include non-members and establish independent links with the variety of women’s associations and interest groups in the civil society.

Yet the transition from PCI to PDS was not without a price for feminism in the party. The turbulent debate inaugurated by Occhetto’s declarations in November 1989 brought out bitter, unprecedented divisions among women, who were not able to avoid splitting along the motions’ lines, compromising the solidarity which had been a major source of incentives for the women faction. During the months be-

(74) Ibidem.
(75) For analyses of this phase see in particular: Piero Ignazi, op. cit.; Martin J. Boli and Philip Daniels, op. cit.; G. Grant Aymot, op. cit.
(76) Motion no. 1: Starting the constituent phase of a new political formation, in “The Italian Communists”, n. 1, 1990, p. 135.
(77) Ibidem.
(78) See Maria Giudagni, op. cit., p. 177.
tween the XIX and the XX Congress the women of the two motions held separate meetings and at the XX Congress two women's documents were presented: The Women's Charter for the Democratic Party of the Left, signed by 162 adherents to the majority for founding the PDS, and The Politics of Liberty, by the group "The Freedom is in our Hands Alone" formed by 20 feminists of the internal Left (79). Both documents referred to "the politics of gender difference". The first was intended as a contribution from a feminist point of view to the new party's identity and program; the second claimed that feminism might never be harboured in a party such as PDS and that any effort towards integration would lead to the depletion of the movement's ideals. In particular two points were stressed in The Politics of Liberty: the alleged, unacceptable reduction of the notion of "partiality" to a synonym for "pluralist" or "programmatic" (rather than as referring to an un-resolvable polarity) and the adoption by the PDS of the rule of majority as the key decision rule, a practice extraneous to feminist groups.

If feminism experimented internal division, its influence in the new party was far from being uncontroversial. The ambiguities in the politics of gender difference were accused to enhance the unresolved eclecticism in the new party's identity: the most fundamental question regards the contradiction between the critique of the idea of the asserted "falsely universalized" notion of citizenship (80) (put forward by feminists also in the documents favourable to the foundations of PDS (81)) and the party's subscription to liberal-democracy since the rupture with the Marxist tradition. The debate peaked in early 1991 when a very controversial article by Miriam Mafai, one of party's leading intellectuals, titled "Lenin's widows or the drift of feminism", disputed the feminist rejection of the notion of "neutral" citizenship and accused feminism of being a new form of dogmatic extremism inside the yet-unborn new party, concluding that after having refused to swear on Lenin she was not going now to swear on the thesis of the French feminist psychoanalyst Luce Irigaray (82).

In fact, quite a few symptoms indicate that, after contributing to

(79) For the text of the two documents see "The Italian Communists", 1991, n. 2, pp. 100-125. For the debate on the women's motions for the XX Congress see the articles in Il congreso delle donne, in "Reit", n. 6, 1990, pp. 53-74.


(81) In the Women's Charter for the PDS it was asserted the incompatibility of feminist thought with "the idea of insuperability of neutral equality, which makes the sexual difference slip to mere corpative interest". Women's Charter..., cit., p. 106.


the foundation of the new party, women's politics entered a phase of stalemate after the Rimini Conference. Lack of cohesion made women unprepared to face the increasing competition for posts due to the institutionalization of party factions: the option for proportional representation of factions in the party's lists thus led to a decrease from 29 to 26.8% of the percentage of women among the candidates to the elections of 1992 (83).

From the point of view of legislative initiative women's politics denounced weakness. The law against rape was not passed in the 1987-1992 legislature, despite an unprecedented percentage of women in Parliament. The most important proposal elaborated by PDS women was the law "Time for life, time for work", which prospected a very fundamental restructuring of timeplan during the work-life cycle (with long leaves for maternity and childrearing and requalification), of workingdays schedule (with a reduction of the weekly worktime to 30 hours) and of the timetable for shops and public services, in order to allow women a better combination of work and family-care: but its radicality and the costs of its implementation seemed hardly compatible with the conditions of the country's economy and public finance, and aroused objections inside the party itself. From the organizational point of view, the debate on the party's model did not produce any significant move towards the form of federative party, with more permeable boundaries, that women supported: moreover, the structures which were to embody women's organizational autonomy inside the party, merely sketched in the party's statute, were very partially implemented, due to disagreement on the opportunity of fuller institutionalization of women's politics. In short, as the PDS entered a very troublesome phase of institutionalization, feminism revealed again its difficulties in adapting to institutional politics.

Conclusions.

Looking back to some twenty five years of relations between new feminism and the major party of Italian Left, one may conclude that the challenge of neo-feminism to the PCI can be considered a story of success. Considering the typology of success of the challenging group proposed by Gamson (84) — negotiation, formal recognition and inclusion — we can classify the outcome of feminist challenge as a kind of inclusion. Gamson defines inclusion as access to members of the...
challenging group in positions of status or authority in the antagonist's organizational structure, maintaining their status, formally or informally, as group members. The fact that in this case access to leadership was gained by female party leaders who adopted neo-feminist values doesn't make a big difference. The greater representation that was granted to women in Parliament and in the party's governing bodies was only a facet of this success. Probably more important is that the core values of neo-feminism (gender difference) was explicitly included among the party's inspiring values, and that feminist ideology became an important source of the PDS symbolic politics; its organizational practices (separatism) were formally recognized in the party's statute; feminists entered the party's leadership without renegotiating their identity. Inclusion was obtained without altering the movement's fundamentalism.

To comment this success in comparative perspectives, it is worthwhile to go back to the cases of the relations between feminism and parties in the U.S. and in Britain as outlined by Gelb: American feminism evolved into "interest group politics", while British feminism did not gain access to the decisional arenas and was confined to sectarian or life-style politics. The fundamental reasons of the different evolution of the relations between the major party of the Left and the feminist movement in Italy is the different strength of the political parties versus the political institutions (namely Legislatives and Executives) in the Italian political system as compared to those of Britain and of the U.S. These differences can be briefly sketched as follows. In the British political system the dominance of the executive on the policymaking and the presence of highly institutionalized political parties tends to limit access to new political demands; the American political system on the contrary is a case of strong institutions versus weak, coalitional-type political parties: the separation of powers and the highly institutionalized, transformative nature of the legislature, particularly the strength and autonomy from the parties of parliamentary committees and their considerable role in the policy making process (85), explain why the interest group action tends to be focused on pressure on the legislature, and therefore to specialize in lobbying. The Italian political system is characterized by weak institutions and strong parties. Italy has a classically parliamentary form of government, where the weakness of the executive vis-à-vis the Parliament due to constitutional provisions is further enhanced by the nature of the party system and the fragmentation and uncohesiveness of government coalitions.


The Parliament in turn is poorly institutionalized, despite the existence of a full range of parliamentary committees, which can operate as enacting bodies. Both executive and legislative are dominated by party leaders, namely by the extra-institutional party leaders not by the leaders of the intra-institutional party groups (86). In the Italian case parties have been the exclusive gatekeepers of access to the policy making arena. Although this monopoly was challenged in the early Seventies, this led parties to a redefinition of their relations with social and economic groups, rather than to a decreasing role of the parties in controlling input and output functions (87). The structure of political opportunities in the Italian case was such that access to the decisional arenas, commanded some sort of integration in the political parties.

If this explains the differences between Italian neo-feminism on one side and British and American feminism on the other, the question of the degree of its success in gaining inclusion in the major party of the Left remains open. First, success can be explained with reference to a number of unordinary facilitating circumstances. The first was the PCI's strategy towards new social movements, which fostered exchanges between "old" and "new feminism". The party's recruitment from the movement, but mostly the existence of strong women flanking organizations and party structures which adopted the culture of neo-feminism provided it with formidable organizational resources — resources that other new social movements lacked in their challenge to old parties. Finally, the crisis of PCI in the late Eighties was so profound, both at the ideological and at the organizational level, that a cohesive party faction such as the PCI feminist, which retained crucial resources for the transition, found great opportunities for gain influence inside the party and for establishing itself as a far from negligible component of the new party's founding coalition. These resources were its identity, uncompromised with the failure of communist regimes, its links with the social movement sector and its potential appeal to the increasingly mobile female electorate. These particularly favourable circumstances explain why neo-feminism could reach inclusion in the dying PCI and in the new PDS without having to undergo a process of "normalization" to institutional politics thus maintaining substantially radical ideological traits. But what explains the stalemate of feminist politics which became visible after 1991?

Firstly, a paradoxical consequence of the feminist participation in
the process of transition is that party feminists contributed to foster changes in the party’s organization which ultimately hindered the attainment of the goal of greater representation of women. Research on women representation in the decisional bodies of the parties, among candidates and elected representatives show that the more centralized the party and the less competitive the process of candidate selection, the greater the opportunities for women to gain representation on more equal basis (88). Yet this unintended effect of party pluralism was probably not unavoidable. The point is that the conditions which produced the strength of party feminism had changed. These conditions can be again summed up in a few points: first, party feminists controlled the relations with a segment of the relevant party’s environment; secondly they were the bearer of a new and uncompromised political identity; thirdly they were a cohesive group. These resources put them in a favourable bargaining position, and allowed them to gain inclusion avoiding the risks of assimilation. The central point is that after the XX Congress this radical political identity, centered on the value of gender difference, generated considerable problems both for the integration in the party, for the representation of women’s interests. As the PDS tried to build its new political identity, an ideology based on a rather essentialist view of gender difference could be hardly conciliated with an identity which had in equality its core value: stronger emphasis on equal rights would have facilitated legitimation of women’s demands, and would assure to the feminist leadership a stronger mandate among the female party membership or electorate, which didn’t share the culture of radical feminism and held more conventional political outlooks. Second, the ideological frame-work of the doctrine of gender difference probably did not facilitate the identification of women’s interest. Surely, it did not encourage pragmatism and incrementism in the policy making arena, which were commanded by the political and financial constraints. Furthermore, this lack of pragmatism and incrementism was at odds with the new party’s strategy of legitimation as a candidate to the country’s government. Of course, success or failure are matters of points of view, and the consequences of this inclusion without de-radicalization may appear not so negative to those feminists which considered that the aim was one of bringing the contradiction of gender inside the party (89): yet after the transition party feminism seems to have lost ground, from the point of view of the consolidation of the success attained on both the programmatic

(88) See Pippa Norris and Joni Lovendug, op. cit.
(89) See the interviews to Maria Luisa Boccia and Livio Turco, Un passo a lato e una continuità sussia, in “Retti”, n.4-5, luglio-ottobre 1992, pp. 22-29.

and on the organizational level and of the capacity of garnering support for policy issues regarding women.

Riassunto — Nel caso italiano i rapporti tra i «nuovi movimenti» degli anni Settanta e i partiti della sinistra sono stati complessi e articolati, e non possono essere ridotti alla contrapposizione tra attori politici tradizionali e nuovi attori politici. Il caso delle relazioni tra il neo-femminismo e il Partito Comunista è particolarmente interessante da questo punto di vista, perché attraverso le intense relazioni di scambio che si andarono sviluppando nel corso degli anni Settanta e Ottanta tra i gruppi del femminismo e le organizzazioni femminili del PCI o che in torno al PCI gravitavano, la cultura e la pratica organizzativa del movimento riuscirono ad affermarsi all'interno del partito e ad influenzare in modo non marginale l'identità e il modello organizzativo nella fase di crisi e transizione che si aprì nel partito alla fine degli anni Ottanta. Viene messa in luce la configurazione di fattori che hanno determinato gli scambi particolarmente intensi tra le organizzazioni della subcultura rosa e il nuovo femminismo e la penetrazione all'interno della subcultura comunista di una diversa cultura politica, che si tradusse nella formazione nel PCI alla fine degli anni Ottanta di una vera e propria corrente femminista. Nel corso della crisi tale corrente riuscì con successo a rinegoziare il ruolo delle donne nel partito e ad affermarsi come una componente riconosciuta e legittimata della cultura del PDS.
LA FUTURA PARTECIPAZIONE DELLA TURCHIA ALLA CE

di M. RITA SAULLE DURANTE

Per poter affrontare il tema concernente le future relazioni tra la Comunità Europea e la Turchia occorre accennare brevemente all'interesse che la Comunità Europea ha manifestato e manifesta da anni nei confronti degli Stati mediterranei in generale. Del resto i rapporti di associazione, in atto fin dal principio dell'entrata in vigore del trattato di Roma tra la CE ed alcuni Stati rivieraschi, testimoniano questa politica che ha dato risultati positivi negli intercambi economici ed in forme di collaborazione sempre più ampie. Proprio tra gli Stati associati rientra la Turchia che ha concluso il relativo trattato con l'allora CEE nel 1963.

Nel corso degli anni sono stati firmati i protocolli di adeguamento all'accordo di associazione CEE-Turchia, tra i quali particolarmente importante è quello del 1988, a seguito dell'adesione della Grecia.

In effetti i rapporti tra Grecia e Turchia hanno talora raggiunto momenti di tensione nel secondo dopoguerra in relazione alla questione cipriota e allo sfruttamento delle risorse sottomarine della piattaforma continentale nel Mar Egeo: tensioni che sono state attuate soprattutto grazie all'azione di consultazione svolta in ambito NATO.

Ma, a parte questo particolare tipo di rapporti con uno degli Stati membri della CEE, le relazioni tra la Turchia e la Comunità sono andate incrementandosi in questo ultimo decennio di tempo mediante il Regolamento n. 1762/92 del Consiglio del 29 giugno 1992 concernente l'applicazione dei protocolli relativi alla cooperazione finanziaria e tecnica conclusi dalla Comunità con i Paesi terzi mediterranei, tra i quali è compresa la Turchia. Il citato regolamento fissa le modalità e le regole di gestione della cooperazione finanziaria prevista dai protocolli relativi alla cooperazione finanziaria e tecnica tra la Comunità e i Paesi terzi mediterranei mediante interventi finanziari sulle risorse di bilancio della Comunità e prestiti concessi sulle risorse proprie della Banca europea per gli investimenti. Del resto il programma di lavoro della

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Commissione CE per il 1993-94 comprendeva anche un negoziato finalizzato all’estensione, nel settore tessile, degli accordi preferenziali con la Turchia, il Marocco, la Tunisia, l’Egitto e Malta.

Tale programma era stato preceduto dalla decisione del Consiglio della CE del 3 febbraio 1992 riguardante la conclusione di un accordo di cooperazione tra la Comunità Europea e la Repubblica di Turchia nel settore della ricerca medica e sanitaria.

A parte il programma della Comunità — che è atto privo di valore vincolante — la normativa qui citata, costituita dal regolamento e dalle direttive, è fornita, ai sensi dell’art. 189 del trattato di Roma, di efficacia obbligatoria. Pertanto, essendo priva di tale efficacia, riveste importanza più limitata se non addirittura marginale la risoluzione del 12 luglio 1991 del Parlamento europeo (A3-121/91), concernente un nuovo profilo per la politica mediterranea, finalizzata a dare un sostanziale impulso alla cooperazione europea con i Paesi terzi mediterranei, affinché il clima di distensione e dialogo in Europa possa tradursi in iniziative concrete a favore della pace nell’area mediterranea, nella quale, tra l’altro, si esprime appoggio incondizionato alla convocazione a breve termine della conferenza per la sicurezza e la cooperazione nel Mediterraneo (CSCM) al fine di «sostituire la strategia del confronto diretto con quella della collaborazione e della convergenza dei sistemi». Tale risoluzione ribadiva e rafforzava il tenore delle precedenti risoluzioni del 15 maggio 1991 sull’ampliamento della Comunità Europea e le relazioni con altri paesi europei (A3-77/91) e del 17 maggio 1991 sul ruolo dell’Europa ai fini della sicurezza nel bacino mediterraneo (A3-76/91); nella prima risoluzione, ricordando la domanda di adesione alla Comunità presentata dalla Turchia il 14 aprile 1987, il Parlamento ha sottolineato l’interesse comunitario a mantenere relazioni politiche ed economiche stabili con la Turchia, spiccando la definizione del contenuto e della forma delle future relazioni tra la Comunità Europea e la Turchia. Nella seconda risoluzione è stato rilevato che la politica della sicurezza nel bacino mediterraneo deve essere concepita come parte integrante di una politica della pace pan europea e che questa debba tener conto dei problemi ecologici, demografici, culturali e religiosi e di quelli provocati dai flussi migratori.

Nel periodo di tempo in cui la Turchia ha partecipato ai lavori della Commissione parlamentare mista con la CEE, di cui si riparerà oltre, essa ha concluso il 10 dicembre 1991 un accordo con i Paesi membri dell’EFTA al fine di realizzare il libero scambio di prodotti industriali (ad eccezione dei prodotti sensibili), ittici e agricoli trasformati.

Tale accordo ha previsto un periodo transitorio fino al termine del 1995, iniziato nell’aprile 1992, durante il quale la Turchia si è immagazzinata a sopprimere progressivamente i diritti di dogana sui prodotti provenienti dagli Stati EFTA, in conformità delle indicazioni di un comitato misto, contemplato dallo stesso accordo.

Parte di negarsi che l’allargamento della CE verso i Paesi mediterranei sia rappresentato e rappresenta un elemento di costante interesse ed attenzione da parte comunitaria in relazione anche all’interscambio con questi: ciò ha determinato, a favore della Turchia, un aumento del 65% dell’esportazione dei prodotti di questo Paese verso la CE negli ultimi quattro anni, nonché l’incremento degli interventi a sostegno dell’ambiente nel Mediterraneo da parte della Banca europea per gli investimenti. Al contrario deve darsi per gli aiuti tecnici forniti dalla Comunità, bloccati sulla base della cd. «clausola sociale» per le persistenti violazioni dei diritti umani rimproverate dalla Comunità alla Turchia.


Se si volessero configurare, in termini di attualità, i rapporti tra la CE e la Turchia, si potrebbe affermare che essi si pongono su due direttrici che per altro non convergono. Da un lato, infatti, la Comunità intensifica tali rapporti attraverso incentivazioni di vario genere, alcune delle quali sono state qui menzionate; dall’altro essa pone condizioni all’acquisto da parte della Turchia della qualità di membro. Certamente l’atteggiamento della Comunità, nell’uno o nell’altro senso lo si consideri, si fonda su dati oggettivi e, quindi, è condivisibile. Sotto il primo profilo, l’attenzione dedicata alla Turchia da parte della Comunità si giustifica con il ruolo che tende ad assumere nel Mediterraneo: ruolo che consolida ed accresce quello già posseduto con la qualità di membro del Consiglio d’Europa e della NATO e di osservatore nel- l’ambito dell’Unione dell’Europa Occidentale. In effetti proprio per accrescere la sua importanza economico-politica, il 25 giugno 1992 è stata firmata la Dichiarazione istitutiva di una zona di cooperazione economica del Mar Nero (ZCEMN) cui partecipa un totale di 11 Stati al fine di superare la teoria e la pratica dei blocchi in Europa, sul modello della CE e della CSCE.
L'istituzione di questa zona ha previsto la sistemazione a Istanbul di un segretariato, con il sostegno economico della Banca Europea per la Ricostruzione e lo Sviluppo.

Quanto, infine, alle condizioni poste dalla Comunità all'ingresso della Turchia in qualità di membro esse sono ricorrenti nelle risoluzioni del Parlamento europeo e soprattutto nella Ris. 22 dicembre 1992 sul diritto dei Curdi. Sono, infatti, sostanzialmente quattro le condizioni che la Comunità pone alla Turchia per il suo ingresso nell'attuale Unione Europea. Esse vertono: sui diritti da riconoscere alla minoranza curda; sulle relazioni con la Grecia con la quale esiste un trattato di amicizia del 1992; sul rispetto dei diritti umani e sul divieto di tortura; sull'esistenza di un vero regime democratico.

Per quanto concerne il futuro dei rapporti tra CE (ormai UE) e la Turchia, essi sono in parte evidenziati dalla Ris. A3-01935/92 del 21 dicembre 1992 appunto sulla base delle relazioni tra la Comunità europea e la Turchia, conformemente alla quale è possibile formulare alcune considerazioni concernenti: 1) la partecipazione alla politica di sicurezza comunitaria, presupposto questo che, data l'appartenenza nel modo sopra precisato sia alla NATO sia all'UEC, implica un maggiore avvicinamento alla «posizione comune» in ambito comunitario, con riferimento al settore della sicurezza, specialmente nel momento in cui questa riuscirà a delinearsi in modo concreto; 2) la problematica della regolamentazione, da parte dello Stato turco, dei flussi migratori da esso provenienti specialmente sotto forma di contingimento; 3) l'armonizzazione della legislazione turca rispetto alle legislazioni degli Stati membri dell'UE la quale implicherà una revisione tale da evitare tra quelle e queste le maggiori discrepanze al fine di facilitare l'immissione nell'ordinamento turco del diritto comunitario sotto forma di regolamenti e di direttive; 4) la partecipazione della Turchia alla politica estera comunitaria (cui si è sopra accennato); 5) le modifiche legislativi nell'ordinamento turco, funzionali all'applicazione della normativa comunitaria in materia di cittadinanza europea.

L'evoluzione che segna l'attuale sistema politico turco fa ritenere che la partecipazione della Turchia alla CE non sia lontana. Ciò anche perché, se è vero che la partecipazione alla CE dei Paesi dell'ex blocco comunisti è subordinata all'acquisto da parte loro della qualità di membri del Consiglio d'Europa ed alla ratifica della Convenzione europea per la salvaguardia dei diritti dell'uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, tali circostanze per la Turchia risultano già verificate. Ne consegue che un ulteriore intervento in materia di tutela dei diritti umani e nella gestione del sistema carcerario non potranno che favorire l'acquisizione della piena partnership della Turchia nell'Unione Europea.
UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
IN TURKEY AND EUROPE:
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

by ERSIN KALAYCIÖGLU

Introduction.

Turkey is the only country in the world where approximately 95% of its population declares allegiance to Islam, and there is a lengthy period of experience with pluralist, multi-party politics. In addition, located at the juncture of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, Turkey is constantly influenced by all the political turbulence that occurs around her.

Turkish politics is under the stress and strain caused by rapid social mobilization and a high rate of population growth. Furthermore, the Turkish political system encountered a heavy load of political demands in the 1960s and the 1970s, which were suppressed through a period of depoliticization under the three year reign of a military regime in the early 1980s. The memories of the 1970s and the 1980s, and the recent surge of terrorism in the Eastern parts of the country still curb the citizens of Turkey from being overtly politicized. Furthermore, impressed by Iran, and perhaps even funded lavishly by that country and other fundamentalist regimes of the Middle East, a small but well-organized and active group of Islamic fundamentalists are pushing for a revolutionary change in the Turkish system. An anti-system, Islamic party (the Welfare Party) also tries to attract the attention of the disillusioned and disenchanted voters.

Under the above-mentioned circumstances, what sorts of conditions, characteristics, and influences trigger a potential for protest behavior in Turkey? Are there any similarities and/or difference in terms of the factors influencing protest potential in Turkey, vis-à-vis the post industrial democracies? If so, what are those differences or similarities? This paper seeks to answer these questions in the following pages.

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I would like to establish in this paper is the determinants of one’s mental preparedness to participate in acts of protest in Turkey, and compare the results of my analysis with the findings of Western European studies.

A Model of Protest Participation.

Political participation, whether in the form of protest, occurs under the influence of three major sources. Any actor who considers a voluntary form of political action should have the necessary political resources, motives, and opportunities to act.

Political opportunity is what the environment of a political system and the political regime provide a citizen in finding a chance to expend his/her energy toward influencing a political decision. A political actor finds a chance to influence political decisions, so long as s/he finds his/her background encouraging him/her to participate. Young men tend to be provided with more vigor and aggressiveness to participate in politics than older people, and women (Milbrath, Goel, 1977: 71). In political systems where the cost of conducting a form of political act is too high (i.e., one risks being shot at by the security forces for obstructing traffic), one would not have much political opportunity to act. In systems where there is censorship of political news and information one would not be informed about a political decision until it is too late to act to influence that decision. Protesters’ political decision after it is taken often increases the risk of being more severely penalized than acting to stop a decision from being made. Most democratic systems provide wide opportunities for their citizens to influence political decisions, both before and after they are taken. Protesting behavior is likely to receive a more tolerant response from the political elites of democratic regimes, than from the totalitarian/authoritarian elites. Therefore, it is not surprising to find more protest potential in democratic or democratizing countries.

Political resources are those characteristics and assets which can be used by citizens to influence political decisions or the decision-making process. Wealth, enlightenment, prestige, respect, etc. are such resources. Each may be utilized by the citizens to influence the political decision-makers or political decisions. Political resources are potential sources of political action. Those who possess them do not necessarily and automatically use them to influence political decision-makers or decisions. However, those who have wealth may find it lucrative to buy politicians, as well as works of art (Dahl, 1974). It is obvious that those who lack resources can have little influence on political decision-makers or decisions. Often, those who have relatively less resources tend to pool them to increase their impact on political decision-making. Pressure groups and political parties are good exam-
ple of such efforts at pooling the resources of have nots. However, the have also use them to further increase their impact on government. In short, affiliation with political organizations comprise an important political resource in and of themselves.

Irrespective of how much resources a person possess and how much opportunity is provided for him/her to participate in politics, if the person in question is not motivated toward politics, s/he will not voluntarily act to influence political decisions. Interest, and knowledge in politics are two important properties that provide a condition which mentally prepares an individual to act to influence political decision-makers and/or political decisions. Without a belief in the efficacy of his/her political actions, there is little reason, if any, for a political actor to try to influence any political decision-maker or the decision-making process.

I would like to propose that voluntary political action materializes only when political opportunity, political resources, and political motives con verge to trigger behavior to influence political decisions. A corollary of the same argument is that where there is opportunity and motives, but resources are dismally lacking, affiliation with political organizations provide a surrogate form of political resources and political participation still occurs. Where opportunity and motives do not exist voluntary acts of political participation fail to occur, and mobilized participation in politics can emerge as an alternative form of political behavior.

In this study I consider place of residence, gender, formal education, age as those independent variables which provide or hamper opportunities to be involved in unconventional forms of political participation. Religiosity, political efficacy, and political interest are considered as the major motives precipitating unconventional political participation. Finally, I use satisfaction with the way of life that the citizen leads as an independent variable that stands for the impact of the socio-political opportunity structure on the individual.

Age, Gender, and Place of Residence and Dissatisfaction as Exogenous Variables.

It is taken for granted in most research on political participation that unconventional political participation is more characteristic of youthfulness (Marsh and Kaase, 1979; 101). It is assumed that a young person has more energy and time to be involved in rallies, demonstrations, picket lines, boycotts, etc. Older people come under the pressure of families, career related worries, and lose their vigor and restlessness.

Socialization of men and women differ. Boys are usually oriented toward social roles, often unrelated with the chores of the household.
emanating from the better educated simply for the same reason as conventional forms of participation. The educated are in a better position to understand the political issues, and in cases where they see little rational reason to agree with the decision makers, they are more inclined to challenge a decision, both because there is little status discrepancy between the political decision makers and the educated masses and because they are not intimidated by the political elite. Furthermore, the better educated are more likely to think a more direct action is more influential beyond voting for a political party to win an election and then hope that it carries out its campaign promises.

Religiosity also provides an individual citizen with motivation to be interested in politics and to act upon political issues with his/her fellow sect members. Religiosity, then functions somewhat like education in providing motives to pay attention and to act upon political issues and matters (Marsh and Kaase, 1979: Chap. 2). Certain issues, such as moral and religious education, family values, and foreign policy often become “hot” issues for the religiously motivated. In these contexts, religiously motivated individuals are likely to become effective protesters to change a national curriculum, to influence aid to fellow brethren in a foreign country, or to prolong or uphold prohibition, for example.

Interest in politics is a necessary condition of any kind of political action. Apathetic and alienated individuals either do not participate or their participation in politics occurs through mobilization by some strong person (patron), or institution (i.e., political party, trade union, or the military (Milbrath, Goel, 1977: 65-73). Voluntary political protest activity requires that the individual in question is interested in politics, follows the news, pays attention to political issues, and has strong feelings about what happens on certain political matters. Therefore, interest in politics functions as a variable that orients the individual to a political object, and at the same time it is a sign that the individual cares about, at least one political issue. Politically interested are motivated to take part in politics, either through conventional or unconventional channels of influence. Since s/he cares about a political issue so much that there is no stopping that person from influencing the political decisions in any way s/he can.

It requires little mention that unless a person believes that his/her action will make a difference in influencing a certain political decision, s/he will see little reason to act. The politically inefficacious tend to be apathetic or alienated, and may only be mobilized to participate in politics (Milbrath, Goel, 1977: 68).

What the preceding argument suggests is that political resources, opportunities and motives interact to create conditions for protest behavior. Place of residence, age, and gender generate conditions for some political resources to emerge, which in turn engender some motives to emerge, which in turn bring about potential readiness to take part in unconventional acts of political participation. What I envision and propose as the determinants of unconventional participation are presented in the following (see Table 1).

Table 1. — Determinants of Protest Potential (A Causal Model).

\[
Y_8 = p_{80}X_1 + p_{81}X_2 + p_{82}X_3 + p_{83}Y_1 + p_{84}Y_6 + p_{85}Y_7 + p_{86}Y_8 + p_{87}U_9.
\]

\[
Y_9 = p_{90}X_1 + p_{91}X_2 + p_{92}Y_1 + p_{93}U_6.
\]

\[
Y_7 = p_{70}X_1 + p_{71}X_2 + p_{72}Y_1 + p_{73}U_7.
\]

\[
Y_6 = p_{60}X_1 + p_{61}X_2 + p_{62}U_6.
\]

\[
Y_8 = p_{80}X_1 + p_{84}Y_4 + p_{85}U_9.
\]

Glossary of Variables:

- **Y8**: Protest Potential.
- **Y4**: Political Interest.
- **Y6**: Political Efficacy.
- **Y7**: Religiosity.
- **Y1**: Education.
- **X4**: Place of Residence.
- **X1**: Gender.
- **X2**: Age.
- **Y1**: Satisfaction with Life.

**Data and the Sample of the Study.**

The data for this paper come from the Turkish Values Survey of 1990. The field survey took place in October 1990. A nationally representative sample of 1030 respondents were selected and surveyed. An interview schedule originally designed by a team of researchers at the Institute of Social Research (ISR) of the University of Michigan, headed by Ronald Inglehart, was translated and adapted to the Turkish context by Ustun Ergüden, Yılmaz Esmer, and Ersein Kalaycıoğlu of Boğaziçi University.
Provinces of Turkey as represented in the publications of the State Institute of Statistics of Turkey for the year 1989 were selected as the primary sampling units. The provinces were divided into 16 strata, of which six were self-representative. They were Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Bursa, and Konya. The other 61 provinces were divided into five strata. Each stratum was divided into large and small strata, according to the sizes of their population. From each of the ten strata one province was randomly selected according to probability proportionate to size (PPS) procedure.

From these sixteen provinces, using random selection, subdistricts (ilçe) were selected. Each subdistrict was divided into a rural and an urban stratum, except for Istanbul, within which no rural stratum exists. Using random PPS, mahaller’s (the smallest administrative units in urban areas), in the urban stratum, and villages in the rural stratum were selected. In each mahalle two streets were selected according to random PPS. In the villages and on the streets, households were selected according to systematic random sampling procedure (for more information see Ergüder, Esmer, Kalaycıoğlu, 1991: 13-14).

Operationalization of the Variables.

The Dependent Variable: Protest Potential. The dependent variable of this study is protest potential. Defined as readiness to participate in acts of protest, it is measured by means of reports of previous incidence of participation in the acts of protest or willingness to consider participation in such acts in the future, even when the respondent had reported no such activity in the past.

In the Turkish Values Survey we asked a question with five items pertaining to acts of protest, and the question read as follow:

"Have you ever taken part, or would you consider taking part in the following activities?
1. Petitioning (Toplu Dikloş)
2. Participate in boycotts
3. Participate in legal demonstrations
4. Participate in wildcat strikes
5. Occupation of buildings or offices."

The responses given per question are presented in Table 2. As an illegality and the risk of participation of the act in question increase the responses concentrate around the “never consider participation” category. Since it is the “readiness toward participation in acts of protest” that we intend to measure, the reporting of actual participation in such an act in the past is not critical. I am inclined to argue that, especially in the context of Turkish politics of 1990, such questions validity tap protest participation potential. Since we have only five items a sophisticated clustering technique is not warranted. Instead I use a simple additive index, construct by means of summation of the scores of each respondent through the five items depicted in Table 2. A simple additive scale with relatively high reliability is constructed out of the above-mentioned five items (see Table 2). The protest potential scale I use in this paper is a simple additive scale with a lowest score of 5 and a highest score of 15 (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protest Potential</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>n</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reliability:
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.75, Standardized Item Alpha = 0.77, Hotelling’s T-Squared = 794.33, F = 197.93, Prob. = 0.0000.

The Independent Variables.

Age, education, gender, place of residence are independent variables that are operationalized by means of a single item each in the Turkish Values Survey of 1990.

Respondents were requested to register their ages, and educational backgrounds. Each interviewer was asked to record the sex and the place of residence of the respondents who they had interviewed, after each interview. Age of each respondent is coded in years, and I use those codings without any change. Likewise, the female respondents were assigned the numeral value of ‘1’, and the male respondents were assigned ‘2’. I employed sexual identities of respondents in exactly the way they were originally coded.

I ranked the place of residence of each interviewer between village, city, metropolitan cities of Ankara, and Izmir, and the megapolises of Istanbul. The inhabitants of villages were assigned a score of ‘1’, the inhabitants of cities were allotted a score of ‘2’, the dwellers of Ankara and Izmir were given a score of ‘3’, and the inhabitants of Istanbul were assigned a score of ‘4’.
The scale of education employed in this paper is operationalized so as to measure to length of exposure to secular, formal education of each respondent. I ranked school attendance of the respondents according to the type of school they had attended. I divided up the sample into two categories first, and assigned a score of "1" to those who just attended a religious school, "0" to those who attended no school, and from "1" to "9" to those who attended some level of secular educational institution. A score of "1" was allotted to those who attended but not graduated an elementary school, "2" to graduates of elementary schools, and so on and so forth, up to a maximum of score of "9", which is allotted to those who successfully completed a post graduate degree.

I operationalized religiosity, satisfaction with life, political interest, and political efficacy by means of a factor analysis run. Each of those independent variables was operationalized by the help of multiple items. They all have to do with attitudes, and values, and therefore the structure of those mental constructs are likely to be more complicated and difficult to determine than age or place of residence of a respondent. The results of the factor analysis run are presented in the following (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor 1: Religious</th>
<th>Factor 2: Political Interest</th>
<th>Factor 3: Satis w/ Life</th>
<th>Factor 4: Religious Tradition</th>
<th>Factor 5: Political Efficacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics Important</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converse Politics</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satis w/ Life</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.00</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satis w/ Income</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious family</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attend Mosque</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Ceremony at Birth</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceremony when wed</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in afterlife</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in spirit</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Devil</td>
<td>.69</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Hell</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Heaven</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in sin</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belief in Resurrect</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satis w/ life at home</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>-.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Int. Rule</td>
<td>-.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in Political Authorities</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.16</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Religiosity is the only variable that comprises two dimensions. By religiosity I mean adherence to the teachings and tenets of Islam. The non-muslim population of Turkey is very small, and although they appear in our sample their numbers are so small that cannot be included as a separate and meaningful category to our analysis. Therefore, by religiosity I aim to measure each respondent's belief in Islamic symbols, teachings, and his/her participation in the Islamic rituals. We have about 3% of respondents who assert that they are atheists, and approximately 1% who are Christians or Jews. The rest of the sample indicated that they were Muslims. I used the responses of the last category of respondents, and scaled them in the factor analysis run (see Table 3). Two separate dimensions of religiosity emerged from factor analysis of the data. One dimension consists of declarations of belief in hell, heaven, devil, life after death, etc. I suggest to call this dimension of religiosity as belief in formal Sunni interpretation of Islam, or simply put belief in Islam. The other dimension includes items that indicate practices of prayer, strong family influence on religion, and dedication to traditional rituals of Islam, such as religious ceremony at birth, religious weddings etc. I propose to call this dimension of religiosity Islamic traditionalism. Both of these dimensions were used to calculate factor scores, and later add them to construct an overall scale of religiosity.

The scale of satisfaction with life I employ in this study consists of four items of the interview schedule which tap how satisfied the respondent feels about life. Two questions inquire about how happy the respondent is. The other two items are constructed out of responses given to questions on how satisfied s/he is with his/her household income and overall situation of his/her household. Each item is operationalized by means of a ten point scale which runs between the lowest score of '1', which indicates total dissatisfaction or lack of happiness, and a maximum score of '10', which signifies total satisfaction or happiness.

Political efficacy is operationalized by reference to two items of the interview schedule. The first item is a response that the interviewee gave to the question on whether the country is governed with a view to the general welfare of the public, or by a few selfish interest groups. The second item tap how much trust the respondent has that the government does what is right for the country. The first question yielded two response categories of '1' public interest, and '2' special interests. The second question yielded four categories: '1' almost never, '2' sometimes, '3' most of the time, and '4' almost always.

Political interest is measured by means of three items of the interview schedule. One of those items consists of a question on whether the respondent has any interest or not. It has four categories: '1' none, '2' a little, '3' some, and '4' a lot. The second item of the scale is about how important politics is for the respondent. The respondents registre-
red their answer as '1' not important at all, '2' not important, '3' quite important, and '4' very important. Finally, the third question is about whether the respondent speaks about politics with his friends, or not. The respondents indicated that they '1' never talk about politics, '2' they speak about politics occasionally, and '3' they speak about politics frequently.

Findings.

Three determinants seem to play a major role in determining potential for protest participation in Turkey. The most important and critical among them is secular, formal education (which I will from now on simply refer to as education). Education is not only among the most important determinants of protest potential, but it also influences political attitudes, and religiosity, which in turn play an important role in determining protest potential. Its indirect effects on protest potential are as important as its direct impact on it (see Table 4).

Table 4. Determinants of Protest Potential (A Causal Model).

| Y9 = -0.04X1 + 0.06X2 + 0.08X3 + 0.15X5 -0.15X6 -0.09X1 + 0.15X8 + 0.06 |
| Y8 = -0.07X1 -0.18X2 + 0.18X5 + 0.06 |
| Y7 = 0.03X1 + 0.09X2 + 0.16X5 + 0.06 |
| Y6 = 0.04X1 - 0.22X2 + 0.15X5 + 0.06 |
| Y5 = 0.04X1 + 0.18X2 + 0.06 (Number of cases = 980) |

Glossary of Variables:

Y9 = Protest Potential.
Y8 = Political Interest.
Y7 = Political Efficacy.
Y6 = Religiosity.
Y5 = Education.
Y4 = Place of Residence.
Y3 = Gender.
Y2 = Age.
Y1 = Satisfaction with Life.

Remarks:

(*) Indicate that the corresponding path coefficients (standardized multiple regression coefficients) are not statistically significant at 0.05 level.

Path coefficients are calculated by means of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of the direct impact of the independent variables on the dependent variables. Missing values are eliminated by substitution of the relevant arithmetic means in their places.

Secondly, religiosity plays an important role in decreasing protest potential. The way religiosity is operationalized in this paper, it consists of two dimensions. In fact, those who express belief in the teachings of Islam, but not so much participate in the ritualistic practices do not seem to be inclined to have much protest potential. Whereas, those who are more keen of following the ritual proceedings of Islam are more inclined to develop protest potential (Table 5). When combined, the overall impact of religiosity seems to diminish protest potential (see Table 4).

Thirdly, political interest emerges as one of the most important sources of protest potential. Those interested in politics are much more likely to develop protest potential, than those who are not (see Table 4).

Fourthly, political efficacy fails to play as big a role in determining protest potential in Turkey, as in Western Europe. Political efficacy scores of the Turkish sample are relatively low, when compared with Western European countries. Some belief in the efficacy of one's effort to influence a political decision exists, however little that may be. Prudently enough most of those interviewed tended not to expect much from the responsiveness of the Turkish political elite (see Table 4).

A fifth finding of this study is that dissatisfaction with life does not foster protest potential. Although those who are dissatisfied with life in Turkey are more inclined to participate in politics through unconventional channels than those who are satisfied with life, the difference is slight (see Table 4).

A sixth finding is that age also plays a minimal role in the making of protest potential (see Table 4). This may be somewhat peculiar to Turkey. I am inclined to argue that "the 1968 generation", or those whose adolescent years coincided with the student uprisings of the 1960s are more inclined toward taking part in unconventional acts of political participation. The protest potential of the middle age groups seems to be so high that there is no difference between younger generations and them. For those over the age of forty protest potential becomes strikingly less, and sharply drops to zero for those over the age of 60 (see Figure 1).
It is not too difficult to argue that those who grew up in the years of political turmoil between 1975-1980, and through the years of de-politization of the 1980s shun away from protest activities. Political activity does not have the same meaning for the young, as opposed to their parents in Turkey. The 1968 generation perceived politics as a way to “save the country”. Whereas, their children are brought up in an environment in which politics was depicted as being dirty and full of high risks. They were socialized to believe in matters that have less to do with the “sublime goals of society” and more with their personal gains in life. It is then possible to argue that old revolutionaries die hard, and that the vigorous youth of the 1990s are no revolutionaries.

As hypothesized, women tend to be less interested in politics than men (see Table 4). However, the direct impact of gender on protest potential is minimal, when compared with other variables. However, gender is a major determinant of political interest with education. In turn, political interest is a major determinant of protest potential. Turkish women tend to be less interested in politics than men. I am inclined to argue that has also to do with their socialization. Girls are socialized into “household related roles”, while boys are socialized into playing a more active and “outside of home” role in society in Turkey (Kagitçibasi, 1979: 89-115, Kalacigolu, 1983: Chap. 11; Kandiyoti, 1979: 329-358).

Finally, place of residence emerges as one of the least important sources of protest potential (see Table 4). As it was shown before in various studies, the Turkish cities are intimidating political settings for the newly settled, but sizable communities. The communal fabric of the cities have been disintegrating, especially where an incessant flow of rural migrants have been inundating the urban centers to settle on whichever city plot they could find. Consequently, the overall impact of urbanization on political interest is slightly negative, and on political efficacy it is slightly positive. The only major role that urbanization seems to play is to provide the incoming population with wider opportunities to attend secular, and formal institutions of education, so far.

Comparisons and Conjectures.

The findings presented in the preceding were examined in the context of the Turkish sample. In this section I scrutinize them in comparative perspective.

First of all, I use findings of Marsh and Kaase (1979: 131) and Dalton (1988) to assess the role of what they called the background variables in determining protest potential (see Table 5a and b). So far as the explanatory power of the regression model is concerned, the
Turkish case does not seem to substantially differ from the other cases. However, the two parts of Table 5 differ. The regression model for Turkey presented in Table 5a does not seem to have as good a fit as the European counterparts simply because two independent variables differ. Policy dissatisfaction and the strength of party identification could not be measured in the Turkish case and the substitutes failed to perform as well. Party identification seems not to matter in determining protest potential in Turkey. However, satisfaction with life seems to make a slight influence to curtail protest potential.

In most of the post-industrial democracies reported in Table 5a and b, protest potential emerges as youth activity. Education appears as the second most important source of protest potential in post-industrial societies. Religion and trade union membership emerge as other sources of protest potential in post-industrial countries. In Turkey, formal education and organizational membership seem to be the most important sources of protest potential. Religion appears to play a major role in determining protest potential in Turkey. What is interesting for the Turkish case is that not all forms of religiosity encourage protest potential. Religion seems to be a conservative force as well as a source of activism in Turkey, while it seems to mainly foster political activism in Europe. The overall impact of religiosity on unconventional political participation in Turkey appears to curb protest potential. Gender and occupational prestige play a limited role in determining protest potential in all of the countries included in Table 5b.

Education seems to provide the necessary resources and motivation for protest potential (see also Peterson, 1990: 22-55). It is possible to speculate that increased exposure to education diminishes the status gap between the political elites and the masses. The latter manages to develop a more sophisticated image of politics and also the readiness to participate in activities of protest, rather than passively wait around for the next local or national elections to register dissatisfaction. Lengthy exposure to education provides the citizens of democratic countries a greater inclination not to take the decision-making procedures and rituals for granted. The threshold for action to undo the perceived wrongdoing of the political authorities seem to become lower for the educated masses. Contesting political decisions and confronting the political elites become more routine acts of participation. A more comprehensive grasp of the legal system, and of the human rights in a democratic system by means of a lengthy education enable the masses to become more ready to act in politics by means of methods of protest than utilizing more conventional forms of participa-

tion. What the Turkish case seems to suggest is that the role that education plays in determining protest potential is not only a characteristic of post-industrial societies. Education seems also to be a more general source of unconventional forms of political action.

Young age seems to further motivate the better educated masses to contest the acts of their elders, who occupy positions of political authority. The preceding data and data analysis do not provide us with clues as to whether the life cycle or the generational effects hypothesis is more valid in the role that age plays in determining protest potential (see Dalton, 1988: 68-70 for more information on the alternative explanations). The Turkish findings need to be interpreted as a mixture of both life cycle and the generational effects, whereas Barnes, Kase, et. al. (1979: 524), and Dalton (1988: 70) seem to suggest that generational hypothesis makes more sense in post-industrial societies. Consequently, I am inclined to argue for Turkey that the young have more energy, less concern with their immediate careers, and they are less tied down by family responsibilities. Radicalism and youthfulness tend to cohere. Furthermore, the middle aged, post-1968 generation in Turkey is more prone to be involved in acts that challenge the political elites.

Trade union and voluntary association membership seem to divert acts of political participation away from protest. Interest and pressure groups seem to be more interested in using the established channels of participation than to motivate protest activity. This finding seems to indicate that the popular belief in the mischievous role of organized interest in politics in Turkey is quite wrong. Voluntary associations seem to erect a hurdle to protest activity, rather than inspire it.

**Table 5. Multiple Regression Analysis of Protest Potential Scales.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a. Countries</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>U. K.</th>
<th>U. S.</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td>-0.01(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strength of Party Identification</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.00(1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Efficacy</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Dissatisfaction</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
on protest potential do not flow in the same direction. Education and political interest seem to increase protest potential, while religiosity and membership in voluntary associations seem to decrease it. Although voluntary associations appear to work no differently in Turkey than trade unions in post-industrial democracies in hampering protest potential, the negative influence of religion on protest potential seems to be peculiar to the former country. It is not amazing to observe that the call of Islam for obedience to political authority ("du'l emr'e ıssat") is still strong in Turkey. My findings seem also to indicate that radical (fundamentalist) Islam yearning for a revolutionary modification of the political system in Turkey was still a marginal movement in 1990. So far as the Turkish electorate is concerned, it is not wrong to assume that Islam is not a revolutionary, but a conventional political force in Turkish politics.

Education, on the whole, engenders protest participation in Turkey. This is not an idiosyncratic finding either. To the contrary, education has the same effect in a host of other democratic settings. However, when taken into consideration with religiosity, on the one hand, and the mild effect of youth on protest potential, on the other, it is not so hard to explain why protest potential is on the rise among the religiously motivated university youth in Turkey. It seems as if the overall impact of education and age overcome the conservative impact of religiosity. Furthermore, the more educated and religiously motivated young start to search for a different interpretation of Islam that befits their level of sophistication and sense of frustration.

Well organized small groups bent upon promoting Islam under the pretext of democracy as an anti-system movement flourishes in Turkey, not so much as a mass movement, but as a peripheral force challenging the secular state and the democratic regime at the same time. Meanwhile, education still goes on being the most critical cleavage in Turkish socio-political life demarcating and pitting the forces of secularism and religiosity against each other.

**Conclusion.**

In this study I examined the conditions under which protest potential develops in Turkey. Education, religiosity, political interest, and membership in voluntary associations emerge as the most important sources of protest potential in Turkey. However, their influences

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(1) Statistically not significant at .05 level of significance.

All entries are standardized partial regression coefficients, except 'R', which is the multiple correlation coefficient for those independent variables indicated in the upper rows of the Table.

Remarks: The top part or "Table 5.4" includes entries for France, U. K., U. S., and West Germany from Dalton (1988: 69-70). The lower part or Table 5.b includes entries for the Netherlands, U. K., U. S.A, Germany, and Austria are from Marsh, and Kauze (1979: 131), and the Turkish entries in both parts of the Table are my calculations from the Turkish Values Survey of 1990.

The variable "sex" is recorded for Turkey as '1' for males, and '2' for females to ease comparisons across countries. For Turkey the same religiosity measure as in Tables 3 and 4 is used. There is no information on Trade Union Membership in the Turkish data. Therefore, I used membership to voluntary associations for Turkey. Occupational Prestige index for Turkey varies between self employed, professional and top level jobs in the public bureaucracy, and marginal sector employees (i.e., the street vendors) and the housewives. The former are assigned the highest and the latter the lowest scores. The strength of party identification cannot be measured from the Turkish data. Instead I tried to measure party preference. Those respondents who registered their party preferences are coded as '2' and those who failed to register any party preference in the survey are coded as '1'. It is not possible to measure policy dissatisfaction in the Turkish data either. Therefore, I use the factor scores indicating satisfaction with life instead to measure it (and see Table 3 for more information about its operationalization).

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**Bibliography.**


Riassunto — Paese con un sistema politico che da mezzo secolo sperimenta un pluralismo multipartitico con una varietà maggiore di sistemi, la Turchia è divisa in due parti: il nord e il sud. La questione sottesa in questo articolo è se esiste un insieme paradigmatico di condizioni che regolano la partecipazione politica non convenzionale nelle differenti democrazie politiche. In questo lavoro la partecipazione politica è vista come il risultato della convergenza di tre fattori: opportunità, risorse e motivazioni politiche. Infatti, le influenze combinate di questi fattori sembrano funzionare in maniera analoga sia nei casi nord che sud. L’istruzione formale si evidenzia come la risorsa più importante che determina sia i motivi che la variabile dipendente, vale a dire il potenziale di protesta. Fra le motivazioni, la religiosità e l’identificazione di partito sono i fattori più importanti che influenzano il potenziale di protesta nel nord e nel sud. La religiosità e l’interesse politico emergono come i fattori più importanti che determinano il potenziale di protesta in Turchia. Il risultato generale indicato dall’analisi dei dati è il ruolo estremamente importante che l’educazione secondaria formale svolge nel determinare la partecipazione politica non convenzionale. Le masse istruite sembrano richiedere miglior governo e corruzione. In base alle differenze di status, dalle élite politiche. Sono inoltre interessate agli affari pubblici, il che a sua volta abbasca la soglia di protesta delle masse contro gli atti politici e le decisioni delle autorità.

1. Introduction.

The story of the relationships between Turkey and the EC is well known. What is very difficult to forecast is their future developments, since they depend from a complex series of internal and external events, where for the former the EC’s evolution toward the Monetary and Political Unions and for the latter the future of GATT negotiations are to be considered.

The Turkish Government handed over Turkey's official application for full membership of the EC on April 14th, 1987. The initiative was broadly supported in the country: all political parties but one approved it.

The EC Council of Ministers decided to send, on the following April 27th, Turkey's application for full membership to the European Commission for examination and preparation of a report. It is important to note that at that time no single EC country had openly welcomed the Turkish application.

The Commission handed over its opinion report on Turkey's application on December 18th, 1990. The report concluded that, due to the evolving internal situation of the EC during the transition from the realization of the Internal Market to that of Monetary and Political Unions it was impossible to consider further applications to the Community until the end of 1995. Moreover, because of some structural economic and political Turkish deficits, the Commission thought that it was impossible to fix the agenda of the bilateral negotiations between Turkey and the EC concerning this country's adhesion to the Community. Nevertheless the realization of the Custom Union before
the end of 1995, of financial, industrial, technological, scientific cooperation and the deepening of political relationships, which already strengthened during the period of the Commission's work, were set as the near future objectives by the report.

The aim of this paper is to produce a preliminary analysis on the main real economic consequences of Turkey joining the EC as a full member, believing that important effects will be produced on the balance of payments of both parts. Particular attention will be paid to the consequences for Italy.

In the first part of the paper the recent structural changes of Turkish exports related to the evolution of its industrial system are analyzed. The second paragraph deals with the situation of Turkey import sector. Particular attention is paid to the effective degree of protection. The different sectors of the economy on both parts most involved with the integration process are considered in the third paragraph. Finally the actual economic relationships between Turkey and Italy are taken into consideration and a description of their future evolution is presented.

2. Turkey's export and the export promotion program.

One of the main elements of the Turkish structural adjustment program in the eighties was the shift from an inward-looking to an outward-looking development strategy.

On the export side, the main instrument of this policy was the implementation of various export promotion measures. These have taken the form of deductions allowed for corporate tax purposes as well as export subsidies and the interest rates reduction on export credits. A major incentive was the "export allowance" granted against taxable income mainly to manufacturers.

This system of incentives has been quite efficient specially for the export of manufactured goods. Table 2.1 shows the increasing share of foreign demand for Turkish manufacturing industry and in particular for consumer goods (1). In front of a very slight growth of the import component, the export one raises almost four times in the period considered, from 5.8% (1962) to 21.1% (1985). Capital goods situation is quite different: while heavily dependent on import during all the period, the growth of export is a quite recent fact, whose value has more than doubled from 5.9% (1983) to 13.3% (1985).

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(1) Consumer goods include textile production which, as it will be see later on, is one of the more expert competing Turkish industry.

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**Table 2.1. — Production and foreign demand for the Turkish manufacturing industry (percentage values within respect to the internal demand).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1962</th>
<th>1983</th>
<th>1985</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumer goods</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital goods</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I = Import; E = Export.

**Table 2.2 shows a more specific sector aggregation concerning consumer goods. Its percentage value of the quantity exported is greater than the Community one and the Turkish textile sector quota is quite important and almost four times the value relative to the same EC sector.**

**Table 2.2. — Export market and manufacturing industry (export percentage value with respect to total sector production) (a).**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EC</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Consumer goods</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— food and beverages</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— textile</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 1985 data.

This result is confirmed by the analysis of the Turkish trade balance: in the eighties the textile sector has ranked third in the export list following the fruit and vegetables and the garment sectors.

More generally, the growth of Turkish manufactured export at the expense of export of the agricultural and primary sectors is well known: manufactured export has grown from 35.9% of total export in 1975 to 79.3% in 1991. Among this component, the garment sector has shown the most fast increase from 4.5% of total export in 1980 to 23.5% in 1989.

This deep change in the Turkish export structure is strictly connected with a modification of its industrial structure. In this sense export liberalization is to be considered as an industrial policy measure which has already exerted much influence. The stylized facts concerning the changes of the industrial structure in the eighties can be briefly
summarized as follows: the heavy industry growth of the seventies has slowed down, while light industry growth has speeded up, particularly the food and textile sectors.

About this specialization pattern, some doubts have been cast about the degree of coherence of Turkish export and the demand of Oecd countries, since it seems to be decreasing just in the Turkish export sectors. In some sense Turkey is specializing in productions which are not favoured by the evolution of Oecd countries demand. Though 40% of Turkish export is directed to countries not belonging to the Oecd such as Arab countries, it exists a structural weakness that couldn’t be overcome by ten years of adjustment effort, i.e. the relatively low sophistication and quality associated with much of Turkish industrial output.

This specialization pattern reflects presumably the existence of a comparative advantage in labour intensive productions, specially the textile and garment sectors, like in most of the developing countries. Turkish export structure is in fact relatively highly concentrated: in 1989 the first ten export categories covered more than 70% of total export. But the specialization in these two sectors has grown during the second half of the eighties, while other developing countries have shift to more sophisticated productions. According to the Oecd "[This] suggests weakness in the industrial structure and failure on the part of Turkey entrepreneurs to respond to emerging international opportunities" (2).

3. Turkey’s import and its liberalization process.

The shift toward an outward-looking development strategy concerned also the import sector of Turkish economy.

The most significant aspect of trade policy reform was the elimination of the quantitative restrictions on imports during the 1981-84 period and subsequent adjustment in the various price measures of protection.

Since the fifties, Turkey has employed a varying mix of trade restrictive measures such as tariffs, tariffs-like taxes and surcharges, import quotas, import bans, advanced requirements and foreign exchange controls either to protect domestic industries or to respond to internal and external shocks.

Until 1981, all imports into Turkey were regulated by annual or semi-annual import programs. These programs itemized commodities under the free import list (Liberalization List I), the restricted list


(Liberalization List II), the quota list, the EC consolidated list and a list enumerating the commodities to be imported under bilateral clearing arrangements. Importation of goods not enumerated in any of the list was prohibited.

Imports were subject to tariffs and tariffs-like charges. The latter consisted of the municipality tax, stamp duty, wharf tax and production tax. The quota list specified the dollar value of imports and thus implied a binding quantitative restriction on imports. It was partly phased out in 1981. In that year, a large number of commodities was also transferred from Liberalization List II to Liberalization List I.

A major reform was introduced in January 1984 when all imports were classified into three lists. For the first time in Turkey, an explicit Prohibited List was prepared and commodities that couldn’t be imported under any circumstances were specified. A second list, Imports Subject to Permission, specified the items that could be imported with prior official permission. A third list, the Liberalized List, enumerated the commodities that could be freely imported.

At the time of the import system reform, the import tariffs and the stamp duty were revised while a new surcharge, the Housing Fund Tax, was imposed on some imports to finance the housing construction for the poor. Within a couple of years following this imposition, however, the number of commodities subject to this tax raised considerably, providing domestic industries with considerable protection. These adjustments were followed by the imposition of two additional surcharges on imports under the titles of Support and Price Stabilization Fund Tax and Resources Utilization Support Fund Tax in 1986 and across-the-board revisions of the import duty and Housing Fund Tax rates in 1988 and 1989.

Thus, notwithstanding the adoption of an import liberalising policy by the Turkish Government, the height of protection, measured by the Nominal Rate of Protection (NPR) and the Effective Rate of Protection (EPR), raised in the country due to the adoption of the numerous duties listed: the average NPR in the economy rose from 65.2% in 1983 to 70.2% in 1984, largely because of the imposition of the Housing Fund Levy and the upward adjustment in the stamp duty (3). However, the final effects of the 1988 and 1989 revisions have been to reduce the average level of protection in the economy. Although the stamp duty and the Support and Price Stabilization Fund Tax were both raised to 10 per cent, the downward adjustment in the custom duty were large enough to lower the overall protection: the average

(3) See Olgun and Togan (1991) for a detailed calculation of the NPR and the EPR levels for different economic sectors.
NPR went down from 70.2% in 1984 to 55.4% in 1988 and to 41.2% in 1989.

Corresponding to these changes, the economy-wide EPR rose from 58.8% in 1983 to 78.8% in 1984 and further to 79.5% in 1988, but dropped to 53.8% in 1989. Thus, while the 1984 revision has raised the average protection in the economy, it is apparent that the 1989 revision has substantially lowered it.

These developments clearly represent changes in the intended direction. However, there still exists a considerable variation in the inter-industry distribution of incentives and protection.

4. The expected economic effects of the Turkish EC membership.

In the past, the Turkish trade balance has always shown a deficit, which has been consistently reduced during the last decade by its export increase, whose rate of growth was double compared with the import one. As already cleared, the textile and garment sector showed the most relevant increase.

The most important Turkey’s foreign partner is the Community followed by the Opec countries, the USA and Japan (see Table 4.1).

Table 4.1. — Turkey’s foreign commercial partners (percentage values) (a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efta</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opec</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 1988 data.

The Opec is the second import and export market and the USA represent the third one. The Community receives more than 40% of Turkish export and provides almost the same relative amount of import. The commercial flows with Turkey constitute almost 1% of total EC exchanges with third countries.

Turkish export to the EC consists mainly of fruit and vegetables (representing almost 14% of the total Turkish export) and textiles, sector in which it has substituted Honk Kong as the first supplier of the Community. The EC export to Turkey consists of electrical material, instrumental machine tools and steel.

This general framework permits to begin the analysis of the main economic effects of Turkey joining the EC. A first topic to be assessed concerns the Turkish industrial system’s competitiveness with respect to the Community one, so to identify the sectors of potential competition.

Recent studies affirm that almost 75% of the Turkish industrial system should stand tougher competition deriving from a progressive integration of that economy in the communitarian one (4).

According to these studies, about fifteen industrial sectors, out of fifty-three considered, producing 22% of total production, are not able to compete internationally, while an other 35% would necessitate some form of protection during the transition period. Thus the sectors which could compete successfully on the European markets are those already operating on them: in particular the textile and some steel producing ones. On the contrary, the less competitive sectors are those strictly dependent on internal demand such as the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, the cement sector and the car and mechanical sectors (5).

Table 4.2 shows the percentage average quotas of some Turkish export categories to the EC over three different five-years periods.

Table 4.2. — Average quotas of Turkish export categories over different five-years periods (percentage values).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1983-89</th>
<th>1984-84</th>
<th>1979-79</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit and vegetables</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spun textile</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspan fibre</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and steel section</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From Table 4.2 it is possible to see the sharp decrease of export shares of tobacco, fruit and vegetables and food categories. The de-


(5) At this point of the analysis a “caveat” is added by the Commission: “... it would be premature at this stage to express a definitive judgement on the competitive capacity of the Turkish industry, since it benefits substantially from import protection and export incentives”. See Commission (1989).
crease in the most recent five-years period of export of spun textiles and unspun fibre categories after an increase during the second period examined, must be weighted with the constant increase of the garment sector. A possible explanation of this phenomenon is that Turkish export has moved up in the value added chain, i.e. from the raw material to the semi-manufactured products (6).

Due to the remarkable importance of the EC markets for Turkish export of textiles and garment, its joining the Community may result in an increased competition for the European firms operating in this sector, specially for the Italian medium and small firms (see Table 4.3). Among the principal EC's partners, Italy represents the second export market for textile and the third for garment, but the values of both quotas may not represent a future threat for these firms on the home market. The garment's export quota to Germany may be a worrying future threat for small and medium size Italian firms, since Germany is their first export market. Thus it may be possible that the Italian firms will face a tougher competition on it as a consequence of Turkey joining the EC.

Table 4.3. — Geographical distribution of Turkish export of textile and garment sectors (percentage values) (a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Textile</th>
<th>Garment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Germany</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Italy</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— UK</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Others</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-East</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) 1987 data.  
Source: Guaschi, 1990.

Turkish firms' competitive advantage in these sectors with respect to their European competitors may not be sufficient to explain their export performance reported in Table 4.3, specially if we consider the fact that Turkey has substituted Hong Kong as the third exporter to the EC.

Recent opinions have stated that those exports have relied heavily upon subsidies granted by the Government and upon the import facilities granted by the EC since 1973. Moreover it must be considered that the Turkish Government has always rejected the application of Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) contained in the Multifiber Agreement (MFA). This decision has permitted to gain quotas with respect to the South-East competitors applying restraints.

Thus the competitive advantage shown by the Turkish firms depends on institutional factors which a full EC membership should deeply modify, so to diminish the competitive pressure on the EC firms (7).

5. Italian-Turkish commercial relations.

During the eighties the Italian-Turkish trade balance has been positive, except in 1988 and 1989. In the year 1990 the positive balance has increased due to a decrease of our import, specially of carpets (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1. — Italian-Turkish trade Balance 1981-1991 (a).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>'81</th>
<th>'82</th>
<th>'83</th>
<th>'84</th>
<th>'85</th>
<th>'86</th>
<th>'87</th>
<th>'88</th>
<th>'89</th>
<th>'90</th>
<th>'91</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1160</td>
<td>1347</td>
<td>1256</td>
<td>1365</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>1384</td>
<td>2021</td>
<td>2199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>-12</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>1691</td>
<td>1555</td>
<td>1286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>-50</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>915</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Billion of Lira in annual prices and per cent variation rate over the previous year.  

The Italian percentage quota of Turkish total import has also increased during the eighties (see Table 5.2). Considering the year 1991, the marked reduction in the percentage variation rate has nevertheless permitted to the Italian quota over total Turkish import to reach the considerable level of 8.3%, though in a situation of shrinking of the internal demand.

(7) Moreover the fact must be taken into consideration that, in the near future, Turkish export to the EC will have to compete with the same kind of export coming from East European countries whose export and product similarity degrees are quite high.
though experimenting a real industrial progress connected to a new export policy, may not be yet prepared to deploy its real comparative advantages. In fact export and import competing industries are still heavily protected, more than in most Western economies, and supported by government policies. Those policies won’t be permitted after a full membership of the EC. Moreover the specialization pattern chosen may not be the optimum facing a decreasing demand in these sectors.

From the Italian point of view the Turkish adhesion to the EC doesn’t worry too much. The Italian-Turkish trade balance is positive and it seems that it won’t suffer in the next future from trade liberalization. Italian small and medium size firms in the textile and garment sectors may have to face an increase in competition on third markets, especially Germany. But also on this topic the assessments are careful to be made because it must be discovered whether the Turkish export are the result of FDI specially coming from Italian firms or they are in some sense autonomous.

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portazioni”), Roma.


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ment), Istanbul.

KÖREN H., ŞAHİE RAŞI (a cura di), 1990, Institutional Aspects of Economic Integra-
tion into the European Community, Amhrurg, Verlag Wohlschlag.


Table 5.2 — Italian percentage quota over Turkish total import 1983-1991.

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<th>Year</th>
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On the side of Italian import, it must be noted that Turkey doesn’t appear in the rank of the first twenty suppliers of our economy.

Concerning the Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), the situation up to the end of 1990 showed 12 Turkish firms controlled by Italian firms, representing 1.2% of the total. The growing importance of this area for our investment is confirmed by the employees variation rate over the last five-years period: it has shown a 120% increase. On the other hand, no investment from Turkey into Italy has been registered.

Italian FDI into Turkey may deserve some comments. As it is well known, the most industrialized countries show a consistent trend toward the localization of mature productions into low cost countries.

This trend concerns also the garment industry, where several important firms pursue the aim of penetrating into low labour cost countries to decentralize low value added parts of production and to create partnerships with local entrepreneurs.

Recent studies on the forms of Italian FDI into Turkey show that some turn keys productive agreements have agreed upon by Italian and Turkish entrepreneurs. These agreements permit to the Italian firms a strict control over the quality of the product to be exported to the Community (8).

6. Conclusion.

This paper has tried to clarify some of the different specific economic problems of Turkish accession to the EC. Industrial problems have just been considered, while problems related to the agricultural and the service sectors have been excluded.

Whether or not the Community and Turkey could absorb the pressure associated to its membership seems more a political question which can only be answered when clarity will be made about how much pressure both are willing to absorb.

In the first part of the paper it has been shown that Turkey, (8) See Calveni (1993) for a more detailed explanation of the nature of the Italian FDI into Turkey.
Riassunto — Obiettivo del lavoro è fornire un'analisi preliminare delle principali conseguenze di ordine reale di un eventuale ingresso a pieno titolo della Turchia nella Comunità Europea, con particolare riferimento alle ripercussioni per l'economia italiana. Vengono innanzitutto sottolineate le modificazioni strutturali che la Turchia ha registrato nel corso degli anni '80 nei settori produttivi exportatori, come conseguenza dell'evoluzione del sistema industriale nel suo complesso, e che ne hanno fortemente accentuato l'"orientamento verso l'esterno", particolarmente nel settore tessile. Anche dal lato delle importazioni, soprattutto con la riforma del 1984, si è assistito ad un sensibile processo di liberalizzazione. Il grado di protezione del sistema permane tuttavia elevato. Viene successivamente presentata una sintetica analisi della bilancia commerciale turca, con specifico riferimento alle relazioni con l'Italia. Si può concludere che, nonostante l'indubitabile progresso della Turchia nel settore industriale e le politiche di liberalizzazione perseguite, gli aspetti economici problematici connessi alla piena adesione sono ancora rilevanti e fanno riferimento, fra l'altro, alla permanenza di un forte sostegno pubblico e al tipo di specializzazione produttiva in cui il Paese si trova collocato rispetto ai partner europei. Quanto all'Italia, l'eventuale ingresso della Turchia nella Comunità non sembra porre problemi di particolare rilievo.

NATO AND THE OUT-OF-AREA ISSUE: THE POSITIONS OF TURKEY AND ITALY

by GARETH M. WINROW

With the end of the Cold War NATO has to adapt to a new security environment. The Soviet threat is no more with the disintegration of the USSR and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The Western Alliance is in need of a new raison d'être. With the absence of a real and potent threat the emphasis on collective defence alone will no longer suffice. In recent years NATO policy-makers have argued that the Alliance should become more involved in addressing possible risks and threats of a lesser nature which could still pose security problems for individual allies if not for the Alliance as a whole. Individual NATO members have also had to revise their foreign policies in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. Although, in theory at least, national interests should not be at odds with the interests of the Alliance, as sovereign states individual NATO members have often pursued their own particular policies without going through NATO channels.

Other institutions and bodies have recently assumed an enhanced interest in security issues in and around Europe — i.e., the CSCE, EC, WEU, and the Franco-German Corps which could form the nucleus of a European army. The emergence of these potential rival organisations has compelled officials in NATO to establish with more urgency new tasks and objectives for the Alliance. In view of this, Alliance policy-makers have been emphasising that recognised risks and situations of potential risk need to be tackled at source before they may develop to become more serious and immediate threats. Here, preventive diplomacy is required. In addition to NATO, the CSCE and EC for instance have also expressed their concern for conflict prevention. If preventive diplomacy fails or is absent, then risks may become actual threats. Crisis management may then be called for. At present, only NATO as an institution possesses the resources to launch an effective crisis management operation in or around Europe. As NATO members are gen-

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erally not confronted with serious internal stability, conflict prevention and crisis management in this context are referring to operations conducted in, or policies relevant for, territory which is known as “out-of-area”.

Throughout the Cold War Turkey and Italy were strategically important members of NATO. Both states have endeavoured to readjust their foreign policies in the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union. Both remain firmly committed to the Alliance and agree, for instance, in the value of the US maintaining an active role in Europe. Located on the periphery of NATO, both states are also acutely conscious of tensions in territory immediately beyond their borders. In the post-Cold War era Turkey and Italy remain geopolitically important states. Both, for example, could have significant roles to play in the out-of-area operations of NATO itself or of individual NATO members. Both have also attempted to conduct their own separate policy initiatives in territory which is out-of-area. This paper sets out to examine and to compare and contrast Turkish and Italian policies toward NATO and the issue of out-of-area.

Out-of-Area in the Cold War Era.

In this period out-of-area with reference to NATO was interpreted in rather straightforward terms. It was assumed that the expression referred to possible military operations in a certain geographic area. Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington DC in April 1949 defined that territory which came to be regarded as “in-area”. The signatories pledged to guarantee the security of their territories and of their forces, vessels and aircraft in the Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic above the Tropic of Cancer. The Alliance security guarantee would not automatically apply to all other territory which came to be known as “out-of-area”. However, allies could consult when it was perceived that their security interests were endangered by threats stemming from out-of-area (Article 4). No article of the North Atlantic Treaty prohibited an individual member or a group of allies from conducting for example military operations out-of-area (1). Indeed, there was no article which prevented the Alliance itself operating out-of-area.

But NATO was constituted as a collective defence organisation. By Article 51 of the UN Charter regional organisations could act in collective defence without seeking prior approval of the UN Security Council. According to Article 53, though, regional organisations would need the authorisation of the UN Security Council before conducting any “enforcement action”. It was thus the provisions of the UN Charter and not the Washington Treaty which placed restrictions on the possible involvement of NATO in enforcement actions out-of-area (2). It was not clear what was meant by enforcement actions. There appears to have developed though the assumption that actions other than collective defence were ones which involved enforcement.

Article 2 of the Washington Treaty had noted that all allies were obliged to contribute to peaceful and friendly international relations by “promoting conditions of stability and well-being”. This actually seemed to provide ample legitimate grounds for the Alliance to become collectively involved out-of-area in actions which were neither obviously in self-defence nor actions of enforcement.

One should distinguish the out-of-area activities of individual allies from policies and operations conducted by the Alliance itself out-of-area. Many allies had and still have important interests in territories which were clearly out-of-area — in colonies (although at French insistence Algeria was regarded, in theory at least, as in-area until independence), in neighbouring territory, or in a region which was of strategic importance. In the Cold War era and after one or more allies have conducted military operations out-of-area without seeking official approval of the Alliance. In these instances other allies may have lent various forms of support to NATO partners without directly participating in the out-of-area operation.

At the Alliance level one should also differentiate between out-of-area involvement and interest. Involvement in this context refers to an activity that has been officially authorised by the Alliance and then implemented in its name. This would need a consensus among all sixteen members. In the implementation more than one ally should directly participate in order to demonstrate that the activity was indeed being conducted by the Alliance and was not the policy of one member only. No out-of-area operation was sanctioned by NATO in the Cold War era. Nevertheless, in the 1980s especially the Alliance was pressured by external events and by individual allies (most notably the US) to become more interested in military, political, social and economic developments in territory which was out-of-area. Clearly, at the Alliance level involvement and interest are here interlinked. Allies would not form a consensus to sanction an activity out-of-area without previously establishing — perhaps through some “persuasion” by more influ-

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ential partners — an interest in the activity. Not all allies though
would be forced or even persuaded to take part in an out-of-area op-
eration, military or otherwise, once this operation was sanctioned by
the Alliance.

One could argue that at the Alliance level out-of-area operations
would most probably be implemented in territory contiguous or near
to territory of a NATO member. It would seem to be easier to obtain a
consensus to sanction operations in such areas rather than in a region
more remote from NATO territory. Out-of-area operations nearer to
home would also appear more legitimate to non-NATO states which
could otherwise accuse the Alliance of having pretensions to become a
global gendarme. Thus, in the 1960s for example NATO was clearly
not going to become entangled in a military campaign in South East
Asia. Individual NATO members involved in such operations far afield
would have to make use of friendly regimes in the vicinity and perhaps
rely on the services of other regional organisations.

In practice, throughout the 1950s and 1960s individual NATO
members tested to what extent they could receive support from the All-
iance in the pursuit of their own particular out-of-area interests. On
occasion therefore the Alliance made fleeting reference to problems in
territory which was out-of-area but where NATO’s involvement was
not seriously considered — eg, the French Indochina campaign in the
1950s and the US engagement in Vietnam in the 1960s and early
1970s. Criticisms were voiced within the Alliance at the lack of con-
sultation between allies involved in out-of-area operations and those
which were not. By the early 1980s the Alliance itself was obliged to
assume a closer interest in developments out-of-area with the emerg-
ence of a radical Islamic regime in Iran, the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War, the Israeli invasion of
Lebanon, and as a consequence of these events, heightened Western
concern for the safety of the oil supply routes through the Gulf. There
was more pressure on individual allies to facilitate out-of-area opera-
tions conducted by other partners by, for instance, offering en route
base access and overflight rights. Moreover, if an ally or group of allies
committed troops or assets out-of-area there had developed the expec-
tation that other partners should compensate for the diversion of these
forces from NATO territory in order to maintain a credible defence
and deterrence posture in-area. Questions of facilitation and compen-
sation were forced on to the Alliance agenda when the US prepared
the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) (later upgraded to USCENT-
COM) which could be despatched at short notice to the Gulf to deal
with out-of-area contingencies there.

Turkey and the Out-of-Area Issue in the Cold War Era.

The failure of initial efforts of officials in Ankara to sign the
North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 resulted in Turkey actually becoming
one of NATO’s first out-of-area problems. Other states recollected
Turkish neutrality throughout virtually the whole of the Second World
War and this became one obstacle to Turkey’s admission to NATO. It
was also stressed that the Alliance was meant to be “North Atlantic”
in nature. When France insisted that Italy should also be a signatory
and that the security guarantee should be extended to cover Algeria, a
differentiation was then made between the Western and Eastern
Mediterranean. There was apprehension that if Turkey were to be
become a signatory, NATO would become inevitably involved in the se-
curity problems of the volatile Middle East and Eastern Medi-
iterrenean. The Korean War aroused concern that Turkey, like South Ko-
rea, might also be invaded, and so the Turkish campaign to secure ad-
mission finally succeeded and Turkey became in-area.

Eager to demonstrate its importance to the Alliance, in the 1950s
Turkey pursued an active out-of-area policy in the Middle East. The
Menderes government regarded itself as a “vehicle for NATO” in the
region (3). Always fearful of the Soviet threat, Turkey played an in-
strumental role in the formation of the Baghdad Pact and its succes-
sor, CENTO. Turkey also supported the out-of-area operations of the
US in the Middle East. In order to stabilise the region and prevent fur-
ther Soviet encroachment, Turkey facilitated the American military
operation in Lebanon in 1958 by allowing use of the airbase at Incirlik
for resupply and refuelling. However, in this period Turkey became in-
creasingly embroiled in Cyprus. This extraregional problem would
lead to a deterioration in relations with one NATO partner, Greece.

The unilateral American decision to remove Jupiter missiles from
Turkey in 1963 and the notorious Johnson letter the following year led
to Turkish officials reassessing their role in NATO. US President John-
son had declared that the Alliance security guarantee need not neces-
sarily apply in the event of a Soviet attack on Turkey triggered by
Turkish involvement in Cyprus. In 1967 and 1973 Turkey refused to
facilitate American support for Israel in the two Arab-Israeli Wars. In
stead, in 1973 all other NATO members with the exception of Portugal
decided to facilitate US out-of-area involvement. Counting the Arab
states in order to encourage the further expansion of commercial rela-
tions, Turkey, though, jealously preserved the Soviet Union overflight

(3) The phrase is used by Philip Robin in his, Turkey and the Middle East, Lon-
don, Pinter, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991, p. 25.
Throughout the 1970s it was apparent that Turkey would be loath to facilitate the out-of-area operations of individual NATO partners. As discussed earlier, the Alliance itself never seriously considered mounting an out-of-area activity. In an official statement on 10 October 1973 the Turkish government declared that US facilities in Turkey were for the security and defence of NATO territory, including the protection of Turkey, but would not be used in connection with conflict in the Middle East (4). The Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, followed by the US arms embargo imposed on Turkey between 1975 and 1976, resulted in the Turkish authorities taking direct control over US military installations on their territory with the announcement that the bases would remain operational for NATO purposes only. The US-Turkish Defence and Cooperation Agreement of 1980 stressed that the defence cooperation envisaged "shall be limited to obligations arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty" (5). Officials in Ankara were clearly signalling their unwillingness to provide base access for the RDF. Commentators argued that Turkish support for non-NATO operations in the Middle East and Gulf entailed serious risks. The Soviet Union could feel threatened and launch a preemptive attack on Turkey. Other NATO members could then contend that because of ostensible Turkish provocative behaviour the Alliance defence guarantee would not apply (6). This issue would be raised again in the Gulf War. However, in 1983 Turkey did permit the US to use Incirlik airbase for storing non-military supplies and for refuelling to support the Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon. At the time officials in Ankara were concerned over American negotiations with the Greek Cypriot government with regard to base access rights, and were also eager to secure American backing for the Turkish Cypriot regime (7).

One point of particular concern to Turkey concerning out-of-area was whether all of Turkish territory in practice would be regarded as in-area and thus covered by the Alliance defence guarantee. Ankara was certainly in-area but was eastern Turkey in effect a "grey area" where the Alliance defence guarantee may or may not apply? For example, in one scenario, if the Soviet Union had invaded Iran and si-

(7) STUART and TOW, NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949, p. 293.

multaneously occupied eastern Turkey, carefully avoiding a strike against Ankara, would such an attack have triggered a NATO response (8)? As will be discussed later, a question mark remains today over the status of eastern Turkey with regard to out-of-area and the Alliance defence guarantee.

Italy and the Out-of-Area Issue in the Cold War Era

Italy, like Turkey, was initially determined to prove its value as an important member of NATO in order to silence critics who had argued on the grounds of recent history (Mussolini’s role in the Second World War) and geography that Italy should not have signed the North Atlantic Treaty. Unlike Turkey’s role in the Middle East though, Italy did not aspire to be recognised as NATO’s agent in the Southern Mediterranean or in North Africa. Until the late 1970s Italy concentrated on contributing forces to the Central Front through deployments along its north eastern frontiers. Arguably, before 1979 there was no Italian defence policy other than an unquestioned willingness to follow NATO directives (9). Only in 1985 did the Italian Ministry of Defence’s White Paper for the first time since 1945 acknowledge the existence of specific threats to national security interests as distinct from those associated with Italy’s commitments to NATO. The defence of Southern Italy, the need to guarantee the flow of strategic supplies such as oil, and concern to protect Italian nationals abroad were mentioned (10).

Having refused to facilitate American support for Israel in the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, thirteen years later the Italian authorities declined to assist the US air raid on Libya. After the raid leading Italian officials made it known that in future bases in Italy would be used for NATO operations only (11). It seemed that Italy would not be prepared to facilitate the out-of-area operations of individual NATO partners. Previously, the Americans had been informed that Italian airports could possibly be used as staging bases in support of the RDF, although this would have been decided on a case-by-case basis (12).

(9) STUART and TOW, NATO Out-of-Area Problems since 1949, p. 297-298; and MAURO CHIRICOSO, Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean?, in CHIPMAN (ed.), NATO’s Southern Allies, p. 119.
(10) EUGENIO GRESSO and LILIA GIUSTONI, Continuity and Change in Italy’s Security Policy, in ROBERTO ALBRECHT (ed.), Southern European Security in the 1990s, London and New York, Pinter, 1992, p. 83.
(11) CHIRICOSO, Italy: A New Role in the Mediterranean?, p. 216.
(12) MAURO CHIRICOSO, Do-It-Yourself: The National Approach to the Out-
Like Turkey and in line with other EC members, and in contrast to the US, Italy was eager to improve relations with the Arab world and ready to be more critical of Israel. Italy also had an important economic stake in North Africa and the Middle East with its oil imports and arms exports and thousands of nationals working there. Officials in Rome came to believe that they could perhaps mediate between the West and the Arab world and thus prevent the radicalisation of states in North Africa and the Middle East (13).

In practice, and unlike the case of Turkey, throughout the 1980s Italy became more actively involved in out-of-area operations in cooperation with other NATO members. These operations though were not sanctioned by the Alliance itself. Italy participated in multinational peacekeeping activities and also offered its assets in support of non-combat actions out-of-area. Thus in 1979 an army helicopter unit was deployed in Lebanon as part of UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon); in 1982 units participated in the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) based in Sinai to guarantee the full application of the Camp David Treaty, with a naval group assuring freedom of navigation through the Tiran Straits and the Gulf of Aqaba; in 1982 and 1983 forces were despatched to Lebanon as part of the MNF; in 1984 minesweepers operated in the Red Sea assisting the Egyptian government; and in 1987 a flotilla was active in the Gulf performing minesweeping and escort services. However, after the failure of MNF 2, unwilling to be associated with American policy in the Middle East, Italy distanced itself from the out-of-area operations of the US. Seeking to avoid the “Lebanon Syndrome”, Italy and France were not willing to coordinate with the US in the 1984 minesweeping operation. Italian officials were also keen to stress the technical, non-political nature of the operation (14). In contrast to Turkey, Italy has also compensated for the out-of-area activity of NATO partners. Hence, in 1980 when the British, French and American fleets were deployed in the Indian Ocean to keep open the Straits of Hormuz at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War, Italy stationed more naval units in the Mediterranean to compensate for the reduced American presence there (15).

Italy shares with Turkey a concern for terrorism which may have its source out-of-area. The Kurdish question will be addressed in this context later. In December 1983 terrorists slaughtered innocent civilian

Out of Area in the Post-Cold War Era.

A recent document of the North Atlantic Assembly notes that with the end of the Cold War NATO should assume new “core functions” in addition to its traditional emphasis on collective defence. These core functions are namely, crisis management and the need to project stability to former adversaries (17). Both would entail a heightened Alliance interest and involvement in policies out-of-area. Crisis management, envisaged under the authority of the UN or CSCE, would essentially involve “peacekeeping” operations out-of-area, although in reality these operations would more likely be of a sanctions-enforcing, peace-making, or peace-enforcing nature. Projecting stability to former adversaries refers in particular to cooperation with the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which includes in its ranks states of the now defunct Warsaw Pact and the newly independent republics of the former Soviet Union.

Before the Soviet Union disintegrated the landmark NATO Summit in Rome in November 1991 adopted a new Strategic Concept for the Alliance. With the end of the Soviet threat, officials acknowledged that security should be perceived in a broadened sense to include not only military but also political, social, economic and environmental as-

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(13) Greco and Guzzon, Continuity and Change in Italy’s Security Policy, pp. 79 and 81-82.
(15) Ibid., pp. 171-174.
pects. The Alliance still had to contend with risks which could become threats to the security of individual members or to the Alliance as a whole if left unchecked. According to the Strategic Concept, risks would not likely result from "calculated aggression against the security of the Alliance". Rather, risks would be the product of instabilities arising from economic, social and political difficulties out-of-area in regions such as Central and Eastern Europe, the then Soviet Union, the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East. In these areas problems concerning ethnic minorities, contested borders, unemployment and general economic hardship, uncontrolled population growth etc. could encourage inter alia weapons proliferation, the rise of extremist ideologies, inter-state disputes and mass migration movements (18)

The perceptions of individual allies could differ over whether a risk situation or threat had emerged to endanger the security of one, some or all NATO members. But no longer having to fear a possible Soviet response, generally allies became more willing than in the Cold War era to assume an interest in out-of-area issues.

The Strategic Concept emphasised the importance of preventive diplomacy — crisis anticipation and prevention — to tackle potential and actual risk situations before they could become threats (19). The first NATO out-of-area operation was an example of preventive diplomacy. The Alliance sanctioned and then participated in a humanitarian relief action airlifting EC food and medicines to the CIS in January 1992 (20). This first NATO out-of-area operation, made possible by the end of the Cold War, was not a military exercise but, ironically, a mission to rescue NATO's former enemy. Through the establishment of the NACC in December 1991 NATO aimed to foster increased stability in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The NACC provided a forum for dialogue and consultation and promoted defence co-operation and arms control. Although membership of the NACC associated the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with NATO, they did not become members of the Alliance. The Alliance security guarantee did not incorporate their territories and hence they remained in effect out-of-area. The extent of NATO's influence via the NACC in the former Soviet Union must be seriously questioned though, as Russia regards that territory as firmly within its orbit.

When preventive diplomacy fails crisis management may then be called upon. The Alliance is in the process of restructuring its forces to have the flexibility and mobility to become involved in a crisis management role out-of-area if necessary. Reaction, Augmentation and Main Defence forces are envisaged. As part of the Reaction Force a Multinational Rapid Reaction Corps (MRC) consisting of land, sea and air components will be assembled by 1995. In the Gulf War, although the security of Turkey and Western access to oil were threatened, the Alliance did not sanction a role for NATO in this out-of-area crisis. Instead, individual allies were free to participate with a number of non-NATO states in an international coalition which was mobilised to oust Iraq from Kuwait in line with a UN Security Council resolution. With the crisis in former Yugoslavia, the Alliance, though, has become involved in an out-of-area operation, attempting to perform a crisis management role. Although the security of no NATO member was immediately threatened, the crisis in the Balkans threatened values which the Alliance claims to hold dear.

In early September 1992 NATO ambassadors agreed in principle to despatch forces to former Yugoslavia to protect humanitarian aid convoys under UN command. An Alliance out-of-area operation was sanctioned, but individual members were under no obligation to participate. Unlike the earlier relief mission to the CIS, this operation clearly also had a military component. It was to be conducted in a battlezone with the troops instructed to return fire in self-defence. In reality this would not be a peacekeeping operation as there was no peace to keep. This out-of-area involvement could potentially assume the form of a peace-enforcing if not peace-making role. In former Yugoslavia, NATO is also helping to enforce UN sanctions imposed on Belgrade. A NATO flotilla is assisting in the implementation of economic sanctions and Alliance aircraft are enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Hercegovina. Aircraft are also on standby to protect UN designated safe areas in Bosnia. If all the warring parties could agree to a peace settlement NATO has promised to deploy further forces to enforce it. Although in the post-Cold War era security has become more multi-dimensional, the crisis in former Yugoslavia has illustrated the continued importance of the military factor.

The Alliance has been mindful that other organisations and bodies such as WEU, the Franco-German Corps and CSCE have taken an increased interest in developments in territory which is out-of-area. This appears in turn to have provided a further incentive for officials in NATO to formulate more clearly the intentions of the Alliance with regard to out-of-area. In reality, other organisations and institutions are at present unable to mount medium- to large-scale operations in territory beyond NATO. Without US support neither WEU nor the

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(19) Ibid, p. 8, paragraph 32.

(20) G. Vor Meixner, NATO takes up its new Agenda, "NATO Review", Vol. 40, no. 1 (February 1992), pp. 3-4.
Franco-German Corps have the logistics, intelligence and airlift capacity to organise such out-of-area missions. Indeed, aware of their deficiencies, WEU and the Franco-German Corps have promised to coordinate with NATO out-of-area. The CSCE remains a political process rather than an international organisation. It lacks an enforcement mechanism of its own. NATO along with the NACC has offered to provide forces to the CSCE for peacekeeping operations, although the CSCE is in principle opposed to involving itself in peace-making activities. Given the shortcomings of the CSCE, the NATO-UN connection is assuming particular significance. Indeed, it is quite possible that in accordance with Article 53 of the UN Charter the UN Security Council may in the foreseeable future authorise NATO, perhaps in tandem with the NACC, to perform out-of-area enforcement actions on its behalf on a regular basis. The NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping presented a report to the NACC Ministerial Meeting in Athens in June 1993 which examined the possibilities of the NACC becoming involved in peacekeeping, peace-making, peace-enforcing and other operations out-of-area under the responsibility of the UN or the CSCE.

Clearly, the out-of-area issue is now firmly on the Alliance’s agenda. However, in contrast to the Cold War era, the issue has become somewhat more complex. The Alliance must coordinate with other organisations and institutions. In particular, the formation of the NACC has raised additional questions with regard to out-of-area. The non-NATO members of the NACC (themselves part of out-of-area) appear willing to cooperate with NATO in crisis management out-of-area. The in-area/out-of-area distinction is here becoming more blurred. Within the non-NATO members of the NACC one should perhaps differentiate between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. At present it is doubtful whether Russia would approve of NACC and hence NATO involvement in peacekeeping missions for instance in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Moldova or in Tajikistan.

In contrast, the out-of-area issue with regard to a possible “threat from the south” to NATO is more straightforward. According to an Alliance document published in 1991, the increase in the number of ballistic missiles in the arsenals of Mediterranean states posed one potential threat. The spread of terrorism with the growth of “Islamic fundamentalism”, and the danger of a flood of political refugees and economic migrants from North Africa to Southern Europe were also identified as possible threats. The report added that Turkey and other states bordering the Mediterranean would probably have to adjust their security policies to make them “more multidirectional”. This would enable these states to be more prepared to contend with “multi-

lateral security risks” as opposed to confronting a “unilateral military threat” (21).

Turkey and the Out-of-Area Issue in the post-Cold War Era.

In the post-Cold War era in place of the Soviet threat Turkey has become increasingly apprehensive about instability around its borders which has arisen in part because of the break up of the Warsaw Pact. Officials in Ankara in these circumstances are now in favour of extra-regional involvement by the Alliance. Alarm at developments in the Balkans and determined to relieve the plight of the Bosnian Muslims, the Turkish government has been only partially successful in its attempts to play an active role in the NATO sanctioned out-of-area operation in the Balkans. Offers to despatch troops on missions to accompany the UN relief convoys, to protect the UN safe areas in Bosnia and to help enforce a settlement if agreement could be reached between the warring parties have all been rejected. Turkish units have participated in the naval blockade and are helping in the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia, but permission was not granted to ready aircraft to assist in the protection of safe areas. Bearing in mind the Ottoman legacy, a Turkish presence on the ground would undoubtedly enflame the local Serbs. Thus, in this instance, although Turkish forces will help NATO to continue to enforce UN sanctions, involvement in a future Alliance peacekeeping, peace-making or peace-enforcing operation seems exceedingly unlikely. Turkey, though, is proceeding to ready its forces for possible future crisis management roles under NATO auspices. Together with Italy and Greece, a Turkish division has been allocated for the RRC which will operate from Germany, and a brigade readied for the southern region multinational division to function under the RRC.

In line with this recent enthusiasm for NATO’s out-of-area involvement, Turkey has also lately been more willing to facilitate the activities of individual or a group of NATO members on non-NATO out-of-area missions. In the Gulf War NATO allies were granted over-flight and landing rights with use of the Incirlik airbase. Turkey also indirectly participated by closing its oil pipelines running from Iraq and by stationing 200,000 troops on the Iraqi border to tie down a substantial part of Saddam Hussein’s forces. In the aftermath of the Gulf War Turkey facilitated and took part with other NATO partners in a non-NATO humanitarian relief operation out-of-area to relieve

the Kurds of northern Iraq. This mission has assumed a more obvious military dimension under the designation Operation Poised Hammer. American, British and French aircraft are continuing to use facilities at Incirlik to enforce the no-fly zone over northern Iraq. One should note in passing that in the Gulf War there was a debate in Germany over whether the Alliance defence guarantee would apply if Iraq attacked Turkey on account of what were called “provocative” air sorties launched from Incirlik. This debate also once again raised the issue about whether eastern Turkey was actually in-area or out-of-area.

Concern that WEU could perform an active out-of-area role in the future was another reason for the Turkish government to support current and advocate future out-of-area involvement by NATO. Unlike Italy (and Greece), Turkey is not a full member of WEU. As an associate member Turkey has no voting rights or power of veto in WEU’s decision-making process, although Turkish officials could attend meetings of WEU Defence and Foreign Ministers and Turkish units could even be deployed in military operations conducted by WEU. This could open the possibility of Turkey helping WEU in combat without being guaranteed the support of WEU members should Turkish territory be attacked as a consequence. From the prospective of WEU, Turkey was out-of-area. With regard to CSCE, Turkish officials have indicated that NATO could act as the security agent of the CSCE beyond NATO territory. In March 1992 Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin reminded reporters that Turkey had proposed that NATO should provide peacekeeping units to lend backing to CSCE decisions. Çetin singled out a role for NATO along these lines in Nagorno-Karabakh should a ceasefire be arranged. The Turkish authorities have probably become less eager to promote the CSCE-NATO linkage with the continued failure of the CSCE to establish a ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, as noted previously, the CSCE is opposed to involvement in peace-making or peace-enforcing actions.

In addition to supporting the Alliance in a crisis management role out-of-area, the Turkish government in the post-Cold War era has developed its own policy of conflict prevention and crisis management in territory beyond NATO. Members of the Alliance generally recognise that these initiatives are often in the interests of NATO. Turkey’s high profile in Central Asia is appreciated by many allies who are anxious that the region should not be further destabilised for example by Iranian-inspired Islamic radicalism. In the summer of 1992 the Turkish sponsored Black Sea Economic Cooperation Scheme (BECS) was inaugurated. This organisation, which included all the Black Sea riparian states and also Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece, Albania and Moldova, seeks to promote the freedom of movement of capital, business and trade in the region. Although not a political or security organisation itself, in the medium to longer term the BECS could help to stabilise the Black Sea region with its interest in enhancing governmental and non-governmental cooperation in such fields as trade, business services, telecommunications, transport and the environment. Elsewhere, Turkey has organised regular meetings at the Foreign Minister level with Syria and Iran to discuss regional issues including the Kurdish question. A Turkish initiative aimed at managing the crisis in Bosnia proved unsuccessful in November 1992 when a Balkans Conference assembled in Istanbul (where leading Italian officials were also represented) failed to make any headway. In its efforts to be a regional stabilising force Turkey has lobbied to enlist the support of organisations such as NATO, the CSCE, the ICO and the UN.

In the post-Cold War era perceptions of risk and threat stemming from out-of-area may differ within NATO ranks. In theory difficulties may arise if one ally perceives that its security is threatened from developments out-of-area but other allies disagree and fail to take preventive measures. At present the views of Turkey and its Alliance partners seem to coincide about the possible danger of a ballistic missile attack against Turkey’s territory or concerning the prospects of a flood of refugees streaming across Turkey’s frontiers should the situation in the Balkans, Caucasus or northern Iraq worsen. These are currently perceived as risks rather than more immediate threats. And, as noted above, several of Turkey’s NATO partners did come to the assistance of Turkey when thousands of Kurds sought refuge in Turkish territory after the Gulf War. Terrorism, in connection with the outlawed Kurdish organisation the PKK, is one potential problem though for Turkey. Is the Kurdish problem here an out-of-area issue bearing in mind that many Kurds also inhabit Syria, Iran and Iraq in addition to living in the south east and other parts of Turkey? Does the Kurdish problem pose a risk or security threat to Turkey in the eyes of the Turks and the Alliance as a whole? It seems that the current Turkish government is unwilling to find the answers to these questions with possible good reason. If Turkey ever were to raise the Kurdish issue at the Alliance level and seek support against what it may argue was a threat to Turkish security (territorial integrity) largely originating from out-of-area, the consequences for Turkey could be grave. Placing the
Kurdish issue on NATO’s agenda could lead to certain allies making public their sympathy for the Kurds. This could thereby set in motion a process which may indeed threaten Turkey’s territorial integrity through signalling to certain Kurdish groups that the borders of eastern Turkey could come under question. Turkey’s preference to negotiate with the Syrian and Iranian governments is understandable given these circumstances.

*Italy and the Out-of-Area Issue in the post-Cold War Era.*

As with Turkey, history (Mussolini’s ambitions in the Second World War) has prevented Italy from more actively supporting the NATO out-of-area operation in the Balkans. There are no Italian troops on the ground nor aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone. However, Italy is coordinating the naval blockade and through use of its air bases is facilitating air activity over Bosnia. An Italian airforce general is commanding the operation to enforce the no-fly zone. Italy would become a key staging area if NATO troops are eventually called upon to enforce a settlement in former Yugoslavia. Although unlikely to see action in the Balkans, the Italian F1R will be ready to perform a future crisis management role out-of-area within the RRC. In comparison to Turkey, it will probably be easier for the Italian military to prepare units for the RRC as the F1R has been operational for some time.

In the Gulf War Italy was actively engaged out-of-area with other states in an international coalition to expel the invading Iraqi army from Kuwait. Italian naval units enforced a UN economic embargo and Italian aircraft took part in sorties against Iraqi military targets. The Italian government allowed use of its territory for transshipment purposes thereby facilitating Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Moreover, along with Belgian and German units six Italian aircraft were despatched by NATO to eastern Turkey in the first ever operational deployment of the Allied Command Europe — Air Mobile Force (ACE-AMF). The Alliance had agreed that Turkey was under the threat of an Iraqi attack from out-of-area and had acceded to Ankara’s request to deploy the ACE-AMF as a precautionary measure. Italian units also initially participated in the Kurdish relief operation in northern Iraq immediately after the Gulf War.

Although a full member of WEU, Italy like Turkey values the importance of NATO. The authorities in Rome regard the Alliance as a guarantee against possible Franco-German domination in Europe (25). Nevertheless, when holding the EC Presidency in the sec-

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(25) GRECO AND GIUFFRONE, Continuity and Change in Italy’s Security Policy, p. 78.

ond half of 1990, Italian officials had endeavoured unsuccessfully to merge WEU with the EC (26). After this reversal Italy coordinated with Britain and in October 1991 issued an Anglo-Italian Declaration on European Security and Defence. This declaration referred to the prospects for an enlarged out-of-area role for WEU but at the same time underlined Italy’s subordination to NATO. The creation of a European Reaction Force “autonomous and separate from NATO” was envisaged capable of functioning out-of-area on peacekeeping missions or in response to threats to WEU. It was far from clear how states could provide contingents for this new force given recent defence cuts. The declaration also noted that NATO should be the “essential forum” for the security and defence commitments of NATO members according to the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that WEU would form a European pillar firmly within the Alliance (27).

In similar fashion to Turkey, in the late 1980s and early 1990s in what were in effect exercises in conflict prevention, Italy, through its Socialist Foreign Minister Gianni De Micheli, attempted to conduct an effective out-of-area policy of its own. As part of an Italian Ostpolitik the Pentagonale was launched in 1990. This organisation, which had many features in common with the BECS (although in the Pentagonale there was less scope for non-governmental cooperation), became later known as the Hexagonale and then the Central European Initiative (CEI) as more Eastern European states joined. By mid-1993 there were ten members of the CEI. Like the BECS, the Pentagonale and then later the CEI was intended to complement rather than rival the EC, and provide a vehicle to integrate Eastern Europe with Western Europe (28). Italy also aimed to counter increasing German influence in the region (29). According to one commentary, Italy had an ambition to redesign peacefully a geographical and economic concept of Mitteleuropa (30). However, unlike the BECS which immediately prior to its founding conference decided not to admit what was by then a disintegrating Yugoslavia, the CEI has become a victim of the crisis in the Balkans. Yugoslavia was a key member of the original Pentagonale. In recent months the CEI has lost its sense of direction and this

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(28) FERRARI, Italy, p. 188.


increasingly unwieldy body is no longer under Italian control. At the
CEI Summit in Budapest in July 1993 delegates clashed on the ques-
tion of whether the organization should handle political as well as eco-
nomic issues. The somewhat disillusioned Italian Premier, Carlo
Azeglio Ciampi, suggested that the CEI could focus on matters of free
trade, reforming the economies of Eastern Europe and improving re-
gional infrastructure, but added: "There are no special ideas that can
be conceived here that would be based on a miracle or bring about a
miracle" (31).

Another Italian initiative aimed at conflict prevention in territory
which is out-of-area, on this occasion targeted at the Mediterranean,
has also failed to meet expectations. In September 1990 at an interna-
tional gathering in Palma, Italy and Spain proposed the formation of a
Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean
(CSCM) to deal with the possible "threat from the south" (32). The
intention was to create a CSCE-type institution which would include
all states of the Mediterranean and Gulf region (hence including Tur-
key). Such a grouping would be much less homogeneous than the
CSCE because of the different values of the various peoples occupying
the region. The CSCM has thus remained only on paper. For example,
no reference was made to it in the Helsinki Document of the CSCE re-
leased in July 1992. Even a more limited Franch initiative to increase
cooperation between France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Malta and theive members of the Arab-Maghreb Union has floundered after the UN
imposed sanctions on Libya as a consequence of the Lockerbie air dis-
aster. Perhaps the establishment of a NACC-type body for the south
organised initially to supervise regional arms control could help re-
duce the danger of threats from the Mediterranean and Gulf. Certain-
ly, Italian officials must be mindful of the possibility of a ballistic mis-
ile attack remembering the Lampedusa incident of 1986. The large-
scale influx of refugees and economic migrants from the south is an-
other potential problem the authorities in Rome are aware of, but in
recent years the actual threat has come from the east with thousands of
Albanians attempting to seek refuge in Italy. Here, though, Opera-
tion Pelican – Italy's own humanitarian out-of-area mission – has
proved successful. Although the Italian government is also on the alert
against the threat of terrorism stemming from out-of-area to its south,
there is no equivalent of the Kurdish question to tax officials in Rome.

(32) For details of the CSCM see FERNANDO RODRIGO, The end of the reluctant
Partner: Spain and Western Security in the 1990's, in ALIBIO (ed.), Southern European
Security, pp. 111-114; and VICTOR YVES COUHAMI, Toward a Mediterranean Helsinki-type
Process, "Mediterranean Quarterly".

Conclusion.

At a time of such uncertainty it is clearly not possible to make
firm predictions about the future of NATO even in the short term. The
Alliance is still in the process of attempting to adapt itself to a rapidly
changing international environment. The forthcoming NATO Summit
called by President Clinton is likely though to address in some detail
the question of out-of-area and NATO's responsibilities there. Will in-
area indeed expand to include Eastern Europe for instance if full NA-
TO membership is extended to some non-NATO NACC members?
How will NATO-NACC respond to further developments in the Balka-
ns? What will be the nature of the UN-NATO-NACC linkage with re-
gard to out-of-area? Will Russia work to block this linkage or even
emerge as an out-of-threat itself to the Alliance? And what will be the
impact of other issues on NATO and out-of-area such as defence cuts,
the German reluctance to become involved beyond NATO because of
an interpretation of its Basic Law, and the possibility albeit however
distant of a common European defence policy?

In the near future the general contours of Turkish foreign policy
are not likely to change. In spite of increasing criticisms from the me-
dia and the public in Turkey over what is regarded for some reason as
a passive policy, the Turkish government will most probably continue
to work for regional stability hoping to make use of organisations such
as NATO and the BECS. Thus Turkey will remain eager to participate in
or support NATO sanctioned out-of-area missions and the out-of-
area involvement of individual or of a group of allies. The continued
facilitation of Operation Poland Hammer is more controversial, but of-
icials in Ankara will most probably continue to press for the exten-
sion of the mandate of this operation in order not to damage Turkey's
image in the West.

On the other hand, in contrast to Turkey, Italy has become more
inward looking in recent months. Problems of corruption in high of-
cine, a large government deficit and accumulated public debt, and a
more fractionated party system with the emergence of new, powerful
protest parties has resulted in the abandonment of a more active Ita-
lia's foreign policy. De Micheli is no longer in charge at the Italian
Foreign Ministry. Under the latest Ciampi government it seems that
Italy has reverted back to a policy where the emphasis is on support-
ing the activities of NATO and the UN (Italy has been involved in UN
"peacekeeping" missions in Somalia and Cambodia for example). But
new, separate Italian out-of-area initiatives are not envisaged in the
foreseeable future. Disappointment over the fate of the CEI and the
failure to realise the CSCM must still rankle some Italian officials.

According to one analyst: "Italy is a European country in the
Mediterranean and not a Mediterranean country in Europe" (33). Officials in Ankara would perhaps claim that Turkey is a European country in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Black Sea region. Italy’s European credentials are guaranteed. Turkey’s are not fully acknowledged. In the future, as the Alliance and some individual allies may seek to pursue a more active out-of-area involvement in regions such as Eastern Europe, the southern Mediterranean and the Gulf, Turkey will most probably offer to participate in or facilitate such operations not only because of a concern for regional stability, but also on account of a perceived need to boost its European credentials by demonstrating Turkey’s value for the Alliance and its individual members.

Riassunto — Il cosiddetto problema del « fuori area » va assumendo importanza crescente per la NATO nell’epoca successiva alla guerra fredda. In precedenza, l’espressione « fuori area » si riferiva, di fatto, a possibili operazioni militari esterne al territorio della NATO. È sempre stato tuttavia necessario distinguere interessi « fuori area » da coinvolgimenti di singoli paesi allievi che si verificavano indipendentemente dall’Alleanza stessa. Si propone ora che la NATO faccia proprii nuovi obiettivi fondamentali, cioè la gestione delle crisi e la promozione della stabilità nei paesi extra-assessori. Entrambi le attività comporterebbero un’interfacciatura all’interesse e del coinvolgimen-
to dell’Alleanza in attività fuori-area. Negli ultimi anni, ed in contrapposizione ad alcuni periodi della guerra fredda, Turchia e Italia hanno appoggiato il coinvolgimento fuori-area della NATO ed hanno altresì perseguito proprie politiche di prevenzione dei conflitti e di gestione delle crisi in territori esterni. È probabile che la Turchia persista nel promuovere il proprio ruolo di rilevante fattore di stabilizzazione a livello regionale, mentre i politici italiani che si occupano di relazioni internazionali, già dislusi a causa dei propri recenti fallimenti in interventi fuori-area, sono al presente distratti da problemi interni.

(33) Ferrara, Italy, p. 192.

FROM DURKHEIM TO HARDY: A POSSIBLE HYPOTHESIS ON REREADING THE NEW POLITICS OF LOCALISM
A Post-Script to Durkheim and Labriola
by FARUK BIRTEK

I. In Search of a New Methodology.

It should be noted from the outset that the point of view expressed in this text is not absolutely precise. This novel and speculative approach is aimed to provoke discussion and reflection. The Assabiyah is presented as a phenomenon. The aim is to justify and legitimise a new, versatile theory, by questioning the rigorous prevailing principles. This method is in conflict with the traditional paradigms of sociology; it is hoped that the abandon of traditional structures is forgiven in this exploration.

Scope of debate:
1) The debate is multi-faceted, the main objective being to redefine the Durkheimian paradigm, and prevent its demise.
Durkheim’s theory, and its paradigmatic sister, Labriola’s Marxism (1), will be depicted as one case, since they share many features.
2) New maps and boundaries will be drawn (with greater atten-

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This is written in the spirit of an appreciative celebration of the centenary of the first publication of Durkheim’s Les Règles de la Méthode Sociologique (Paris, 1895).
In terms of the debt this article has incurred, in specific terms, I believe it will be self-evident how much this article owes its existence to S. Mardin’s “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?”, Daedalus (1973) which by its publication opened a totally new vista for the historical sociology of the Ottoman empire and made the work of many students of this subject, and mine, possible. For a more general and personal debt, I am most grateful to I. Sunar for his contribution over many years to my own intellectual development: its traces lie deep in any theoretical virtues which might exist in this article but yet are so numerous that it is impossible to account for them here in any detail. However, in particular, I could mention in two direct ways Sunar’s work shaped the current article: one is Sunar’s overall critique of the Sociological paradigm; and second is Sunar’s preliminary work to conceptualize Ottoman Social Formation.
tion), disregarding previous theory, saving both Durkheim and Labriola's Marxism from a misguided perception of weakness, based on mis-guided judgement.

The above, unleashes a desire for further and more profound exploration and for a better understanding of the exogenous Durkheim/Labriola terrain.

Here is where we begin to redraft and remodel Ibn Khaldun's theory on periphery, regionalism and localism, to depict 'the theory of the new Assabiyah' (2).

This theory is supported with the example of Turkey post 1950. The validity of this example in other similar geographies cannot be explored in this text.

Our current task is to create awareness of newly emerging trends in Italian politics.

5) Our third aim, connected to the last observation, is to create a new environmental context (niche), the current ideal (among most populations) for the location of 'the new town', being in-between village and city centre. This assertion leads us to redefine and identify 'future globalism'. This theory has been inspired by Thomas Hardy's novels. The process mentioned above can be traced to the English countryside of Wessex a century ago and has since been extended to many other geographical locations.

The prevailing trend of new towns located between urban and metropolitan areas relates to my final aim, which is not a geographic issue, but one of political organisation.

4) My ultimate aim is to offer 'sparks' (however unrefined and simple they may be), forming the basis of a new political approach in the field of political ecology. This theory should be named 'politics of relative affluence' and should argue and demolish the primitive and inadequate theory of "relative deprivation". In this context we will analyse the prevailing mode of political organisation, the phenomenon and typology of the 'town' versus traditional village and city.

Many differing phenomena of power co-exist in conglomerates (megalopolis), however unstable they may be. However, it is the politics of the region which will shape the outcome and determine the distinct future of these new trends. The goal of this task is to create a distinction between the 'subjectivity of political action', beyond the boundaries of the Durkheimian Marxian methodology.

This is the core of the study of the structure of history, technically referred to as 'social formations'.

I shall associate the new town theory to the field of 'politics by affiliation', since it is distinct from its city counterpart associated to the 'politics of anonymity', and the village theory associated to the 'politics of affinity'.

This process is an illustration of what should be considered a prototype of 'the new politics of localism'.

To conclude, I shall briefly trace the arguments sustaining this theory. This leads to an obvious conclusion, the acceptance and understanding of:

(i) New town politics in relation to the 'politics of affiliation'.

(ii) The shift of opinion in the paradigm of Marx and Durkheim. It is the endemic quality of cultural traditions, which in turn leads to the regeneration of hope, which brings about change in economic orientation, key component of national productivity.

Only Schumpeterianism can fully explain how economic organisation can become the variable in economic performance. It is only here that we begin to understand the relevance of economic activity in the process of intertwining culture, tradition and politics. The key for this distinction lies in the conceptualisation of culture. In Marx and Durkheim these aspects are given and taken for granted.

In Schumpeter's theory it becomes a self regenerating force (similar reaction caused by labour within Marxism Institutions within Durkheim).

This methodology is most applicable to the Schumpeterian economic world. I propose to link this theory to the 'new assabiyah', iden-
tifying the politics arising from the affiliation of the principles of anomicity or affinity, speaking à la Weber (3).

II. From Durkheim to Hardy: ‘Recasting the Current Nexus of Contemporaneity towards a Theory of Relative Affluence’.

I will begin by trying to ‘liberate’ the Durkheimian boundaries from their unnecessary slumber. I have previously touched upon this theory. In my previous article (4), my argument began by placing the century old wake of the French Revolution in question. During this long wake the Durkheimian theory (faithful to the ideology of revolution entailing enlightenment) proved to be the best approach for nation building.

In this earlier text, I argued that the political creation of the Turkish Republic, in the first quarter of the twentieth century, (the outlined paradigm of revolution and enlightenment) proved the most effective method for the reconstitution of a ‘society’, from the scattered remnants of a traditional conglomeration of communities.

In addition, I have tried to illustrate the success of the Durkheimian paradigm in its accomplishment of creating its own methodological limits. I will expand on this thought.

The success of this theory heavily relies on its executioners’ belief in its appropriateness, as ‘the tool’ required for the realisation of a predetermined historical purpose (a particular historical operation). However, in the Turkish chapter, this theory becomes victim of its own success, running into an ‘operational crisis’. This is mainly due to its practitioners having been given the task of redefining the strategies required for the political reconstruction required in the lead up to the First World War. This ‘crisis’, in turn, led to imperialism.

The success of imperialism, led to the natural consequence of lack of freedom of interpretation, causing economic problems which led to the downfall of the Durkheim paradigm, and the vindication of Labriola, albeit momentary.

This sustains my view that a ‘dogmatic theoretical paradigm’ has its natural limits, which come full circle when considering the full historical context in which it is placed. A valid theory is one that takes in account its historical context, allowing its practitioners political superiority over others. The irony however is that, however good a theory may be, the historical context changes continuously. Furthermore, history is effected and changes according to the success of the chosen

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(3) Cf. Footnote 29, below.

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theory. This inevitably leads to a ‘social crisis’. This I proclaim a vicious circle!

The first of these ‘social crisis’ in the Turkish history, is directly associated to the interests arising from economic formations: i.e. the defined interests of the Durkheim paradigm led to economic results that could not be upheld by the Durkheimian paradigm. This is where Labriola’s (good student of Marx) ‘class-full’ theory of progress proved to be correct (5).

For the most part, crises do not lead to radical change. Crises tend to be endemic and repetitive or to perpetuate themselves. Internal arising can only be considered as a mean of radical transformation, when linked to the global context and associated to other international conflicts of the time.

However low the Turkish people’s interest may have been, the Turkish crisis of 1950-1990 continued to exist. The main reasons behind such a long duration can be accounted to:

(i) Its connection to other international affairs of the time.
(ii) Populist uprising in the Durkheimian paradigm; i.e. military action and force (coup), however unstructured in theory as means to a pre-defined solution.

The second methodological limit to Durkheim however has risen much more recently.

This is perhaps due to the macro-changes in the world society as they find their mirror-image in the Turkish crisis. This methodological limit of Durkheim is more general than the first one, and it equally incorporates the Marxian paradigm which the Durkheimian theory could not grapple with.

This methodological boundary is hence at a higher/more general epistemological plane. This is the methodological crisis which arises when the Durkheimian-Marxian paradigms confront the “communities”. A most particular kind of a Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft terrain which “throws-off” the premises of the Durkheim-Marx methodology. Here, I think, Weber is most germane.

The social context I have in mind is when the Durkheimian paradigm faces the challenge of the “town” society. My next task is then to analytically specify this social terrain, the town, distinct from the urban/metropolis on one hand and the village on the other.

Secondly, the task is to indicate how the Durkheimian/Marxian paradigms in their joint methodology fail to explain the phenomenon that the contemporary town faces, and why this is the area where Weber’s theory most applies. In short, in Durkheim’s political “discov-
ery" of the town I want to unearth another — different from the above — limit to the Durkheimian sociology, a limit which embraces both Marx and Durkheim, for reasons which I shall briefly discuss in that later context.

What should be stressed from the outset is the epistemological premise I am now referring to. First and foremost, the Durkheimian theory is indeed the most ingenious theoretical paradigm which lies in the core of analytical sociology; it embodies an epistemological break of no little proportion.

Its limits only serve as an indication of the "correctness" of this paradigm. Each paradigm, if coherent and sufficiently explanatory, must have its limits, and in fact the limits of a paradigm often attest its explanatory coherence. Paradigms cover particular processes which can be operationally identified as "social terrains", and one such type of operational terrain is the history of social formations. Therefore, not all theories/paradigms are valid; nor, do all valid theories/paradigms cover all social processes, or are appropriate to any historical contexts.

Secondly, political practise is one form of historical operationalization. A "correct theory" yields "resources" to its practitioners as part of the "normal affairs" of a society (i.e. resource flows that systematically benefit the correct practitioners are part of the structural processes of societal reproduction). However, correct theories and their practitioners might change the very conditions/context in which that theory has been valid, to make that theory come to its historical limits of interpretation.

As a consequence to that political practise either the system gravitates to an increasingly lower level of equilibrium with ensuing fragmentation, (i.e. loss of coherence in the system occurs with gaps emerging), or, as a part of this phenomenon, an increasing use of force is imparted onto the system in order to compensate for the tendencies of lowering the equilibrium levels and for "patching up" the gaps.

Now, let me discuss the contemporary town in which the Durkheimian theory finds its methodological nemesis. The town in this particular form is different from the traditional towns, which are stipulated to be different from the villages or the cities in terms of their population size and geography.

For us the contemporary town is different not only in its demography but moreover in its phenomenological context. This difference draws from the Durkheimian city on its threshold. Hence this new town is embedded in a world which is a consequence of the success of the Durkheimian society. Its novelty relies on its relative adjacency to the Durkheimian metropolis: it is this relative urban proximity which makes our concept of the new town different. This is yet only a "relative" adjacency, as the town has the relative option to partly foreclose itself to the city. It has, nonetheless, constantly to reckon with it: it cannot escape from that urban reality tangential to it. Conversely, it is also separated from the village, since this one is also potentially adjacent to the city, however removed from it. Hence one specific quality of the contemporary town is its tangential relationship to a successful Durkheimian society.

The contemporary town that I have in mind is illustrated in the novels of Thomas Hardy, where the English nineteen century countryside is depicted. I believe that the rise of the hardyesque town as a new contemporary phenomenon has today acquired tremendous voluminous significance. Hence its investigation is not only for the very good purpose of understanding the Durkheimian paradigm and its limits, but it is also most relevant for the global picture which we saw prevailing in the last few years. I believe that it will come to dominate, more and more, the future, by drawing both the world energies towards new conflicts and regional wars and the energies that need to be channelled to provide peace as a response.

Here I want to argue that a new political force has arisen in the horizon of global turmoil. It is to be distinguished from nationalism as we have known it so far: child of the 19th century. Today's form is a new force built on an earlier parallel paradigm, of the late 18th century. Briefly, we can trace the differences between these two concepts of "collective action". The late 18th century concept of collective political action, whose roots descend from the French revolution, was a reaction to the Enlightenment of Kant, or, of the earlier Voltaire. This Volksgeist movement, ensuing largely from the Romantic notions of community, is where today's reconstructed "ethnic" politics at the world scale derive from.

Here I want to explore how this reconstructed action has arisen in the last decade. I want to propose a hypothesis for its rise; furthermore, I want to argue that this is no old wine in new bottles but it is a new phenomenon with respect to "culture and politics", a new phenomenon which the classical social theory cannot understand.

I shall argue that this novelty is best captured by bending the much older concept of Ibn Khaldun's 'Asabiyyah' to the new context. My hypothesis is that this new polity arises at a particular juncture, whose specificity also shapes the new political force. It arises at a particular location, the specific location where it arises having been best described by Hardy, than by any other social scientist: that particular town's society in transition, sitting on the threshold of modernity.

My view is that the town society, distinct from the village and the
urban, is the location of this new assabiyah, and it arises from a necessary blending of the old and the new. It is the consequence of the specific tension arising when the tangent of the traditional paradigm crosses the tangent of the structure of new opportunities. It is the politics of tradition-lodged privilege, extending itself to a new realm of economic opportunity. In this context, "culture", as a passive variable of Durkheim, in that paradigm a reactive social category which at best provides meanings in the urban sea of meaninglessness — becomes an active social force to shape politics, alike, for example, what Durkheim had thought of political processes — i.e. a non-institution but phenomenologically conceived social category (6).

Durkheim is a student of the urban and of the city. Town or village categories are eventually to be absorbed by the urban, by the "modern", as it was for Tönnies or Maine. I am arguing here that a new context has arisen in which they will not disappear as long as the urban fails to transform it; and today, more than ever, these desiderata are primarily politically defined. Which of these identified categories — that I will identify in terms of their relational ecology and not of their geographical or demographic attributes — would survive and shape the bulk of human geography depends on what type of political processes will ensue and what results will eventually prevail.

The future of politics will inform us which distinct phenomenology of power will prevail be it the politics of town or that of cities. What is relevant to our discussion is that the new town context sets a specific imprint on its politics, which is phenomenologically distinct both from the city/urban and the village. This result is due to the system's internal structure in addition to its contemporary connection to the urban and the traditional village.

III. The Political Economy of the New Town and it’s Assabiyah: A Preliminary Hypothesis.

Here I will discuss how this tradition based on privilege that defines the town political culture by extending itself to the modern avenues of economic opportunity, finds in assabiyah politics the best approach to short-circuit its tenuous position.

Its political success alters its initial position and converts the

town into a historically viable social category. This is what defines the specificity of new town politics. In other words this is the element which gives a particular twist to culture, turning it into a political force redefining the future of this force emerging at the tangents of the new and the old. This force becomes 'the fixed pole', in relation to which other relations are written in town society, thus preserving the town as a permanent social reality and preventing its absorption into the urban, as Maine and Tönnies and even Durkheim had envisaged.

Therefore, above all, the contemporary town is a different and undissolvable social category of today's social ecology. Secondly, it is the town at a particular historical context which we are analysing. Whether this specific context is to become historical permanence is an open-ended question, which only the future of politics will determine. It is therefore irrelevant to question whether the assabiyah is a passing phase. Nor is it correct to think of this phenomenon as a sub-section of the essence of the non urban, a town in isolation, a remnant of the town's past. The assabiyahs future relies on the urban. My question is whether the urban will be able to transform the town that lies in its immediate periphery, that is competing with, however hostile it is to it, or whether, in the case of defeat, the city itself will be able to accommodate with the 'phenomenology of the new assabiyah' of the new town politics.

It might be worthwhile considering, even if only momentarily, how this phenomenon is distinguishable from the cases in which the traditional relations are maintained or reinforced by their submission to capitalism. This is what has previously been identified by academics as the expansion of capitalism and the "development of underdevelopment". The discussion of these cases was part of an important breakthrough in the Marxist understanding of the contemporary theory of underdevelopment.

However radical a departure those discussions may be from the more classical, evolutionary renditions of the marxian paradigm, still in those cases the mode of organization is assumed to be static and not fluid; surplus extraction benefits from freezing the production organization rather than making it an instrument of production; here, organization is only a medium through which labour is extracted; it has an arithmetical, linear relation to production: a simply case of a Cobb-Douglas function. This treatment of production relations is most patently found to be appropriate in large extractive, raw material oriented economic activity: either as in the examples of low productivity "rye" agriculture done on a large scale, basic to the history of second
serfdom, of the East of Elbe and similarly argued by Gerschenkron (7) for the later authoritarianism of the 'Junkers, or in the examples of plantation and enslavement in the history of the American South which Genovese (8) so brilliantly contrasted to modern industrial production to explain the origins of the Civil War. However, Gerschenkron had earlier described, is not just a medium, but it is part of the very instrument of production. It might be analogous, conceptually, to what computerization did to new economic activity in the urban context. A dimension of technical progress which is not "labour-saving" but "capital-saving", which of course Marx had to exclude from his model of capitalist accumulation: a conceptual flaw which also influenced to no lesser degree the later schools of conventional economics.

Perhaps, it was because of this conceptual bias that the marxian paradigm failed in its predictions about the "ultimate crisis" and the "overthrow" of capitalism, and the conventional science of economics failed in its appreciation of the current crisis of the 90's. In the new context of the town, organisation is the new instrument of production, and physical technology is only its dispensable accessory. Whether in the new town or in the new services of the urban economy, accumulation does not "impersonalize" social relations but on the contrary pursues the grids of "repersonalization", in the neo-communities of lost urbanity, or in the reconstruction of cultures of reaction in the new town society where the new "tribal" niches of power readily thrive.

In this new context, town society, enmeshed within a nexus of a larger urban context, is saddled with a new political process, the new assabiyah: a political force emergent according to its ability to forge politics with culture, invent tradition in the service of power, replenish the communal phenomenology for putting old privilege in the bottle of the new economy. My contention is that from the new politics of economic interest a new concept of community ensues, now reinventing a tradition but within a slightly different language; a language of tradition ultimately infused with new economic opportunity, offering itself as a source for individual identity so far as the latter is absorbed and converted as a part of the new input of technology as organisation. In the meantime the new informal economy abounds, as low capital intensity and high know-how — whether bred by tradition or service skill — prevails to articulate.

(7) A. GERSHENKRON, Bread and Democracy in Germany (Berkeley, 1945).

Only then, from force and economic opportunity, the new culture of identity is issued, but only precariously. In this world of new labour processes — Was Braverman discovering something new when he thought he was original in re-reading the old? (9) — romantic notions of the particular, the new anthropology of the native, the ethnography of the unique is most apt in the towns' resistance to their urban absorption, when all they want to uphold is the new opportunities which they incorporate from the city in their proximity, while aspiring to maintain their preexisting communal basis of power and privilege; that is perhaps what unifies, unknowingly and most innocently, so many of the groups of right-wing politics with a part of the green movement.

Before I conclude this methodological discussion, let me go back to Durkheim, to redraw its explanatory boundaries, to reach its theoretical limits from which the new methodology of new assabiyah will be suggested. Durkheim and Marx share the same methodology, but with different theories; the new towns and their new politics, politics which we called of "relative affluence", cannot be understood by either theory; these phenomena call for a new methodology: a methodology of course limited to the motions of the new assabiyah arising in the new towns and not for the origins of that assabiyah, not for the structures which makes this assabiyah possible and relevant. Again for the latter question, Durkheim and Marx share the methodology I believe most suited for that question; and equally, it is their methodology which will inform me in the forthcoming discussion of Turkish traditionalism, whose historical fixity would be understood in terms of a history read in the frame of a Marxian concept of social formation; it is that traditionalism which, I will argue, prepared the niche for the particularity of the new towns. In turn, the nationalism which had the most particular transformational impact on the historical traditional society by its politically impulse, would be conceived in terms of Durkheimian categories. only then the new assabiyah with its new methodological requirements becomes relevant. Hence each terrain is set for a different methodology; phenomenological reading of political processes is no substitute for a structurally grounded analysis of history, but also vice versa; that is, neither the structural paradigm is a substitute when late-capitalism fails to transform the town society to its own extent, and thereby making "culture" much more than a reactive category of the Marxian and Durkheimian mold. Here, culture becomes a political force which shapes other social processes, and breeds on its political success. In the meantime the new informal
economy abounds, as low capital intensity and high know-how — whether of tradition or of new forms of intelligence — prevails to articulate.

Which informal economy, whether the new town or the recommodali- zed urban/city, whether the expertise of new services/skills or the involuted know-how of tradition, would embody the new assabiyah obviously depends on the historical context, depends on the “geology” of the “plied-up” divisions of labor. Below, for the empirical ground- ing of the above methodology, I shall discuss one case where the continuity of the town traditionalism would be historically argued with refer- ence to the new niche of the contemporary upsurge of a particular assabiyah build on relations of “affiliation”. My contention is that, whether the historical town traditionalism renewed in the context of a new division of labor, or the recruspuculization of the urban process in the context of the new informal sectors on the outer edges of new of division of labor, similar methodologies are called forth for explain- ing the motions of new the politics.

Yet, this new methodology of the town or the “town-like” urban- ity does not dismiss the structural methodology of the question of its origins. However many versions might exist for each, no good scholasticism could confuse the story of Genesis with Proverbs, and vicever- sa (10). Yet, I would point to the weakness of the earlier methodolo- gies of “neo-corporatism”, which prevailed in the high corridors of political science (11); they discovered a new phenomenon, but failed to notice its new economic roots: that is, they were correct in identify- ing a new type of politics, but they failed to develop its new methodolo- gies; they discovered the new town-like politics but failed to notice the Hardyesque texture of the new assabiyah. Giving up Marx and Durkheim was not enough; they had to be more careful to incorporate Weber, Schumpeter, Ibn Khaldun to the new world of St Paul and the Corinthians; they might have been in need of a new theory of politics of the new economic relations which, however different in origins, still resembled in methodological terms the revival of traditional towns in the new economic context.

**Durkheim, Labriola, Tilly, Mardin and a Search for a New Political Anthropology: The Political Ecology of Assabiyah (12).**

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(12) This is notwithstanding the brilliant and seminal work of Morton Fried. Cf. Morton Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology* (New York, 1967). His work is in the great tradition of Marx and Weber: and the one be-
which today appear as neo-localism, neo-regionalism, etc. Hence, the emphasis here is not on the historically particular context, but on the more general methodological issues; the particular Turkish example is hence rewritten with this general methodological concern and should not be taken in its particularity. The intention is not of course to offend the historian by historical error, but to read history with analytical purposes foremost in mind, of course without violating the findings of historical research.

In the political creation of the Turkish republic (1908-1923) the paradigm of modernity provided the necessary "elan" for reconstituting a "society" from a previous "collection of communities", and a republican state from the remnants of a semi-patrimonial polity. Yet, this Durkheimian theory of society and political vision, however successful in building a new society and a new centralist polity, also created, once succeeded, the potentials of its own failure. As I argued in an earlier study in this journal, this contradiction surfaced as a dilemma, though often unknown to its practitioners, between "state legitimation and economic policy", as the ends of economic and social progress were increasingly achieved according to the overall vision of this theory.

To quote from that study, "... a good deal of the success of the "Turkish Political Revolution" was due to its fundamental modus operandi shaped by a Durkheimian positivistic optimism... Durkheimianism, shaped in the political society of the Third Republic, found its most devoted carrier in the historical struggle of the Turkish "center" which inherited the structural supremacy of its functional position from its Ottoman (patrimonial) past. In this new context the Turkish political center was however endowed with a new texture — the texture of a particular brand of nationalism, the nationalism of the Third Republic. The Turkish republican construction had found its momentum in the Durkheimian theory of society, and that momentum proved to be crucial both for its internal agenda and its external success... the new Turkish centralist structuration and the ideological grid of the "Turkish transition" had been thus squarely grounded in Durkheimian "progressivism"... "The international context after the First War, encouraged that particular political struggle to be forged into a nationalist republic; and furthermore that republican nationalist itinerary was... privileged by its Durkheimian mental cast to overcome its rivals and adversaries... yet the success of this wonderful marriage of ideology and historical juncture did in many ways create the very structures which possibly in the long run undermined the Turkish Durkheimian republic, and created its vibrant alternatives... "For example, economic policies of the republic could be seen as the social instruments, connected to the successful political transition, to reinforce the structuration around the Durkheimian political center. But, it was also the case that in the epitome of (that) successful Durkheimian practice, the economic tail did eventually wag the political head to perhaps prove Durkheim’s 1897 attempts (Revue Philosophique, 1897) of disproving Labriola slightly futile when put through the acid test of historical hindsight?... "... (Here) I will thus investigate how much history has vindicated Mr Labriola, how much of the Turkish revolution was dissipated in the hands of an albeit belated "class-full" interests. I will try to show in this context, how a Durkheimian policy fails to cope with its contradictory consequences often because of its roots in the French Revolution, a Revolution which could not and did not resolve the Jacobin vs. Girondins conflict other than shelving it with Napoleon. If it was partly on this lack of resolution on which the Third Republic had built its own liberal institutions, and conversely on which the Turkish republic could not, perhaps because it was, in contrast to its French counterpart, primarily an outcome of a political and not a social revolution."

Furthermore, the conclusion of this study anticipated the current essay: "... This might yet also to remain only a momentary vindication of Mr Labriola. In a subsequent article, as a post-script to the current argument, I will propose to draw the limits of Durkheim’s and Labriola’s methodologies. Both theorists have proven to be much more of akin than they each thought of the other. Both had been grounded in the same, wholistic theory of society and both shared the same Enlightenment optimism and rationalism, and thus they would eventually share the same methodological dilemma. Consequently, in that post-script, I will propose to dismantle the paradigm of "Center and Periphery", propose to dissolve the dichotomy of politics vs. economy (or its minor variant "state vs. class"), and thus seek to abandon the central methodology of this paper. That sacrifice would be for a preliminary search for a new methodology, perhaps more appropriate for the new social forms and totalities, which might be rapidly commencing to pervade in the 1980s and 1990s, partly as the unintended consequence of the "universalizing" historical momentum of the Durkheimian/Labriolan practice". The current discussion I hope will also help to open that future vista" (14).

i) The Further Dilemmas of the Durkheimian Paradigm: Culture and Community or the Republic versus the Peripheral Assabiyah.

Continuing in the same vein, here, I want to suggest that one can capture a similar irony, a similar dialectic, first, at the level of "culture

and community”. This dilemma however is more prodigious; it calls forth a new methodology. I will suggest that, again in the context of the same particular historical example, in the Turkish transition to modernity, the Durkheimian theory of society, actualised in the real, could not accommodate the social forces it unleashed by destabilising the traditional communities as a part of its universalistic “organic solidarity”; and, in the realisation of the democratic state as a part of its “liberal bourgeois” political vision, the ends of political legitimacy and political participation became even less compatible than it had been under patrimonial authority. In short, as a new hypothesis, I want to argue that once the Durkheimian conception of society is achieved, a new type of crisis emerges as the new cultural norms of the Durkheimian paradigm fail to account for the specific questions of “social integration” which the success of the Durkheimian developmental perspective “throws-open” in its realisation.

The particular manifestations of the “post-Durkheimian” crisis, the way the questions of successful Durkheimian universalist integration reveal themselves, depend on the particular texture of the traditional order which the Durkheimian process displaces or starts to displace. For that purpose, in terms of our historical example, we thus have to analytically describe the Ottoman social formation which the republican societal project purported to replace.

I will start with a hypothesised model of an Ottoman Social Formation, different in its emphases, and different in its internal logic from most of the comparable models, perhaps with the exception of Sunar to whom it owes a great deal (15). In this stylisation, Ottoman history on the whole could be described as having had developed according to the patterns most suited for the exercise of its particular type of political authority, i.e. Ottoman patrimonialism as typified by its Classical period in the 16th century. In that context, i.e. in the context of what we might call the Ottoman Social Formation, the ends of political control and patrimonial continuity was impinging on a social stability through the immobility of societal units structurally exogenous to the political organisation. In that respect, Ottoman social formation necessarily encouraged the types of social organisation in which social units remained self-enclosed and substantively disjoined from each other. At the ecological level this is best captured by the prevalence of village communities in the countryside, and the “mahalle” (quarters/districts) in the urban setting. Institutionally speaking, the same immobility and foreclosure can be said to be reproduced for the Classical Period, in the strength of the urban guilds and in the semi-insularity of the religious communities of various sizes. In turn the politically defined strength of this type of social formation relied on the disjoined immobility of its extra-political social organisation.

Hence, political supremacy necessitated, as a part of its logic, the immobility of diverse communal structures. The deep and enduring traditionalist nature of this society arises from the strength of this type of “corpsuscized” social organization. If the unyielding traditionalism could be a sufficient evidence for its source in this type of “efficient” social arrangement, we could then think of the Ottoman social formation as a “collectivity of communities”, adjoined by the over-arching and supra-communal, but socially superficial, extensity of political organisation. The transcontinental trade had the same geographical extent, the same over-arching place, but remained socially even more superficial, despite its most essential role, as adjoined to the centralist political authority, in order to secure its fiscal viability and the mainstay of its structural superiority. In this context, interregional trade was not the solvent of the system, but only a crucial contributor of the patrimonial state’s political supremacy, until the legal opening of the local economies in 1838, an added reason for intercommunal segmentation. The “millet-system” as another layer of determinacy whether in its pre-1839 segmental Insularism, or in its post-1839 form as a part of “Ottoman social pluralism” (16), only reinforced this structure, until the political authority was eventually radically undermined by the First World War. Thus, the logic of the system, in the ideal-typical sense, historically articulated the political exigencies of patrimonial authority with this static community based social organization.

Furthermore, it is in this successful articulation of the exigencies of the political role of a particular patrimonial authority, and in this particular type of social organization typified by the corpsuscized immobility of its social units, that we should seek the explanation of the


(16) When we come to the 19th century, with the Tanzimat reforms and the subsequent Constitutionalism, this particular politically defined Ottoman social formation as its natural extension as its internal development within the context of the other changes in the 19th century, will readily evolve into what we might call, coining a new term, “Ottoman Social Pluralism”. For reasons hinted earlier above and which will be developed in another forthcoming article, “Ottoman, Social Pluralism” is intimately connected with Ottoman political elitism which incorporates all ethno-religious groups in the public/political realms without dissolving their private/communal moorings and constantly strives and structurally endorses the superiority of the former over the latter segment of each status/personal identity without trying to destroy the latter. It was this masterful socio-political “free-floating”, this otherwise most delicate balance, which was destroyed by Wilso’s doctrines and the First World War; and that forceful rupture I think still lies as the reason behind most of the otherwise indecipherable instabilities in the area. Cf. F. BTRA, The Tale-End of the Eastern Question: Franks and the Ottoman Near East at Its Post-War Crossroads, forthcoming.
terrain which we today in our contemporary vision anachronistically call religious toleration. The maximization of local liberties under the Ottoman rule was not due to an anthropomorphized sense of “tolerance”—which after all could only be a trait of human personality and thus not an appropriate concept for typifying societies—nor due to a cultural norm of benevolence. Had these been the reasons, it would have been much more precarious and open to the whims of history and to the rapid erosion of time. My contention is that the optimization of local liberties was a by-product of Ottoman social formation as defined by its political exigencies; it was due to the exigencies of the Ottoman brand of Patrimonial rule which partly relied on the disjointed, corporitized and in the long run static nature of communally reproduced social organization. Once this corporization is accepted, then what in retrospect appears as religious tolerance and ethnic libertarianism is better explained as part of the structure of a social formation: hence less ephemeral and less precarious in itself as long as it is the necessity of the expansive interests of a control-orientated political authority, as part of maximizing of political interests. As a corollary, the crisis in political authority, i.e. what Weber called Sultanism, has severe consequences for “religious tolerance and ethnic libertarianism”, thus proving this intimate connection of a particular type of political authority with expansive impulses and with hyper-exigencies of control, and the solidarity of the socially conservative communities.

Perhaps the success of this cohesive structure might have also militated against the rise of capitalism in the Ottoman empire until the 19th century, though its economy had been a large beneficiary of interregional trade, and though its geography had made it contiguous to rising capitalism for three centuries. Ottomans sat on the threshold of capitalism, facilitated and contributed to its rise but remained, as its contemporary Venice and Genoa, only what might be called, a “para-capitalist empire” (17).

I believe that the success of the Ottoman empire in this articulation of the two converse processes—one, the communal, flowering in its static, and the other, the political, in its expansive nature—partly lies, as the dual reason for both, in the historical endurance of its political stability, and in the long entrenchment of traditional culture as vested in local communities. In this most fundamental way, the “community” had the immunity of its tradition, and the state the ebbs and flows of its history. If this general description is correct, some other problems with the Durkheimian mode of transformation come to the fore. The Durkheimian ideology of social and political organization accompanied with the rise of rapid marketization of economic relations, had no categories for this type of community-based social organization, nor for the traditional cultural norms vested in it, other than its almost militant rejection. In the Turkish context I had observed the success of the Durkheimian vision, its association with political rule, and its eventual coupling with the expansion of capitalism (18). Durkheimianism, successful in the transformation of the political authority and the urban society on its wake, reached its self-estrangement when it politically tried to force itself into the texture of traditional communities. This might partly explain why the opposition to the Republican regime in the early years mostly came from the traditional segments of the society. This yet is not the context when we have to seek for alternatives to the Durkheimian methodology nor to abandon Mardin’s model; this so far could be construed as a conflict between the Durkheimian centre and the communal periphery.

The crisis context, I believe, arises at a later period, that is, when the Durkheimian policy paves the way for a rapid economic penetration of the countryside as a result of the economic expansion subsequent to the 1950s. The populist rhetoric of the 1950s’ DP (Democratic Party) governments in this context can be seen as a political response to this disintegration in the countryside, without a clear alternative to the Durkheimian paradigm (19).

As this transformation of the countryside gains pace and urban migration accelerates in the late 1960s and 70s, and the community bases of social organisation are torn apart, the Durkheimian paradigm ceases to offer any viable guideline to the crisis of culture arising from its own successful disestablishment of the traditional communities.

(18) For the later Durkheimianism, the Republic, and the dissolution of the Durkheimian with the ascendance of rural capitalism, See my The Rise and Fall of Etnik in Turkey, « Review », New York, 1985. In that study in comparison to the contemporary, the principal aim, without denying the important changes in the structures of the world economy in the 1950s, 1960s, and the 1970s, has been to construct a theory for the internal transformations grounded in the local and national structures and then seek to explain the consequences of their possible articulations, endemic to each period in the world economy. In other words, it is not to deny the empirical significance of the world economy, but it is instead to elucidate the explanatory paradigm at the level of the local/national structure, historically given and, at that juncture, politically defined.


5 For a comparative perspective, it might be without too much strain proper to see the Turkish Democratic Party as an analog of the Christian Democrats in Italy, during this period.
Thus, when a new grammar of obedience had to be created in the countryside in replacement of Patrimonial Authority, the Durkheimian state, increasingly without a society, had to rest its stability on finding ways to insulate the polity. In the 1980s the question was naturally transferred to the sphere of political hegemony, as how the Durkheimian state with its legal-rational premises might possibly survive without distortions its newly acquired defensive insularity (20).

iii) Reinventing the Concept of Assabiyyah: Crisis of Fragmentation and the new politics of Unity within the Periphery (21).

My argument is that if Mr Labriola had been vindicated and Mr Durkheim's critique of him had proven to be only shortsighted; this vindication nevertheless has been, methodologically speaking, only momentary (22). Both Durkheim and Labriola share company in their inability to assess the importance of communal cultures: Labriola and Durkheim both were bred in the sociology of Enlightenment and Modernity; all of us have been the children of the French Revolution.

Yet, the history of the Turkish Vandaee (23), I have come to believe, has to be rewritten, and now rewritten differently from Tilly's (24). Whether Tilly or earlier Mardin, the text was the renewed forms of the traditional opposition to the political center; in terms of our earlier study this was the Durkheimian modernity politically confronting the countryside. The Labriole critique gave it an economic mold and also an endogenous contradiction. This was at best the story of the rebellious assabiyyah, an assabiyyah of a peripheral opposition to modernity — a still continuing trend which no one can deny. But the principal aim here is to underline yet another source of an assabiyyah which the earlier stories — including mine — did not tell; this is an assabiyyah which arises from the tensions within the pre-modern community, and arises in order to heal the imminent fragmentation within that community.

This is not an assabiyyah of response, it is an assabiyyah of means, of means to circumvent the communal fragmentation arising from the economic boom by setting goals of political hegemony, creating scenarios that tap the peripheral status by the real possibility of repossessing structural power. This is parallel the way once Goffman talked about stigma as a means of reconstructing an identity which benefits its beholder (25). I.e. an assabiyyah which creates its own preconditions, an assabiyyah which reverses its customary causality (26).

Its peripheral discourse is the very sign of its surface political superiority.

This is a political force that re-creates its peripheral semiotics because it is no more peripheral, no more secondary, no more politically the inferior; here the assabiyyah is created as a political force to enable political repossess as a means to short-circuit the very inner divisions which the ascendant positions entail; hence it is an assabiyyah which increasingly arises when power is possessed and when economic affluence penetrates, and when economic affluence is best obtained through the positions embedded in the traditional-communal society but generated by its rapid exposure to the modern economy; a constant yin-yang of a situation on for social actors and for communities vis-à-vis other communities, traditional towns in relation to metropolis and villages.

In Turkey, perhaps a social revolution had started to occur in

(20) Cf. Birtek & Toprak, for the details of an argument which stipulates the possible danger of insularity which might override Durkheimianism and the "holosphere of modernity" if and when the class bases of the newly emergent political discourse is not recognized; and, cf. Burns (1994) for the distinction between "political" and "social" revolutions in the Turkish context, and its theoretical import; and the same, for the new forms of this insularity for the 1980's.

(21) Please see footnote 2 above, for the new use the concept of "assabiyyah" has been put into; it is this particular reading of the concept that I have in mind by its "invention".

(22) What has constituted the bases of the Labriola-Durkheim comparison has been first, Labriola's essais sur la conception materialiste de l'histoire (Paris, 1902), and Durkheim's critique of the same book in his review, "Revue Philosophique", XLIV, pp. 645-51.

(23) Marcin, Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?, Daedalus (1973), can be read as the analysis of the Turkish Vandaee, albeit in very different terms from C. Tilly, Vandaee, (Cambridge, 1964).


(25) L. Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New Jersey, 1963). The discussion above clearly benefited from the symbolic interactionist methodology, and in particular from the writings of Goffman, and Garfinkel, as only appropriately for the underling methodological effort to formulate the boundaries of two, on surface, competing methodologies. For this theoretical concern, I am grateful to Robert Dunn for our many years of communication on this issue; he was the first to pursue the issue of establishing reciprocity between these two perspectives and has convinced us of its importance; but in an avenue different from the way it has been pursued here (cf. Robert Dunn, Structuralism and Phenomenology: Two Competing Perspectives in Sociological Theory, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1969). I am also most grateful to David Matza for his brilliant insights and many years of guidance for students of my generation in these issues of methodology (cf. David Matza, Becoming Deviant (New Jersey, 1969)). His Berkeley graduate seminar on this and allied topics certainly made this perspectival concern possible and a lasting issue for the last two and a half decades for myself. That seminar was a source of great intellectual exhilaration for many of us who were deeply involved in the issues of theoretical sociology in Berkeley in those years of commitment and theory; and the most difficult challenge of sustaining the two again in the same context, I am grateful to the most astute and brilliant interventions of Carol Joffe (Block). It was a learning experience to be her fellow-students.

(26) See, footnote 2. Above for the self-generative dimension of the new assabiyyah. Here assabiyyah, contrary to its original Ibn Khaldunian form, creates its own peripheral status out of its political project. As the basis of its claims to immediate and imminent political power.
1950, and came to maturity in the 1980s. The agenda of 1990s, I want to propose, can thus be best deciphered in terms of a new dilemma which has emerged as the revolution of 1950 perhaps yet very incom-plete — has become to be juxtaposed within and against the structure defined by the legacy of five centuries of centralist history. This dilemma is best captured as the tensions of two interdependent, intertwined yet separate histories competing, coexisting and conflicting for the same space and time. One being the long history of the political structure that I have previously recounted, and the other the new history of the emerging revolutionary society, intermeshed within a texture of traditional communal lives. The previous timelessness of communities contrasts sharply with the ebb and flows of the history of the state. The state (and later society) has history, the community only timeless tradition.

As emphasised above, the exigencies of the Ottoman political rule required a social system which was constituted of fragmented parts fixed on a social terrain in terms of their particular relationships to the political centre; in other words, sociologically speaking, a collection of non-societies suspended by their superficial connection to an overarching political authority — at least until the 19th century Tanzimat reforms (27).

The absence of a “social” revolution — as opposed to a “political” revolution — before the 1950s secured a long, undisturbed, uninterupted continuity of social norms at the village, town and at the urban district (“mahalle”) level and had locked the collective popular “mentality” within the communal traditionalism. But if 1950 had been the beginning of a social revolution, how its most recent phase, the new social revolution, is going to be enacted at this communal level, where history had stood still by its absence, can be nobody’s guess; how “dead time” will confront “rapid time” cannot yet be known.

Thus, two political paradigms are in action: communal and Durkheimian, each with its own contradictions, intertwined but separate, partly interdependent but mostly separate, demanding a new history of the Turkish Vândee to be written. But certainly the enigmatic nature of the Turkish contemporaneity, and yet the constant political elusiveness of a consensual equation, arises. I think, from the necessity to solve these two separate political questions, the two separate dialectics, the two separate crisis at the same time; this is as if almost asking how to do the impossible: two unknowns, two motions to be put into a single equation for a solution. It is perhaps for this impossibility that

once in a decade politics is used to suspend politics, civil society is abolished to establish civil society.

In the earlier essay, I had dealt with the Durkheimian side of the contradictions which Labriola unknowingly somewhat had anticipated. There is no way to deny the importance of this motion; but when it begins to coexist with the motions of another contradiction emanating from a texture alien and different from itself, how are we then to understand the limits of the Durkheimian or even more so the Labriola paradigm? Ironically of course the beginning of the emergence of the second motion was largely due to the dialectics of the Durkheimian paradigm as we observed above. It’s only because the Durkheimian revolutions of 1908 or 1923 had been political revolutions, that 1950 could then be the beginning of a social revolution.

How that, 1950, will be “accommodated” by the Durkheimian Republic is where the test of the Durkheimian sociology will be observed, and there Labriola’s sociology might inadvertently assist. Yet, both Durkheim and Labriola at that moment face a new, unforeseen “assabiyah” which their method cannot anymore comprehend — an assabiyah whose origins might be told by Durkheim and Labriola jointly, but whose motions are most alien to their joint paradigm.

Labriola might assist in the understanding only of the origins of the new assabiyah as lodged in the new relations of class and power that the social revolution of 1950 had created from anew but not its motions. Its motions are most alien to both Durkheim and Labriola, and yet the essence of an assabiyah is discovered in its motions and not in its origins; not in the consanguinity from which it presumably arises but in its arising claims to power, as I have argued above.

One methodological clue for deciphering the motions of the new assabiyah, I think at this point, could be found in the step to abandon the “centre-periphery” paradigm of Durkheim writ in Ibn Khaldun format, and see how communities are not only the periphery — the Vândee — but that they also require a study of their own with a new method; they constitute the subject matter of a new research with a new paradigm.

The theorist who provided an understanding of the polity with the intra-Ottoman paradigm of the “center-periphery” (28), has again been the first to contribute brilliantly to the study of communities as a distinctive locus of research. In his most recent work, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey (Albany, 1989), Mardin has once more broken new theoretical ground, opening the way for a new political anthropology.

(27) Period of legal and political reform, please refer to footnote 16, above.

What is required as the next step of research, to build on Mardin's recent seminal work, is the same method we had used for unpacking the actions of the Durkheimian paradigm. For a new understanding of the communities we have to understand their new dialectic, their new inner contradictions; the method we used for Durkheim might once more prove useful in explaining the simultaneity of success and self-destruction that the contemporary communities are experiencing today.

For that first step, we have to suspend the assumption of considering the Ottoman society or even the Turkish society in terms of a sociologically defined totality.

Instead, we shall have to assume two societies and two processes in one. The first can be deciphered in terms of Durkheimian and its type of modernization, the Ibn Khaldunian periphery; and the other, sharing the same space and time with the former, is the process whereby the traditional communities are threatened by their own individual revolutions. It is a process continuing with an equally profound insecurity: economic progress with cultural reaction; their Iran and non-Iran at the same time, the sources of the new assabiyah.

Hence, methodologically we are challenged to study, in the same context, both the new tracks of a latent assabiyah and the assabiyah of a latent periphery, intertwined and competing.

For an understanding of the latter question, an assabiyah arising from the inner tensions of an “over-charged” pursuit of change and stability within the same context and often by the same social actors, neither Durkheim’s nor Labirola’s paradigm, but rather a new type of political anthropological, is, I think, called for: not an anthropology in its customary form, but an anthropology that admits the ecological discontinuities of culture and politics.

The ingredients of this new political anthropology might be a science of “political ecology” of village, town, and metropolis, as independent yet distinct and different political entities, each in need of its separate theory; and a new anthropology, an anthropology of the assabiyah, which seeks to understand “culture”, communally redefined, as a real milieu in the exercise of power, and at times, as an instrumentation in the use of force.

According to the argument of this paper, culture as a social variable in each context has a very different function in creating these three distinctly different textures for these three distinctly different types of networks of political instrumentation. My contention is that the “networks of affiliation” which are endemic to the politics of towns, which were best described by Hardy, have come to the forefront to prevail at a larger terrain, and hithero also to find a new lease of life, to reinforce themselves in the new town context.

Thus the “new political anthropology” envisaged here would propose paradigms which are fundamentally different for the political processes in each of the three ecological nodes: metropolis, towns, and villages, identifiable in terms of the texture of political relations, ideologically constructed. The way power is built and exercised in each context is conceived to be different, and the way culture is intertwined with power as a medium in its exercise, as well as an instrument in its enhancement is different, since for both instances, the textures of social relations and communal networks are fundamentally different for each of the settings. If in metropolis the politically relevant social organization is, ideologically speaking, backed on relations of “anonymity”, in the town it is built on networks of “affiliation”, and in the village on “affinity” (29).

Here in particular, what I have in mind is a “sociological anthropology” of the town as the linchpin of traditionalism and as the node which sits on the gateway to the village through its mosque society and the qaruni schools, and enhances its position by means of commerce and economic exchange. In this particular locus of two contradictory social forces, an assabiyah which retroactively creates solidarities through increasing claims to power is crucial to short-circuit the possible fracture due to a rapid absorption of radical economic change in a structure whose major political thread is communal traditionalism.

(29) Anonymity is the basis of most political and social theory which assumes the political actor as sufficiently individualized, and from that builds various organizations for influencing political process in the context of lost primordialism. This is the basis of theorists different as Mclnan, Political Parties, Lancer, Political Men; and even Tocqueville, Democracy in America. On the other hand in the village, affinity is the principal form of political networking. As people either act in unison according to their larger kinship ties, or the village community which again is often an expression of a larger kin group. In either of these cases of affinity, political action inherits some type of almost a priori similarity. Hence the term affinity its fundamental building-block is a presumption “kinship”. What Banfield might have failed to observe, in his A-moral Individualism was the unapparent, hidden lines of affinity which gives the village system a source of stability which is not otherwise apparent in to-day workings. Banfield might have tried to read a moral texture conceptualized in terms of the model of “anonymity”, hence failing to notice the moral texture implict in and indirectly governing behavior, premised on a fundamental “kinship” that rests as a shared “common-stock of knowledge” in the Alfred Schutz’s sense. In contrast, in the town, primordialism is built on a subscription to a group and which at times is validated by some vague kinship connection. The relation of affiliation, tying the town context of political networking is hence different from the associations of the urban by being primordial and retains acting “like” kin. It differs from the village as even the interjected kin relationship is most volatile, unstable, and cannot be maintained unless it is validated by a reasonable good scheme of continuing mutual benefit. Because it is the reward which help to recreate nonkin primordial relations, political power has to intimately connect membership with some material benefit. What makes this type distinctly different from others is the absolute need of immediate benefit to its affiliated member in terms of a reinforced kinship; it is this dependence on high returns for the survival of the primordialized relationship which perhaps makes this type of networking most sensitive to the issues of political power and economic influence.
It is this context which elicits the particular dimension of the assabiyah which I am here emphasising.

But, again, just as it was true for the study of the Durkheimian paradigm, successes, whether based on politics of force or on persuasion, in achieving cultural unity at the communal level, might still be also impregnated with the possible sources of its future fragmentation. Needless to say, if for the “communities” their present success might be the source of their own future dialectic, with it the “new political anthropology”, grounded in the political ecological comparisons of communities, would also find its own demise.

Thus, one day, it will need also perhaps to be replaced by an another kin of the Enlightenment social science, of Durkheim and Labriola, another in the genealogy of Apollo (cf. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, Cambridge, 1987); and the history of the Vandé might need to be then rewritten once more, but then closer to the pre-existing Tillian vision: a return to the study of the assabiyah in the old form, of the latent periphery which Mardin, in his earlier study of the centre-periphery, had us so brilliantly described, where the dichotomy of centre and periphery is politically broken forever (30).

Nonetheless, today we face the methodological challenge of studying in the same context, both the new tracks of a latent assabiyah, and the assabiyah of a latent periphery, intertwined and competing; one lodged in the methodology of Durkheim-Labriola, and the other to be deciphered in a new political anthropology, that takes the political phenomenology of the new town and its new assabiyah as its methodological core; a ying-yang situation of both politics of relative deprivation and politics of relative affluence, which makes the methodology of the contemporary town often so elusive.


(30) Cf. Birek & Torrace, 1993; and, Birek, 1994, for the crucial role politics could play in shaping the future of the contemporary structures. The irony which remains is that at the time when politics could become a crucial variable for the direction the societal structures would take, politics has also become an arcane category/value in the public mind.
L’ITALIA
E IL TRATTATO DI LOSANNA DEL 1923

di M. ANTONIA DI CASOLA

È un giudizio ormai diffuso nella storiografia italiana che non si possa parlare di politica estera «fascista» prima della fine degli anni ’20. È pur vero che il fascismo salì al potere nell’ottobre del 1922 ma, sin verso il 1929, la politica estera fu nella strategia mussoliniana, nettamente posposta e subordinata a quelle interna e finanziaria (1). E ciò per un insieme di ragioni: soggettive, quando inerenti alla necessità per il fascismo di rafforzarsi all’interno; oggettive, per quanto atteneva alla staticità della situazione internazionale che non consentiva di allontanarsi più di tanto dalla politica estera sostanzialmente tradizionale adottata da Mussolini in questo periodo (nonostante che, almeno inizialmente, Mussolini intendesse conferire «uno stabile contenuto dottrinario al fascismo proprio attraverso la politica estera» (2)).

Il cambiamento si sarebbe avuto con il sopravvivere della «grande crisi», nel 1929 appunto, quando una politica estera più dinamica si poté saldare su quella economica in un’azione volta a creare nella regione danubiano-balcanaica dei mercati privilegiati per l’economia italiana. Ecco dunque che, pur cadendo il Trattato firmato a Losanna il 24 luglio 1923 nell’epoca fascista, esso non fu però rivelatore di una politica estera propriamente fascista. L’azione italiana a Losanna avrebbe rispecchiato un insieme di interessi «tradizionali», sostanzialmente intenta a tutelare il «buon diritto» dell’Italia nei confronti del Dodecaneso.

In un contesto più ampio l’Italia, «vincitrice in guerra, sconfitta in pace», si trovava a fronteggiare un non facile dilemma. Doveva diminuire la capacità negoziale della Francia al fine di riproporre quei compensi non ottenuti alla Conferenza della pace a Parigi, e pertanto

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avrebbe presto avuto bisogno della Germania quale valida interlocutrice sul continente nei confronti della Francia; ma nello stesso tempo una eccessiva represa della Germania sarebbe stata pericolosa. Più ravvicinatamente, anche l'ostilità dell'Inghilterra non sarebbe stata un falso scorciato da superare (e Losanna l'avrebbe confermato), se non fosse stato per l'indirizzo antisovietico dell'Inghilterra, che il segretario generale del ministero degli esteri, Contarini, sarebbe riuscito a far assumere alla politica estera del nuovo governo fascista (3).

All'epoca di Losanna si stava, dunque, impostando la sostanziale contraddizione di fondo della politica estera italiana successiva al conflitto mondiale, con il risultato che l'Italia sarebbe stata costretta ad operare sui due scacchiere tradizionali, continentale e marittimo, in un movimento altalenante ora verso l'uno ora verso l'altro (4). Ma doveva ancora trascorrere del tempo perché si verificasse il passaggio dalla politica estera del «piede di casa», a quella dell'«elmo di Scipio», cioè a quella «grande politica», che Mussolini aveva già preannunciato nei discorsi della vigilia e poi nelle prime esposizioni in Parlamento, in qualità di presidente del consiglio.

Non era meno vero, però, che buona parte della diplomazia italiana, per lo meno quella coinvolta nella questione orientale, dal nuovo governo salito al potere si aspettasse un'azione più incisiva, capace di superare quel «panico rinunciatorio» che nello «sciagurato anno 1920 aveva invaso la nostra diplomazia» (5), per adoperare le parole del governatore di Rodi, De Boreda, contenute in un lungo rapporto riempiglogativo della situazione del Dodecaneso indirizzato al neo presidente del consiglio e ministro degli esteri Mussolini. E quando Mussolini prese parte ai lavori della prima fase della Conferenza di Losanna, mosso dal desiderio di rivendicare all'Italia il prestigio negatole (6), non mancarono i commenti allarmistici positivi che attribuirono alla sua presenza e alla sua personale azione, la virile soluzione favorevole all'Italia del problema del Dodecaneso (7).

Del resto un «particolare» riguardante la Conferenza caratteriz-


zò subito la presenza di Mussolini ormai al potere; e riguardò la presidenza della Commissione italiana, non affidata a Carlo Sforza che vi si era proposto (8), ma al quale fu negata da un Mussolini offeso per le dimissioni che l'ex ministro degli esteri aveva dato a ambasciatore a Parigi, in dissenso sulla politica mussoliniana nei confronti della Jugoslavia (discorso di Napoli). Sforza poteva essere definito un esperto della questione turca; se ne era già occupato, non soltanto nella sua funzione di Alto Commissario a Costantinopoli durante la prima fase dell'occupazione alleata della capitale ottomana, ma anche a Parigi, durante alcune sedute di una Conferenza indetta per le riparazioni te-
desche, nel gennaio del 1921, quando al dà dell'argomento principale si era cominciato a trattare della questione turca; e ancora, più tar-
di, nel febbraio-marzo del 1921 a Londra, durante quella Conferenza per l'Oriente che aveva avuto all'ordine del giorno la specifica revisione del Trattato di Sèvres che — era ormai chiaro — non avrebbe più potuto avere esecuzione integrale.

Non solo tecnicamente quindi, ma anche proprio nello «spinto» della Conferenza di Losanna, Sforza poteva apparire l'uomo più indi-
cato per rappresentare l'Italia in un'assise, che doveva sancire il rico-
noscimento internazionale della nuova Turchia, rigenerata da un movi-
mento nazionale come quello kemalista di cui l'ex Alto Commissario Sforza aveva, prima di altri, intuito l'importanza e incoraggiato l'azio-
ne (9). Ma tante.

La Conferenza di Losanna, apertasi il 20 novembre 1922, rappre-
semtò l'esordio di Mussolini sulla scena internazionale; non era ancora trascorso un mese dalla «marcia» su Roma e c'era chi come Poincaré «n'aurait alors dix mois d'existence au fascisme» (10). Ma già il viag-
ggio alla Svezia fu l'occasione per grandi manifestazioni riservate ad ogni stazione all'Uomo Nuovo, che avrebbe rivendicato quei diritti di cui il popolo italiano riteneva di essere stato ingiustamente defraudato. Era una difesa aspettatamente verso la vittoria che Mussolini aveva riportato nella battaglia diplomatica di Losanna. E non importava che l'incontro di Teritter (con Poincaré e Curzon) fosse giudicato dai diplomatici poco più che una «ingenuità» (11). Nell'opinione pubblica «il piede di uguaglianza», rivendicato da Mussolini, aveva già sortito il suo effetto (e di lì a poco anche la stampa inglese si sareb-
be espressa in termini altamente elogiativi sullo stile diplomatico-politico di Mussolini) (12).

Le tesi della posizione italiana alla Conferenza di Losanna erano già state poste prima dell'avvento al potere del fascismo; il « caso » vi aveva avuto parte non piccola. Nel marzo del 1922, infatti, nell'ultimo ministro Facina era stato nominato ministro degli esteri l'on. Schanzer, il quale, nominato nella carica mentre faceva ritorno dagli Stati Uniti, dovette recarsi immediatamente alla Conferenza indetta a Parigi per discutere le nuove condizioni di pace da imporre alla Turchia. Come ci ricorda il Guariglia (13), Schanzer non aveva avuto il tempo di farsi un'idea — sia pure approssimativa — della questione da trattare: posto di fronte alle precise richieste di Lord Curzon circa la posizione italiana, fu il diplomatico che lo accompagnava, appunto il giovane Guariglia, a segnare su una piccola carta geografica una linea di confine piuttosto favorevole alla Turchia di quanto non avessero proposto i francesi un momento prima.

Quelli che divennero i punti di confine « desiderati dal governo italiano » erano stati improvvisati per il dalla valutazione del funzionario consapevole che, alla luce della situazione che si era creata nei Balcani, l'interesse italiano era di estendere quanto più possibile i confini della nuova Turchia in Europa. Nell'immediato, ci consentiva di avvantaggiarsi nei confronti della Francia che, con l'accordo firmato poco prima con i Kemalisti dal Franklin-Bouillon, pareva aver recupero terminato sulla via dell'amicizia con la Turchia. L'accordo aveva scatenato critiche (14) in Italia, dove vi si vedeva una violazione dell'Accordo Tripartito, firmato insieme al Trattato di Sèvres, e Guariglia aveva agito in base a quel clima.

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Un'un accurata nota, in data 3 novembre 1922 (15), indirizzata a Curzon da Mussolini (ma in realtà « magistralmente » redatta dai Contarini (16)) rendeva chiaro il punto di vista italiano sulla complessa questione da affrontare a Losanna circa la sistemazione del confine orientale. Era la risposta a una nota inglese del 15 ottobre (provocata dalla denuncia da parte italiana dell'Accordo Bonin-Venizelos), nella quale si profilava netto il contrasto con l'Inghilterra. In termini duri e perentori il Foreign Office chiedeva il riconoscimento degli impegni precedentemente assunti dall'Italia, vale a dire il rispetto degli accordi per la retrocessione del Dodecaneso alla Grecia (Accordo Bonin-Venizelos, firmato contemporaneamente al Trattato di Sèvres il 10 agosto 1920) pena la decadenza di altri accordi con i quali Roma aveva ottenuto vantaggi in Anatolia (17). Sostanzialmente la politica filo-turcha sostenuta dall'Italia, il Foreign Office ritornava sulla tesi secondo cui il Dodecaneso era un problema concernente gli Alleati nel loro complesso, e non esclusivamente l'Italia e la Grecia che avevano sottoscritto l'accordo (18); mentre, al contrario, durante gli incontri tra i ministri degli esteri Alleati svoltisi a Londra e a Parigi nel giugno e luglio precedenti, a Roma era parso che il governo britannico ammettesse il punto di vista italiano che considerava la questione delle isole occupate come un problema tra l'Italia e la Grecia che doveva essere risolto tra di loro (19).

Professato il desiderio di andare d'accordo con il governo britannico, — principio ritenuto dai Contarini di generale utilità per la politica inglese, — e con l'aria di accettare tutto quanto diceva la nota inglese (20), il documento sottolineava che la pace con la Turchia formava un tutto unico, con relativi vantaggi e svantaggi per i vari contraenti e che quindi l'Italia « era disposta a tutti i sacrifici proporzionalmente a quelli che sarebbero stati accettati dai suoi Alleati ». In effetti, la presenza italiana nel Dodecaneso non era dovuta a « circostanze fortuite ». Allo scopo della guerra l'Italia ne era in possesso in base al Trattato di Ouchy che aveva posto fine alla guerra italo-turcha. Con apposito articolo (8) nel Patto di Londra del 1915 gli Alleati avevano sottoscrissi l'impegno che l'Italia ottenesse la sovranità delle isole e, più tardi, gli avvenimenti bellici si erano incaricati di perfezionare il diritto stesso dell'Italia sul Dodecaneso; con il suo intervento infatti, la Turchia aveva mancato all'adempimento del Trattato di Ouchy (oltre a provocare quelle rivolte, in Tripolitania e Cirenaica, che avevano obbligato l'Italia a maggiore rischio e a maggiore sforzo di uomini e di finanze).

L'assunto dei Contarini era che « quand'anche non fosse intervenuto l'impegno solenne degli Alleati contenuto nel Patto di Londra, la (17) E. COPOLO, La catastrofe orientale, in « Politica », vol. XIII, p. 176; « Orien


(19) « Oriente Moderno » II, pp. 81, 141 e segg.

(20) GUARIGLIA, op. cit., p. 20.
posizione dell'Italia nel Dodecaneso si sarebbe perfezionata compiutamente per lo sforzo da essa compiuto nella guerra e per l'azione della Turchia» (21). Quanto al successivo accordo, sottoscritto dall'ambasciatore Bonin-Longare con il Premier Venizelos, con il quale l'Italia si era impegnata a retrocedere il Dodecaneso alla Grecia, esso rientrava tra «gli elementi conciliativi» approntati all'opera comune degli Alleati nell'intento di assicurare, con il Trattato di Sèvres e col Tripartito, una pace duratura nel Mediterraneo orientale.

Stante l'assetto di Sèvres, l'Italia non avrebbe avuto difficoltà a dare esecuzione al Patto Bonin-Venizelos ma era chiaro che gli ultimi avvenimenti d'Anatolia — le vittorie kemaliste e l'evacuazione di Smirne da parte greca — facevano temere di non poter giungere alla desiderata pace «senza un'ampla revisione dell'assetto prestabilito». Il governo italiano pertanto, concordando perfettamente nel concetto che la questione del Dodecaneso rientrasse nella più ampia questione dell'assetto generale del Mediterraneo orientale alla pari col Trattato di Sèvres e col Tripartito, non poteva ammettere la resa delle armi come condizione di pace; assunto a riesaminare con gli Alleati l'assetto progettato nell'agosto del 1920 nel suo insieme per giungere a una nuova sistemazione.

Di fatto, già l'8 ottobre 1922, il ministro Schanzer aveva comunicato al ministro greco a Roma, Metaxas, di considerare decaduti gli accordi speciali con la Grecia circa il Dodecaneso (22) e tra le istruzioni in proposito fornite alle nostre rappresentanze di Londra e Parigi, perché ne informassero i governi (23), aveva raccomandato di mettere in evidenza le ulteriori difficoltà cui si sarebbe andati incontro con il governo di Ankara, che non avrebbe accettato che il Dodecaneso passasse alla Grecia e, alla conferenza della pace, si sarebbe rifiutato di rinunciare formalmente alla sovranità sulle isole a favore dell'Italia, qualora fosse esistito un contemporaneo accordo per il loro passaggio alla Grecia.

«Denunciando la Convenzione Bonin-Venizelos si evitava anche la possibilità che la Turchia reclamasse la restituzione del Dodecaneso e quindi il ritorno di quelle popolazioni greche sotto la sovranità turca» (24); era questo, inoltre, l'avviso del governatore di Rodi, De Borsari, molto contrario all'iniziativa della sua missione (agosto 1921) a

(22) La stampa nazionalista italiana considerava decaduto l'Accordo già dall'agosto del 1921, CORPOLO, Nuova politica per il Levante, in «Politica» vol. IX, pp. 25-26.
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putava saggio privilegiare le ragioni etniche e si dichiarava favorevole a cedere le isole alla Grecia (31).

Quanto a Ismet Pascia, preciso e tenace esecutore della politica di M. Kemal, personalmente impegnato in quelli stessi giorni in rivolu-
zionarie trasformazioni del suo paese, si era da subito interessato af-
finché le isole non potessero in alcun caso essere cedute alla Grecia. Per il resto, nel corso delle lunghe trattative che impegnarono la Tur-
chia vittoriosa essenzialmente contro la Grecia e l'Inghilterra, i buoni
rapporti tra le due delegazioni ebbero modo di approfondirsi (32) e (la
stampa nazionalista italiana ne attribuiva il merito alla simultanea pre-
senza dei due paesi nei governi austriaci) (33) fino a rendere chiaro, come infatti avvenne, che non ci sarebbero state particolari di-
scussioni da parte turca per la cessione del Dodecaneso all'Italia.

I contrasti con i turchi, riguardarono soprattutto la sovranità su Castellorizo, poi denominato Castelrosso (34), la piccola isola molto vicina alla costa turca che il Trattato di Sèvres aveva assegnato all'Ita-
lia, che ora la Turchia intendeva conservare per motivi strategici e che
la delegazione italiana aveva avuto istruzioni di ottenere a tutti i costi
per motivi di prestigio, non potendo il nuovo governo fascista rinun-
ciare a ciò che i precedenti governi « rinunciati » avevano già ottenu-
to (35).

Il nodo su Castelrosso venne al pettine con una nota presentata dalla Turchia l'8 marzo 1923 (36), praticamente un mese dopo che le
trattevano, a Losanna, si erano infratte su questioni economiche e fi-
nanziarie. Alla nota erano anneschi i progetti completi del Trattato e
delle Convenzioni già presentate ai turchi a Losanna il 31 gen-

(31) E. DRABARY, La question d'Orient 1918-1937, Paris, Aeka, 1938, vol. V, pp. 82-83; L. BISOLIATI, La politica estera dell'Italia dall'897 al 1920, Milano, Treves, 1923, pp. 283-288, 405-406; E con queste dichiarazioni Bisolati credette di aver servito il pae-
se? e si chiede a S. Carato, Alla dieta d'Italia in guerra e a Versailles, Milano, Mondado-
ri, 1937, p. 237. Già all'immanità del Trattato di Losanna-Ouchy del 1912 Bisolati aveva presto a cuore il destino delle isole egie e gli inglesi avevano accuratamente ammesso il

(32) D.D.I., Settim Sette, vol. I, doc. 455, 466, 473, 477; A.L. CASTELLA, (Mis-
senso, l'Italia aveva pagato le isole alla Turchia nel 1921 aiutandola a sottomettere l'attacco
aliato contro Kemal Ataturk ».


(34) Il nome di Castelrosso appare adottato ufficialmente dal locale governo italiano
solo il 31 maggio 1921, cioè tre mesi dopo l'occupazione italiana (A. BERTOLA, Comi
sull'ordinamento giuridico di Castellorizzo durante l'occupazione francese, 1915-1921, Ro-
li, Tipografia Rodia, 1924, p. 5).

(35) UGAROLO, op. cit., p. 22; GIANNONE, Le isole italiane dell'Egeo, op. cit.,
p. 320.


naio (37) con in margine le modifiche ora proposte da Ankara (38). La più clamorosa riguardava proprio l'Italia, poiché con l'art. 15 il
Dodecaneso veniva ceduto ma Castellorizzo rimaneva alla Turchia. Un posseggiamento italiano di fronte alla terraferma turca — veniva deto-
to —, in particolare di fronte alla regione di Adria, dove il Trattato di
Sèvres e l'Accordo Tripartito avevano assegnato all'Italia una zona di
speciale influenza, non poteva essere accettata dall'opinione pubblica
turca (39).

Subito il delegato italiano rimasto a Losanna non mancò di far
notare « il senso di profonda stupore e di giusto risentimento suscitato
dalla pretesa turca »; giunta tanto più inattesa in quanto nessun accen-
nò ne era stato fatto in precedenti osservazioni scritte (40), e oltretut-
to perché l'amichevole atteggiamento serbato dall'Italia « dava diritto
e non altro corrispettivo ». Roma fu così informato da Mustafa Sherif
che la richiesta proveniva dall'Assemblea generale e che Ismet era sta-
to a pareggiare contrario. Era verosimile ciò, o si trattava di tecnica
contrattuale? Tanto più che veniva suggerito che la Turchia avrebbe potu-
to desistere dalla sua pretesa se l'Italia si fosse impegnata a non cedere
in avvenire il Dodecaneso alla Grecia (41).

Su queste basi, da Londra veniva la promessa che a Losanna il go-
vero britannico — oltre a non ammettere discussioni sulle questioni
territoriali — avrebbe sostenuto il punto di vista italiano su Castellor-
izzo (42), accettando in cambio la richiesta turca della frontiera sulla
Mariza e di Tenedos. Nella questione strategica degli Stretti che era in
gioco a Losanna, Londra realizzava l'importanza del sostegno italiano
per rafforzare la sua posizione. Con ciò veniva a sbloccarsi una situa-
tione conflittuale tra l'Italia e l'Inghilterra alla quale era strettamente
tconnesso il contenzioso con la Grecia.

Dall'immediato dopoguerra, Londra aveva sempre appoggiato la
Grecia nelle sue rivendicazioni delle isole. Sin dal dicembre del 1918,
quando Venizelos aveva esplicitamente richiesto dalla Conferenza del-
l'alta pace « tutte le isole dell'Egeo, compreso Rodi e il Dodecaneso »,
(43) ponendo in definitiva all'Italia più una questione morale
basata sui principi etnici wilsoniani, che non giuridica, poiché la posi-
azione italiana, con il Patto di Londra pareva inattaccabile — l’Inghilterra, con Lloyd George, gli aveva dato man forte (44), sostenuta anche dal presidente Wilson che, oltre a basarsi sui principi etnici, al Patto di Londra, come è noto, non si sentiva legato (45).

Era stato sostanzialmente in seguito ai cattivi rapporti con gli Alleati dell’Intesa di guerra e alle loro pressioni che, nel luglio del 1919, in Italia, «l’inaffusto» governo Nitti era arrivato all’accordo italo-greco conosciuto col nome dei negoziatori, Tittoni e Venizeles: abdicando a tutta la politica italiana riguardo alle isole egree sostenuta per anni da San Giuliano e ancora agli inizi della guerra, da Sommella, si veniva stabilito che l’Italia cedeva «alla Grecia la sovranità sulle isole che occupa nel mare Eggeo» ad eccezione però di Rodi e Castellorizzo dove avrebbe concesso una larga autonomia.

Non era bastata l’esile riserva dell’art. 7 (nel caso in cui l’Italia non ottenessse soddisfazione in Asia minore, essa riprenderebbe piena libertà di azione in rapporto a tutti i punti del presente accordo) né il protocollo aggiuntivo nel quale si prometteva un plebiscito alla popolazione di Rodi nel giorno stesso (quanto ipotetico!) in cui l’Inghilterra avesse deciso di cedere Cipro alla Grecia (46), per far mutare il giudizio di «netta catastrofe» attribuito alla politica estera italiana dai settori nazionalisti che non eravano a rimpiangere la Triplice Alleanza (47) che aveva molto meglio garantito gli interessi mediterranei dell’Italia.

Creatasi una nuova situazione con il riconoscimento italiano dell’indipendenza dell’Albania, l’accordo era stato denunciato da Sforza (ministro degli esteri del nuovo governo Giolitti) nel luglio del 1920 (48) e sostituito di lì a poco con l’accordo Bonin-Venizeles del 10 agosto 1920, che otteneva semplicemente una modifica nel regime di Rodi. L’opinione pubblica italiana non aveva però tardato a manifestare il suo dissenso anche contro questo accordo; molta parte della stampa aveva chiesto di procedere tout court alla occupazione delle isole che il Trattato di Sèvres aveva assegnato definitivamente all’Italia, Castellorizzo compresa (49).

Finita, il 1° marzo 1921 (tardando la pace di Sèvres ad essere ratificata) l’Italia aveva ottenuto direttamente dalla Francia, che la occupava come concesione di Castellorizzo; l’occupazione dell’isola non era avvenuta a titolo di sovranità ma semplicemente a norma dell’armistizio con la Turchia. Contemporaneamente, il nuovo gabinetto Bonomi, con Della Torretta nuovo titolare degli esteri, promettendo un regime di larga autonomia alle due isole, ribadiva che con la revisione delle clausole di Sèvres, l’Italia si sarebbe ritenuta libera anche dagli impegni correttivi verso la Grecia, con ciò provocando una nuova costernazione nel mondo dei filo-ellenici (50).

Ora, a Losanna, dove l’Italia intendeva frenare e impedire la «megalomania greca», la nota turca dell’8 marzo 1923, confermando la volontà di cedere all’Italia la sovranità del Dodonacense, rimetteva in discussione la sorte della piccola Castellorizzo. Era spontanea, il 13 aprile 1923, la manifestazione sull’isola, nei pressi di San Costantino, con la quale la popolazione protestò solennemente per poter rimanere sotto la sovranità italiana? (51).

Di fatto, la discussione su Castellorizzo si aprì a Losanna il 25 aprile 1923, quando il delegato inglese, Sir H. Rumbold, respinse la proposta turca in base a due argomenti; il cambiamento di sovranità equivaleva a una modifica sostanziale e pertanto in accettabile, del progetto e la popolazione di Castellorizzo, sette-ottomilia greco-ortodossi, non permetteva di far rientrare l’isola nel Patto nazionale turco. La vi-vace discussione aperitiva tra la delegazione italiana e Ismet Pascha vide gli italiani impegnati a sostenere che Ankara aveva già accettato di cedere le isole (con lettera del 4 febbraio) (52) e la Turchia convinse delle sue ragioni in base a sottili interpretazioni della pace di Losanna-Ouchy del 1912 e dell’art. 1 del Patto nazionale.

Grato dell’aiuto avuto a Roma in un’ultima insidiosa vertenza con la Grecia e soddisfatto per la decisione alleata di rinunciare alle riparazioni (che gli veniva confidatamente comunicata da Montagna, quale «grave sacrificio per l’Italia»), Ismet si impegnò infine a riparare la riserva su Castellorizzo (così l’Italia ritirava quella, posta ad ar-
mandati affinché anche l'Italia fosse infine degnamente ricompensata (59).

La ratifica del Trattato di Losanna, avvenuta da parte italiana il 6 agosto 1924 (all'indomani, dunque, del superamento della questione dell'Oltralpe), leciterà l'Italia nel "novo mediterraneo", con il governo di Mario Lago e, quindi, quello di Cesare Maria De Vecchi Di Val Cismon, inteso a fascilitare la "latinità" di Rodi, "sentinella italiana nel Levante" (non senza spesso suscitare il compiacimento della popolazione turca delle isole, come nell'occasione in cui i Mutti di Rodi - entro in vigore il decreto sulla cittadinanza - emanò un manifesto con il quale si consigliò ai concittadini di emigrare in Turchia - facoltà loro conferita dal Trattato di Losanna — poiché molti erano i vantaggi assicurati dal governo italiano e, soprattutto, veniva loro accordata l'esenzione dal servizio militare) (60).

Di fatto, l'andamento dei lavori della Conferenza di Losanna, così positivo per quanto riguardava i successi dell'Italia (61), il carattere conciliativo cui era stata improntata l'azione della delegazione italiana, insieme alla gratitudine espressa da una personalità di primo piano come Ismet Pascià, permettevano di auspicare la valorizzazione in "altri campi" dei particolari vantaggi conseguiti con la Turchia (62). Fortunatamente negli anni immediatamente successivi, l'occupazione di isole minori da parte turca e le ricorrenti voci sulle fortificazioni militari di Rodi da parte italiana faranno prevalere il timore che gli auspicati "altri campi" non fossero solo quelli economici-finanziari ma celassero ben più temibili aspirazioni aggressive.

Si può inoltre aggiungere che il benevolato atteggiamento sostanzialmente tenuto dalla Turchia nei confronti dell'Italia fu alla base del cambiamento di posizione del Foreign Office verso la politica estera italiana, dal momento che Londra cercò l'aiuto di Roma nell'importante questione degli Stretti, riuscendo di fatto a raggiungere una posizione di privilegio nel Mediterraneo orientale.

D'altra parte, legata com'era alla questione del Dodecaneso, l'Italia perse per di più il problema centrale del controllo sugli Stretti, ritenendo che il Dodecaneso fosse in grado di avere una importanza equivalente. E mentre la delegazione italiana e Musolini poterono es-

(60) "Hakimiyet-i Milliyet" e "Islam" del 27 luglio 1926, in "Oriente Moderno", 1926, p. 466.
sere fieri del successo di Losanna, si potrebbe avanzare l’ipotesi, in se-
de di riasume storico, che la politica estera italiana, non lasciando il
Dodecaneso ai turchi, perse forse un’occasione per impostare una
politica nuova nel Mediterraneo (63).

Summary — Although the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 falls into the Fascist era,
one cannot say the results Italy achieved in the Conference were the fruit of a spe-
cific Fascist foreign policy.

Recent Italian historical studies concur in saying that to talk of a more typical fas-
cist foreign policy one has to wait for the end of the twenties, when, after 1929
“great crisis”, a more dynamic foreign policy could join the financial one in search-
of new markets for Italy in the Danubian-Balkan region.

Nevertheless the new national spirit embodied in Mussolini, who had just come
to power, was much granted for the success the Italian government achieved in
Lausanne.

This was represented mainly by the acquisition of the sovereignty over the Do-
decanese Islands (already decided by the Treaty of Sèvres in August 1920) which
the new Turkey, eager not to let them to Greece, would easily concede to Italy.

A sort of cooperation then took form between the two delegations, the Italian
and the Turkish ones, in spite of the question of Castelorizo, the small island
near the Turkish shore which both of

them wanted to acquire respectively for
prestige and strategic reasons.

Grateful for Italian help in drawing
new Turkish frontiers in Europe (Marit-
za) and in general in backing Turkish po-
positions against Greece, Ismet Paia at the
end withdrew his opposition presumably
held as a bargain tool.

Benevolent Turkish attitude towards
Italy was also the reason why Great Bri-
tain changed its position towards Italian
foreign policy: London looked for Italian
help in the important question of the
Strait which she could then arrange so as
to achieve a privileged standing in the
Mediterranean.

On the opposite, bound as she was to
the Dodecanese question, Italy perhaps
lost sight of the central problem of the
Strait’s control thinking the Dodecanese
could be an equivalent substitute. And
while the Italian delegation as well as Mus-
solini could be proud of the Lausanne
success, one could think that the Ita-
lian foreign policy, not choosing to let the
Dodecanese to the Turks, lost an oppor-
tunity to start a new policy in the Medi-
terranean.

L’ITALIA E LA CONFERENZA DI MONTREUX
NEI DOCUMENTI BRITANNICI

di DONATELLA BOLECH CECCHI

Nel corso delle trattative di pace che dovevano condurre la pri-
ma guerra mondiale si era avuta nuovamente conferma della rilevanza
internazionale del Bosforo e dei Dardanelli. A Sèvres, al fine di favori-
re il commercio internazionale, era prevalsa la tendenza favorevole al-
la più ampia libertà di navigazione attraverso gli Stretti. L’art. 37 del
trattato infatti, consentendo il libero transito in pace e in guerra alle
navi di tutti i paesi, sia da guerra che mercantili, equilibrava di fatto all-
a neutralizzazione degli Stretti, apportando una notevole limitazione alla
sovranità turca.

Un regime più favorevole alla Turcia fu stabilito dalla Conven-
zione di Losanna del luglio 1923, che, pur salvaguardando il principio
della libertà di passaggio e di navigazione per mare e per aria, in pace
e in guerra, nei Dardanelli e nel Bosforo, disciplinava in modo diverso
il transito in caso di guerra e di pace (1). Alla Turcia veniva inoltre
garantita la piena libertà di transito per la sua flotta e veniva assicura-
ta la tutela dei suoi interessi, nel caso fossero posti in pericolo dalla
smititarizzazione degli Stretti. Le nuove condizioni, anche se meno
grave rispetto alle precedenti, venivano comunque percepite dal governo
turco come tali da minacciare l’indipendenza del paese e sminuirne la
posizione internazionale.

Tuttavia, davanti all’opposizione della Gran Bretagna, che poteva
tcontare sull’appoggio della Francia e il consenso dell’Italia [Mussolini,
la cui conoscenza del problema era « pressoché nulla » (2), aveva ade-

(1) Per la questione degli Stretti si rinvia a EUGENIO ARCHIBALD, Costantinopoli e gli
Stretti nella politica russa ed europea, Milano, Giuffrè, 1948; MARIO FOSCANO, La Confe-
renza di Montreux e la Nuova Convenzione degli Stretti, Milano, Martucci, 1938; HARRY
Office, 1947; JAMES SHOFIELD-FRANCE DEAK, Turkey at the Straits, New York, Macmil-
lan, 1940; A.L. MACNAB, The Straits Question 1908-1936, Thessaloniki, Institute for Bal-

(2) Per la posizione della Gran Bretagna si confronti MACNAB, op. cit., pp. 181-188. Per
quanto riguarda l’Italia, Curzon e Poincaré, accordatisi prima fra di loro, si incontra-

206 e note.
rito senza grande difficoltà), i turchi dovettero cedere malgrado il so- stegno dei russi, che miravano invece alla rimilitarizzazione degli Stretti. Da quel momento gli sforzi del governo turco furono diretti al- la revisione della Convenzione di Losanna, sempre però nel rispetto della legge internazionale e nell’ambito della Società delle Nazioni (3).
Nel 1933, fidandosi nell’appoggio dell’Unione Sovietica e contando sui buoni rapporti che avevano stabilito con la maggior parte degli stati europei (4), alla Conferenza sul disarmo a Ginevra, Ankara propose la nomina di una Commissione di stati rivierasci del Mar Nero e del Mediterraneo in vista dell’abrogazione delle clausole di smilitarizza- zione degli Stretti. Ancora una volta si oppose la Gran Bretagna, so- stenendo che le garanzie previste dalla convenzione provvedevano effi- cacemente alla sicurezza militare della Turchia. Altre occasioni si pre- sentarono in seguito al riaffermarsi e alla denuncia delle clausole militari del Trattato di Versailles da parte della Germania, ma di nuovo il go- verno turco incontrò il rifiuto della Gran Bretagna appoggiata dalla Francia e dall’Italia.
Fu infine l’Italia ad offrire l’occasione sperata con l’attacco all’A- bissinia che modificò profondamente la situazione nel Mediterraneo e mise in luce l’impotenza della Società delle Nazioni. La rimilitarizza- zione delle isole del Dodecaneso e il rifiuto italiano di onorare gli ob- blighi derivanti dalle garanzie accettate sotto l’egida di Ginevra veni- vano così a privare la Turchia della sicurezza nella zona degli Stretti. Nel frattempo il governo britannico si era reso conto di dover trovare nuovi alleati per fronteggiare la crescente potenza italiana nel Mediter- raneo.
Quando il ministro degli Esteri turco Aras il 24 marzo 1936 solle- vò la questione degli Stretti trovò questa volta attenzione da parte del Foreign Office. La posizione turca al momento non era delle migliori, con gli italiani che avevano fortificato in maniera considerevole il Do- decaneso, isole a poche ore di navigazione dai Dardanelli, allo scopo evidente di dominare il Canale di Suez e gli Stretti. Il governo turco, non potendo provvedere direttamente alla propria difesa, si propone- va, in pleno accordo con la Gran Bretagna, di notificare simultanea- mente ai firmatari di Losanna la propria intenzione di sollevare la que- stione e di inviare nel frattempo sue truppe nella zona degli Stretti. Con questa procedura si intendeva evitare colpi di mano italiani: an- 

che se l’Italia era una delle potenze garanti, non si poteva escludere un’azione navale italiana contro gli Stretti, tanto più che Roma aveva dichiarato di non sentirsi legata ai propri impegni internazionali fino al mantenimento in vigore delle sanzioni (5).
Abbandonata su consiglio britannico l’idea di una occupazione preventiva degli Stretti, in quanto questa, oltre a costituire una viola- zione della convenzione, sarebbe passa quale strumento di pressione sugli altri firmatari (6), il governo turco optò per una soluzione nego- ziata, notificando l’11 aprile al Segretariato della Società delle Nazio- ni, alle potenze firmatarie, alla Russia e alla Jugoslavia la propria in- tenzione di denunciare la Convenzione di Losanna e chiedere una nuo- va Conferenza sugli Stretti (7).
L’abbandono da parte della Gran Bretagna della tradizionale politi- ca di chiusura degli Stretti non era che una delle due facce della stes- sa politica di difesa contro la Russia. Fino a quando l’impero ottoma- no aveva gravitato nell’orbita inglese, la flotta britannica aveva potuto contare, in caso di guerra con la Russia, che la Turchia le concedesse il transito attraverso gli Stretti, indirmando invece ai russi. Era stata la guerra mondiale, che aveva visto la Turchia a fianco della Germania, a indurre la Gran Bretagna a farsi sostenitrice della libertà di transito. A quel punto diveniva quindi opportuno favorire un miglioramento delle relazioni con la Turchia, concedendole di ripristinare l’ordine interno e di difendere il suo territorio e aiutandola a rafforzarsi militarmente (8).
I turchi, che temevano che gli italiani fossero decisi ad approfitta- re della situazione per «salvare vecchi conti» (9) con il loro paese, insistevo in un’occupazione preventiva degli Stretti per non essere

(7) Per una valutazione di questa nota cfr. TUSCANO, op. cit., pp. 52-55, il quale ri- tiene giustificabile la posizione turca.
Il fatto che Menemencioglu non si recasse a Roma non era certo la mossa migliore per garantirsi la collaborazione italiana. Il governo turco poi, che in un primo momento era sembrato pronto a venire incontro al desiderio italiano di dare avvio alla conferenza dopo la riuscita del Consiglio dei Sette e le azioni di Stato, al contrario, si recò a Montreux, dove fu possibile valutare la posizione di Roma, di Atene e di Bruxelles. Il risultato finale fu che i tre paesi decisero di proseguire con le discussioni senza l'intervento di Roma.


(16) Per la nota italiana cfr. TOSCANO, op. cit., p. 72, nota 149.


La posizione turca, così come la posizione araba, e persino quella francese, non era più interessata a proseguire con le discussioni, considerando che l'interesse italiano era stato fatto in modo tale da garantire l'equilibrio tra i tre paesi.
colpire il diplomatico italiano, che insisteva però su un presunto atteggiamento ostile della Turchia nei confronti dell’Italia. Tale posizione sembrava quindi giustificare lo stato di nervosismo dei turchi (19). Del resto il Times il 20 giugno, in un articolo «The Straits Conference - Questions at Issue», vedeva nel possesso del Dodecaneso e nella trasformazione dell’isola di Lero in una potente base militare in vicinanza della costa turca l’origine della richiesta di revisione (20).

Mentre gli inglesi cercavano di limitare in qualche modo i desiderata turchi (21), preoccupati anche di evitare le ingiunzioni degli stati rivieraschi, proseguivano febbrilmente i preparativi per la conferenza (22). Ankara era veramente preoccupata per la posizione italiana; il collaudo dell’Italia aveva messo in evidenza l’inefficacia delle sanzioni. Atatürk, convinto che Mussolini mirasse a ricostruire l’impero romano, si aspettava una penetrazione italiana, o tramite aggressione diretta o attraverso forme di sussidio e propaganda, in Albania, Jugoslavia, le isole Ionie, la valle del Nilo, la Palestina, la Siria e la Turchia, punto di vista questo, che, certamente suggerito dal naturale stato di nervosismo dei turchi, non era condiviso né dall’ambasciatore Loraine né dal Foreign Office, inclini a pensare che gli italiani sarebbero tornati alla normalità (23).

Il 22 giugno ebbe inizio la Conferenza di Montreux con la partecipazione della Francia, della Gran Bretagna, del Giappone, della Turchia, della Russia, della Romania, della Grecia, della Jugoslavia, della Bulgaria e dell’Australia. Il governo turco era stato invitato ufficialmente e per prima volta che l’Italia, non ritenendo quello il momento opportuno per discutere argomenti di tale importanza, rinviava la propria partecipazione a dopo il chiarimento della situazione internazionale in seno al Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni (24). Le discussioni si svolsero sulla base delle proposte presentate dai turchi, che ri-

(20) «Il possesso italiano del Dodecaneso e la trasformazione dell’isola di Lero in una potente base militare presso la costa turca hanno senza dubbio provocato i sospetti verso l’Italia presso i turchi, sospetti che di cui i nuovi fondatori dell’impero romano debbano rimproverare loro stessi». The Times, 20 giugno 1936 cit. in Toscano, op. cit., p. 67, nota 148.
(22) Sulla preoccupazione coi quali si accostavano a desiderio di Ankara e sul collegamento della questione alla politica societaria cfr. Toscano, op. cit., pp. 69-72.
(24) Per la nota italiana cfr. Toscano, op. cit., p. 72.

prendevano le linee già comunicate all’ambasciatore britannico l’11 giugno (25). In caso di una guerra in cui la Turchia fosse neutrale era concessa libertà di transito alle navi da guerra e ausiliarie; se la Turchia era belligerante, era richiesto il suo consenso; in caso di «minaccia di guerra» era diritto della Turchia imporre la richiesta di assenso, previa notifica ai firmatari della convenzione e al Segretario Generale della Società delle Nazioni. Innovativa era la clausola che garantiva alle potenze del Mar Nero diritti privilegiati di uscita, inaccettabile per la Gran Bretagna, in quanto così si abbandonava a favore della Russia il principio di reciprocità. Il contratto si focalizzò quindi fra la Gran Bretagna, che voleva uguali diritti per tutti e la Russia che pretendeva di porre alle potenze non rivierasche un limite di tonnellaggio in entrata, mentre non intendeva accettare alcuna limitazione all’uscita delle navi russe dal Mar Nero al Mediterraneo.

Dopo il 25 giugno furono sospese le sedute plenarie per dar modo al Consiglio della Società delle Nazioni di decidere sull’abrogazione delle sanzioni, che vennero infatti abolite nel corso delle sedute del 4 e del 6 luglio.

Il 6 luglio, alla ripresa della conferenza, la delegazione britannica presentò una sua rielaborazione del progetto turco, in cui si introduceva una formula scalare: il tonnellaggio globale delle potenze non rivierasche, contemporaneamente presenti nel Mar Nero, non doveva eccedere le 30 mila tonnellate. Se la forte flotta del Mar Nero, cioè la russa, avesse subito un incremento del 10% rispetto al suo potenziale al momento della firma della convenzione, il limite del tonnellaggio sarebbe cresciuto percentualmente. I turchi, che guardavano sempre ad una possibile minaccia italiana, pretendevano che il limite di 30 mila tonnellate si applicasse a due o più potenze non rivierasche (nel caso di un attacco italo-rumeno, oltre a navi per 30 mila tonnellate nel Mar Nero, si sarebbe anche dovuta fronteggiare una forte flotta nel Mediterraneo). (26) Nella trattativa angolo-russo si confrontavano l’aspirazione russa a fare del Mar Nero un mare eunymus e la concezione britannica del carattere internazionale del Mar Nero e degli Stretti.

L’8 luglio il governo fascista rese nota la propria decisione di non inviare i suoi rappresentanti a Montreux fin tanto che rimanevano in vigore i patti di mutua assistenza (27). Diversamente dai turchi, gli inglesi, pur ammettendo che l’assenza italiana comportasse complicazione-

ni sotto l’aspetto legale, non ritenevano di dover prendere la cosa trop-
po tragicamente (28).
Per assicurare il successo della conferenza, la Gran Bretagna ac-
cettò una soluzione di compromesso che chiudevà gli Stretti alle navi
de guerra di tutte le potenze belligeranti, ad eccezione di quelle inviate
nel Mar Nero contro l’aggressore dalla Società delle Nazioni in base ad
accordi di cui fosse parte anche la Turchia (29). Raggiunto l’accordo
su questo punto, si risolsero rapidamente anche le altre questioni,
giungendosi alla conclusione della conferenza il 20 luglio. Nonostante
già il 18 luglio la Francia avesse notificato al governo britannico di con-
siderare decaduti, per effetto dell’abrogazione delle sanzioni, i patti di
mutua assistenza, subito imitata il 13 dalla Grecia e il 20 dalla Tur-
chia, mancando la notifica britannica, che giunse il 27 luglio a confe-
renza conclusa, l’Italia fino alla fine si astenne dal parteciparvi. In li-
nnea di principio a Montreux fu fatta salva la libertà di transito, sia pu-
re con qualche limitazione, cui erano esenti gli incrociatori e i sotto-
marini dei paesi rivieraschi, purché passassero da soli e di giorno. La
commissione fu abolita, la durata della convenzione fu fissata a dieci
anni (30).
Soddissfata dei risultati conseguiti a Ginevra fu la delegazione bri-
tannica: il principio della libertà degli Stretti era stato riconfermato,
la Turchia si era impegnata a fornire alle potenze firmatarie informazioni
in maniera superiore all’abolita Commissione degli Stretti. Se le condi-
zioni di transito per le navi da guerra erano più severe, le condizioni
stabilite per il tempo di pace erano migliori di quelle inizialmente pro-
poste dai turchi. Si era resistito con successo al tentativo russo di fare
entrare il Mar Nero un mare clausum e inoltre, se si era dovuto rinunciare
ai pieni diritti di belligeranza previsti dalla legge internazionale, si era
ottenuto che la Turchia accettasse di operare discriminazioni fra i belli-
geranti esclusivamente nell’ambito della Società delle Nazioni (31).
Nel discorso che pronunciò ai comuni il 27 luglio, riflettendo sui risul-

tati della conferenza da lui definiti « estremamente soddisfacen-
ti » (32), Eden diede chiarimenti sull’atteggiamento dell’Italia, alla
quale era stata data la possibilità di accedere alla convenzione successi-

tivamente.
La posizione dell’Italia era stata vagliata attentamente al Foreign
Office. La stampa italiana, sottolineando con esclusi la resa britannica,
aveva ribadito che l’accordo non aveva alcun valore per l’Italia. In ef-
fetti appariva assai dubbio la tesi che una convenzione potesse essere
sottoposta a revisione anche in assenza di uno dei contraenti, con la
conseguita implicazione che una potenza, sottoposta a servitù nel-
ll’ambito del suo territorio, potesse ottenere la modifica di tale situazione
senza l’assenso di tutte le parti contraenti l’accordo iniziale.
D’altra parte non si voleva accettare che una sola potenza potesse af-
fossare un accordo generale non firmandolo o non ratificandolo. Si
cercava di addurre a giustificazione il fatto che le normali regole inter-
nazionali, e questa era la testa turca, non fossero applicabili a caso
speciale quale era quello degli Stretti (33). La debolezza di questa po-

tizione veniva ammessa nel seno dello stesso Foreign Office. Dal pun-

to di vista legale la nuova convenzione era valida solo fra la Turchia
e le altre parti contraenti. Con l’Italia vigeva ancora la Convenzione di
Losanna, anche se i turchi pretendevano che l’adesione della maggio-
ranza delle potenze interessate consentisse alla Turchia di applicare il
nuovo regime. Ne conseguiva appunto che il governo di Ankara doves-
se regolare esso stesso la questione con Roma. A questo scopo a Mont-
reux si era deciso che qualsiasi potenza firmataria di Losanna potesse
accedere alla convenzione dopo il deposito delle ratifiche. Si era dun-
que lasciata aperta la porta all’Italia, che vi sarebbe potuta entrare
« via pure con una certa riluttanza » (34), fermo restando il suo diritto
di stipulare un accordo bilaterale con la Turchia o a rendere una di-
chiarazione bilaterale di accettazione del nuovo regime. Davanti alla
minaccia arrecata al suo predominio nel Mediterraneo orientale causa-
ta dalla volontà di espansione dell’Italia, Londra aveva dovuto sacrifi-
care parte dei propri interessi vitali nella zona per assicurarsi l’amici-

(28) P.R.O., F.O. 371/20080 E 4633/26/44 U.K. Delegation, Montreux, 20 luglio
1936. Lo stesso Eden scrive a questo proposito: « Mussolini fu un asse di rilievo alla
Conferenza di Montreux... Mentre afferma che non aveva partecipato finché non fos-
sero state revocate le sanzioni, il duce credeva evidentemente che senza di lui non si sa-
rebbe potuto raggiungere un accordo. La conferenza, tuttavia, proseguì tranquillamente e
arrivò a conclusione senza l’aiuto dei fascisti ». A Eden, La memoria di Anthony Eden - Di
(29) Per i ragionamenti cfr. TOSCANO, op. cit., pp. 85-146, il quale ne riferisce detta-
gliatamente, e MACH, op. cit., pp. 220-226, che ne tratta più sinteticamente. Per le deci-
sioni finali si vedano MACH, op. cit., pp. 225-226 e TOSCANO, op. cit., pp. 147-170, il
quali dà anche una valutazione critica delle varie clausole. Per la posizione conciliante as-
sunta da Londra cfr. PEATT, op. cit., pp. 142-144.
(30) P.R.O., F.O. 371/20080 Narrative of the Negotiations at the Conference held
at Montreux, July 1936, cit. in MACH, op. cit., p. 227.
(32) Su questo discorso si vedano i commenti di TOSCANO, op. cit., pp. 172-175,
che sottolinea la contraddizione fra questa dichiarazione e l’affermazione seguente: « Non
no abbiamo dunque nessuna ragione di essere contenti dell’accordo concluso a Mon-
treux ».
(33) P.R.O., F.O. 371/20081 E 5228/26/24 F.O. Minutes: L. Baggeley, 30 luglio;
Sterndale Bennet, 31 luglio; Fitzmaurice, 6 agosto; Skrine Stevenson, 8 agosto; O’Malley,
24 luglio 1936.
(34) P.R.O., F.O. 371/20080 E 4845/26/24 Strains Conventions - Position Result-
ting from Non-Signature, L.W. Fitzmaurice, F.O., 24 luglio 1936.
zia di Ankara e impedire che si rivolgessi all’Unione Sovietica o alla Germania (35).

Il 3 agosto ad Ankara la Commissione degli Stretti passava le consensi ai turchi. Il delegato italiano, avanzando riserva formale sullo scioglimento della commissione, affermò che il suo governo conservava i diritti e dover di osservare il Convenzione di Losanna, attestando questo che, secondo gli inglesi, gli italiani avrebbero adottato frequentemente in futuro (36).


Il 16 novembre a Parigi con la ratifica dei paesi firmatari la Convenzione di Montreux entrò definitivamente in vigore. Restavano ancora riserve sull’adesione dell’Italia e, anche se Roma aveva iniziato a trattare con il governo turco, senza porre in discussione il suo diritto a provvedere alla fortificazione degli Stretti: del resto il riformulato del Bozforo e dei Dardanelli non era mai stato messo in discussione. Nuovi accordi commerciali furono infatti nell’estate e firmati a Roma il 29 dicembre 1936.

L’adesione dell’Italia stava molto a cuore anche alla Gran Bretagna, impegnata in una politica di riavvicinamento all’Italia. Londra non intendeva però sollevare essa stessa la questione, per non suscitare sospetti da parte italiana, soprattutto in un periodo in cui stavano affluendo attraverso i Dardanelli munizioni russe dirette alla Spagna (39). Sull’argomento tornò invece Ciano con l’ambasciatore Drummond il 21 dicembre, lasciando intendere, sia pure in forma non ufficiale, che l’Italia avrebbe aderito alla Convenzione di Montreux, oltre che al Trattato Navale di Londra. Il governo italiano, anche se non particolarmente «soddisfatto», dal momento che la questione era «sfruttatamente» connessa con la Società delle Nazioni — e questo era il motivo per cui l’Italia non era andata a Montreux, confermava il ministro — avrebbe infine approvato la convenzione quale unico modo a risolvere una situazione difficile (40). Da parte italiana si tendeva quindi a collegare Trattato Navale e Convenzione di Montreux, subordinando l’accessione alla convenzione alla firma del trattato e al miglioramento delle relazioni italo-turchi che si sarebbe verificato in conseguenza dell’accordo mediterraneo anglo-britannico.

Mentre gli inglesi nel corso del 1937 e del 1938 continuarono ad operare per un riavvicinamento con l’Italia (41), la questione dell’adesione di Roma alla Convenzione di Montreux diveniva una questione puramente italo-turca, anche se il miglioramento delle relazioni italo-britanniche ne veniva a costituire uno dei presupposti fondamentali. Il 20 gennaio 1937 veniva soppressa la legazione turca ad Addis Abeba, il 3 febbraio il ministro Aras discuteva con Ciano a Milano le questioni di comune interesse, constatando alla fine che non vi era alcuna diversità fra i due paesi, che intendevano cooperare nell’interesse loro e generale. Segui poi l’ammissione da parte dell’Intesa balcanica che la questione del riconoscimento dell’Impero era irrilevante per tutti i quattro paesi e che pertanto anche la Grecia e la Turchia, che avevano fatto la Jugoslavia e la Romania, dovevano operare il riconoscimento dell’Impero italiano in Etiopia, fatto che si verificò il 4 aprile 1938 (42).

(38) P.R.O., F. 371/38824 R 4966/39/82/22 Ingram a Eden, Roma, 12 agosto 1936. Queste voci irritarono fortemente gli inglesi, ritenuti per il fatto che gli alti dirigenti fascisti, che ignoravano tutto degli altri popoli, erano sempre sospettosi di tutti.
Con la conclusione dell'accordo italo-inglese del 16 aprile 1938 si poneva fine alla tensione mediterranea nata dall'impresa etiope. Il 2 maggio l'Italia accedeva alla Convenzione sugli Stretti, contribuendo così alla pacificazione del Mediterraneo orientale. Del resto «l'Italia non poteva pensare di modificare da sola il complesso regime degli Stretti» (43) e non conviveva con le altre potenze mediterraneo un compito che non si era assunta da sola neppure la Gran Bretagna.

La questione della partecipazione dell'Italia alla Conferenza di Montreux e la sua accessione alla nuova Convenzione degli Stretti non fu quindi che un episodio della partita per il predominio sul Mediterraneo orientale giocata fra l'Italia e la Gran Bretagna. La Turchia si trovò a svolgere il ruolo di semplice pedina: non contro di essa si indirizzò il risentimento di Roma, se non in maniera marginale e solo a motivo del suo schierarsi con gli altri paesi della Società delle Nazioni nell'adozione delle sanzioni, quanto piuttosto contro l'Inghilterra, colpevole di essersi opposta all'espansione in Etiopia, che, comportando una forte presenza italiana nel Mediterraneo orientale e nel Mar Rosso, veniva a minacciare la rotta verso l'India. Del resto il fatto che al Foreign Office si ritenesse impossibile un attacco italiano contro la Turchia dà adito a pensare che Londra fosse consapevole che la partita veniva giocata contro di essa e non contro Ankara. Da parte italiana inoltre non si pose mai in discussione il diritto della Turchia a rimilitarizzare gli Stretti, mentre si salse l'astensione da Montreux quale strumento per indurre la Società delle Nazioni alla revoca delle sanzioni e la Gran Bretagna alla rinuncia ai propri desideri di assistenza nel Mediterraneo. E anche se in seguito l'adesione dell'Italia divenne utile strumento di scambio per ottenere dalla Turchia il riconoscimento del l'Impero etiopico, resta il fatto che prioritaria ad ogni intesa con Ankara fu la ricerca di una normalizzazione dei rapporti con l'Inghilterra. La quasi totale assenza nel diario di Ciano di riferimenti alla Turchia indicherebbe l'importanza relativa che si anetnevva in quel periodo alle relazioni italo-turchi. Infatti Roma, pur avendo già ottenuto il riconoscimento formale dell'impero da parte della Turchia, solo dopo la firma con la Gran Bretagna dell'accordo di Pasqua, che mirava alla composizione dei loro interessi nel Mediterraneo e nel Mar Rosso, accettò di accedere alla Convenzione sugli Stretti.

Summary — The Italian attack to Ethiopia offered Turkey the long waited opportunity to ask for the revision of the Lausanne Convention on the Straits. Great Britain, who had strongly opposed to Turkish wishes until that moment, fearing the Italian challenge to her supremacy on Eastern Mediterranean, decided to win Ankara to her side. Thanks to London's assent, Turkish government could summon an international conference on the Straits problem at Montreux in June 1936. Italy refused to participate, pretending she would not take part in any international meeting, as the sanctions adopted against her by the League of Nations were still in force. Notwithstanding Italy's abstention, a new convention was signed in July. Italy was left the possibility of joining it later. But only in April 1938, after Turkey had recognized the Italian Empire in Ethiopia and the Anglo-Italian Agreement of April 18, 1938 had improved the relations between London and Rome and restored peace in the Mediterranean, Italy accepted the new Straits regime, according to the Convention of Montreux.

(43) Toscano, op. cit., p. 184.
ITALIA E TURCHIA:
DEMOGRAFIE A CONFRONTO

di CARLA GE RONDI (*) e ROBERTA ROSSI (**) 

1. Dinamiche a confronto.

Le più recenti valutazioni delle Nazioni Unite (1) collocano l'Italia al 22° posto nella graduatoria dello sviluppo umano e la Turchia al 73° posto (al 1° posto si trova il Giappone, al 2° il Canada e all'ultimo, cioè al 173°, la Guinea). La graduatoria è stata compilata tenendo conto di una batteria di indicatori sociali alcuni dei quali possono contribuire a interpretare il differente quadro demografico presentato dai due paesi e sul quale si intende soffermarsi nel seguito. Ecco in sintesi il gap tra Italia e Turchia: undicimila dollari (dollar internazionali con pari potere d'acquisto) di differenza nel reddito pro-capite, con un rapporto di 3,5 a 1, una disponibilità di medici di quasi sei volte superiore, un tasso di scolarizzazione doppio, una quota di addetti all'agricoltura pari ad un quinto. Si può aggiungere che in Turchia un quarto della popolazione femminile tra i 14 e i 25 anni è ancora analfabeta; che il numero medio di anni di scuola è per una donna la metà di quello maschile (dallo sottile inferiore in Italia), che circa 200 donne ogni 100.000 nati vivi muoiono per cause legate alla gravidanza (6 in Italia).

I due paesi si trovano in effetti a differenti stadi del processo di evoluzione demografica: ad uno studio di piena maturità l'Italia, in una fase avanzata dello stadio transizionale la Turchia (2). Notiamo

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Il lavoro è frutto della collaborazione dei due autori; tuttavia il primo paragrafo è stato scritto da Carla Ge Rondi e il secondo da Roberta Rossi.
(2) Conviene ricordare che la teoria della transizione demografica è un modello atto a descrivere le fasi che ogni popolazione storicamente attraversa, pur con modalità e ritmi diversi, nel passare da un regime demografico di tipo antico (alta natalità e alta mortalità) a un regime demografico di tipo moderno (bassa natalità e bassa mortalità). Durante la fase transizionale si verifica dapprima il declino della mortalità mentre la natalità
subito che le due popolazioni hanno attualmente un ammontare non dissimile: circa 57 milioni di abitanti, ma ben diversa è stata la velocità alla quale sono pervenute al medesimo traguardo se si considera che quella turca del 1960 (27,5 milioni di abitanti) era di poco inferiore a quella italiana del 1871 (28,1 milioni, ai confini attuali). Per raddoppiare la propria consistenza demografica sono quindi occorsi al nostro paese 120 anni, al nostro confratello mediterraneo solo 30 poiché il tasso medio annuo di incremento dell’uno è stato un quarto di quello dell’altro. Per di più mentre la popolazione italiana è attualmente stagnaria, se non in declino, la popolazione turca manifesta ancora una capacità espansiva superiore al 20 per mille in media all’anno, il che significa un tempo di raddoppio che si aggira sui 35 anni. In proposito può essere utile riferirsi al grafico di Fig. 1.

**Fig. 1. — Lo sviluppo della popolazione italiana e di quella turca.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anno</th>
<th>Italia (in miliardi)</th>
<th>Turchia (in miliardi)</th>
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<tr>
<td>861</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td>981</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>991</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fonte:** Turchia: ONU, Demographic Yearbook, anni vari. Italia: Censimenti della popolazione.

rimane ancora elevata con conseguente accelerazione del tasso di incremento naturale; successivamente il ritmo di decremento della natalità diviene più forte di quello della mortalità. Nella fase post-transizionale il tasso di natalità rimane dapprima superiore a quello di mortalità, se pure di poco, per poi assumere livelli inferiori.

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Se confrontiamo il numero di eventi accaduti nel 1990 in un’ipotetica comunità italiana di 10.000 abitanti con quello degli eventi accaduti in un’ipotetica comunità turca di analoghe dimensioni, notiamo che in Italia nasce poco più di un terzo dei bambini che nascono in Turchia (99 contro 260) mentre sono più frequenti i decessi (94 contro 75) per la maggiore presenza di anziani nella comunità (1.400 ultrassessantacinquenni contro 400). Notiamo ancora che in Turchia 16 dei 260 neonati, ossia il 63 per mille, muoiono entro il primo anno di vita e 20, ossia l’80 per mille, entro il quinto compleanno; la mortalità infantile italiana (8 per mille) è meno di un ottavo di quella turca.

Anche le modalità di accesso al matrimonio sono apprezzabilmente differenti nelle due comunità: le italiane si sposano in media a 25,3 anni, cioè 3 anni e mezzo più tardi delle turche, così che quasi i due terzi delle prime ma solo un terzo delle seconde in età compresa tra i 20 e i 24 anni sono ancora nubili. D’altra parte l’indice di nubilato definitivo, calcolato con riguardo alla popolazione femminile tra i 15 e i 59 anni, è pari al 10 per cento in Italia e solo l’1 per cento in Turchia. Il che significa che in questo paese praticamente tutte le donne si sposano (3).

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(3) I dati relativi alla Turchia per quanto riguarda la struttura per stato civile e i
Come è diverso il comportamento nei confronti dell'istituzione matrimoniale, poiché in Italia ci si marita più tardi e con minore frequenza, così è diverso il comportamento riproduttivo. Il tasso di fecondità totale, cioè il numero medio di figli generato da una donna nel corso della sua vita riproduttiva qualora il suo rischio di morte fosse nullo, è pari a 1,3 se la donna è italiana, ma a 3,7 se è turca. Pertanto mentre in Italia il livello della fecondità è inferiore di oltre il 30 per cento a quello necessario per consentire la sostituzione dei generi (cioè 2,1), in Turchia ogni coppia, oltre a garantire la propria sostituzione, «accumula» almeno un altro figlio e mezzo. L'ipotesi (le misure qui impiegate sono calcolate su contingenti di contemporanea) di scendita delta nascita al termine dell'età seconda, rischio ancora sensibile e che si può stimare mediamente pari al 10 per cento. Le donne italiane sono viceversa praticamente certe di completare la propria vita riproduttiva.

La differenza nei livelli della mortalità infantile nei due paesi, sottolineata più sopra, si traduce in una fortissima differenza nella mortalità generale come pongono in luce i valori della vita media alla nascita. Un bimbo che nasce oggi in Turchia e le cui probabilità di morte a tutte le età siano quelle attualmente sperimentate dai suoi contemporanei e conterranei, può sperare di vivere circa 63 anni se è un maschio e circa 66 anni se è una femmina. Se nascesse e vivesse in Italia il maschio avrebbe ulteriori 11 anni da vivere, così da raggiungere i 74 anni e la bambina ulteriori 14, così da raggiungere gli 80 anni.

Nei grafici di Figg. 2, 3, 4, 5 e 6 è possibile cogliere, attraverso i principali indicatori, sia i caratteri attuali sia quelli evolutivi del regime demografico delle due comunità. I grafici sono stati costruiti in modo da porre in evidenza la dimensione temporale che ha segnato comportamenti analoghi.

Fermiamo l'attenzione dapprima sulla componente positiva del movimento naturale (Fig. 2), notiamo che la Turchia presentava all'inizio degli anni Settanta una natalità generica pari a quella dell'Italia di ottant'anni prima (33 per mille); l'attuale tasso turco si aggira sul livello di quello italiano della metà degli anni Venti (26-28 per mille). In sostanza, quindi, si può sottolineare che per vedere diminuire di 7 punti la frequenza delle nascite è occorso un trentennio al nostro paese e un quindiciennio alla Turchia. Si può aggiungere, peraltro, che tas-

matrimoni sono stati desunti da: ONU, Demographic Yearbook, 1990. Quelli relativi all'Italia sono di fonte ISTAT.
A conferma delle considerazioni precedenti precisiamo che secondo stime abbastanza affidabili (6) in Turchia ben il 63 per cento delle coniugate in età feconda ricorre a metodi di controllo delle nascite, moderni o tradizionali che siano. Il Governo turco sta, infatti, vigorosamente attuando programmi di pianificazione familiare che includono, oltre alla diffusione delle pratiche contraccettive anche la legalizzazione dell'aborto (1983), consentito su richiesta fino alla decima settimana di gestazione e per motivi terapeutici anche successivamente (7). In Italia l'accesso alla contraccezione è stato liberalizzato negli anni Sessanta quando il valore del tasso di fecondità totale era di poco superiore a quello che garantirebbe la crescita zero e l'aborto volontario, entro il terzo mese di gestazione, è stato reso legale nel 1978.

Osserva la Salvini (8), riferendosi ai risultati di recenti indagini sulla fecondità secondo i quali il numero di figli attualmente desiderato dalle donne turche è di 2,1, che la Turchia appare il paese dell’area mediterranea islamica che maggiormente dimostra di avere recepito le nuove idee in termini di fecondità desiderabile, auspicate dalla politica di programmazione familiare. Alla luce di questa e delle considerazioni precedenti, pare quindi che l’ancora elevata fecondità della popolazione turca sia da porre in relazione con gli elevati livelli di mortalità nella prima infanzia, tali da indurre le coppie a procreare un numero di figli sufficiente ad assicurarsi la discendenza finale desiderata.

Si è in precedenza rilevato che la discesa della fecondità in Turchia è avvenuta assai più rapidamente che in Italia. Si può ora aggiungere che, sempre in Turchia, nei primi anni Cinquanta poco meno di un bambino su quattro non riusciva a raggiungere il primo compleanno; occorre risalire all’indemnità dell’Unificazione per trovare nel nostro paese un analogo livello di mortalità infantile. D’altra parte un quoziente pari a quello turco attuale, cioè il 60 per mille, fu sperimentato in Italia nel secondo dopoguerra. In sostanza, quindi, occorse all’Italia un numero di anni doppio di quello che occorse alla Turchia per conseguire la medesima riduzione del rischio di morte a meno di un anno. Il differente ritmo che ha caratterizzato la lotta contro la “strage degli innocenti” è in parte attribuibile ad un processo di modernizzazione più rapido di quello che può avere interessato l’Italia a cavallo del secolo e, soprattutto, ai benefici derivanti dall’acquisizione di conoscenze e tecniche progredite in campo medico e sanitario accumulatesi nel frattempo. Ed è grazie proprio alla maggiore diffusione di tali conoscenze — poiché, l’attitudine a tirer parti des grandes innovations médicales varie avec le degrés d’ouverture culturelle et le niveau corrélatif de développement (9) — che la mortalità infantile italiana ha subito, negli anni successivi, un’accelerazione nel ritmo di declino. Pertanto, il tasso di mortalità entro il primo compleanno pari a un quarto di quello turco negli anni 1950-55, si è ora ridotto ad un quinto.

È peraltro evidente il determinante apporto che la diminuzione della mortalità infantile ha dato a quello della mortalità generale turca il cui tasso è sceso dal 25,5 per mille (1950-55) al 7,5 per mille (1985-90). Assai inferiore si può considerare tale apporto per l’Italia perché il peso dei decessi entro il primo compleanno è decisamente molto più contenuto a fronte di una molto più elevata quota di decessi nelle età avanzate connessa con l’invecchiamento demografico. Si può precisare che nella Turchia contemporanea oltre un quinto dei morti ha meno di un anno di vita: l’incidenza negli anni Cinquanta era di oltre il 50 per cento. Osserva in merito Silvana Salvini che « sulla base di questo indicatore socio-demografico così importante, la Turchia occupa una posizione molto sfavorevole nell’ambito dei paesi asiatici: nel 1988 il valore del tasso 𝑞₀,5 è di 97,4 per mille, ossia quasi il 10 per cento dei bambini non raggiunge l’età di 5 anni. Differenze marcate esistono secondo il tipo di residenza (𝑞₀,5 è uguale a 63,6 per mille nelle città ma è più del doppio nelle aree rurali) e tra le regioni del paese (…) le regioni centro-orientali — molto meno modernizzate — hanno una mortalità infantile più elevata di quelle nord-occidentali » (10). Differenze territoriali nella mortalità a meno di un anno sono rilevabili anche in Italia dove esiste tuttora una spiccata dicotomia tra il Nord e il Sud del paese (6,5 nel Centro-Nord e 10,4 per mille nel Sud).

I progressi nella mortalità generale sono correttamente documentati dall’evoluzione della vita media alla nascita il cui valore, come è noto, non è influenzato dalla composizione per età della popolazione. Un bambino che nasceva in Turchia nella prima metà degli anni Cin-

(8) S. Salvini, La transizione demografica, op. cit., pag. 95.


(10) S. Salvini, La transizione demografica, op. cit., pag. 115.
quanta poteva sperare di vivere 43,6 anni e, più in particolare, 42 anni se era un maschio e 45 se era di sesso femminile. Ossia ne viveva quanti un neonato italiano agli inizi del Novecento. Nell’arco del trentennio successivo, la speranza di vita sia dei maschi sia delle femmine turche si è accresciuta di 20 anni; per conseguire analoghi risultati all’Italia è occorsa tutta la prima metà del secolo. Nel medesimo trentennio intercorso tra il 1950-55 e il 1985-90 la vita media della popolazione maschile italiana si è accresciuta di 10 anni e quella femminile di 14,8 anni.

Si possono fare alcune considerazioni sia in proposito alla diversa velocità di variazione della vita media nei due paesi sia in proposito all’entità degli incrementi conseguiti. Per quanto riguarda il primo punto è evidente che il più veloce ritmo di variazione della speranza di vita turca rispetto a quella italiana è strettamente legato ai diversi ambiti temporali nei quali essi si sono verificati, potendo la Turchia beneficiare, come già in precedenza si è sottolineato, delle tecniche di lotta contro la mortalità nel frattempo venutesi ad accumulare. Per quanto riguarda poi la diversa entità degli incrementi conseguiti nell’ultimo trentennio, va tenuto presente che essa dipende dal livello di vita media già raggiunto e trova un limite in quello “biologico” dell’esistenza. Pertanto se si assume come età limite quella pari a 100 anni (11) e si calcola un indice di variazione relativa, rapportando la variazione osservata nei valori di vita media alla nascita, essi riuniti, nei due paesi, al massima variazione possibile (per l’Italia la variazione osservata è di 11,2 anni e quella massima sarebbe di 34, per la Turchia la variazione osservata è di 20,6 anni e quella massima di 56,4) si conclude che in effetti nelle due popolazioni il saggio con il quale la mortalità si è ridotta dagli anni Cinquanta o oggi è quasi identico (33 per cento contro 37 per cento). A diverse conclusioni si sarebbe pervenuti se si fosse misurata la contrazione del tasso di mortalità della popolazione stazionaria associata alle tavole di mortalità considerate (il reciproco di e): la riduzione della mortalità turca sarebbe risultata più che doppia di quella italiana (32 per cento contro 15 per cento).

2. Strutture a confronto.

La situazione attuale, la storia recente e il futuro prossimo della demografia dei due paesi di cui ci occuperemo può essere agevolmente compresa facendo ricorso alla rappresentazione grafica conosciuta con il nome di «piramide delle età». Tale profilo fornisce una rappresentazione semplice ma eloquente della composizione per età e sesso di una popolazione, e riflette le perturbazioni e le lente modificazioni intervenute durante un secolo circa di storia demografica; l’esame comparato delle piramidi delle età della Turchia e dell’Italia, osservate in momenti diversi di questa storia, consente di comprendere meglio le conseguenze del movimento naturale della popolazione (Figg. 7, 8, 9 e 10).

Se infatti è vero che le nascite e i decessi che hanno luogo nel corso di un anno non dipendono soltanto dalla fecondità e dalla mortalità isolatamente considerate, ma anche dalla distribuzione per età della popolazione che a queste leggi è soggetta, è altrettanto vero che il reciproco assunto: la struttura per età della popolazione non è il prodotto esclusivo ed inerente della struttura esistente in precedenza, ma dipende altresì dal modo in cui fecondità e mortalità (tralasciando il fenomeno migratorio) si sono evolute nel frattempo. Anzi, a lungo termine, la struttura per età della popolazione dipende interamente (sempre tralasciando le migrazioni) dall’evoluzione passata della sua fecondità e della sua mortalità. Ne consegue che la transizione demografica si traduce in una profonda modificazione della piramide delle età.

Nel 1985 (Fig. 7), la Turchia presenta una composizione per età giovane: la piramide presenta una base ampio e un profilo concavo; l’erosione progressiva delle generazioni, ad opera della mortalità, viene compensata da un flusso di nascite cosicche. Possiamo però già notare l’effetto di una natalità in calo: la classe di età 0-4 anni ha una consistenza minore della classe 5-9 anni. Secondo una classificazione dei diversi tipi di struttura per età esistenti al mondo (12), la Turchia si colloca infatti nel tipo 3, che ha come tratti distintivi una popolazione giovane caratterizzata, rispetto al profilo medio mondiale, da una sovranalisi pronunciata delle prime classi e da una diminuita virilità di una fecondità già ridotta. È possibile notare una certa analogia tra il profilo di questa piramide e quello dell’Italia del primo Novecento (Fig. 8), sebbene si possano notare, in questo secondo caso, una natalità non ancora in declino e una maggiore probabilità di sopravvivenza alle età adulte e anziane, indicante dalla caratteristica forma a campana della piramide.

(11) Tale età è convenzionale: l’assenza di informazioni circa le modalità di sopravvivenza alle diverse età in Turchia non consente di formulare ipotesi più motivate.

(12) Il Nois (D. Nois, Atlas de la population mondiale, Montpellier, Reclus, La Documentation Francaise, 1991) ha elaborato, con riferimento al 1985, una tipologia delle situazioni demografiche esistenti al mondo, secondo una classificazione ascendentemente geochronica, che consiste nel raggruppare i diversi paesi aggregando man mano quelli che presentano la maggiore somiglianza: le classi sonoificate fra loro secondo una graduatoria in cui la parte terminale è rappresentata dall’albero di classificazione. Essa è stata costruita con le variabili demografiche più significative fra quelle disponibili, di cui due fondamentale all’analisi di mortalità, una alla fecondità, una alla struttura per età e una alla velocità di accrescimento. Per quanto riguarda la struttura per età, i «tipi» sono facilmente identificabili: l’albero di classificazione separa bene i due tipi vecchi corrispondenti ai paesi industrializzati dal quattro tipi giovani corrispondenti ai paesi in via di sviluppo.
Nel 1990 (Fig. 9), in Italia, la configurazione della piramide è quella di un paese che, avendo completato la transizione, è demograficamente inviuvchiato: presenta infatti, a causa della persistente, debole fecondità, un forte deficit di giovani ed una simmetrica sovrapresentazione delle classi di età adulta e anziana (tipo 6 o «europeo»).

Nell'ipotesi che la Turchia veda diminuire progressivamente nei prossimi anni la propria fecondità fino a raggiungere nel 2015 il tasso di sostituzione, ossia 2,1 figli per donna (13), fra quindici anni essa potrebbe presentare una struttura per età simile a quella che l'Italia aveva nel 1961 (Fig. 10). Tuttavia, a tale data in Turchia il processo transizionale sarà più avanzato di quanto non avvenisse nell'Italia degli anni Sessanta: il peso sempre maggiore degli anziani sarà già accompagnato da una rarefazione delle classi di età giovani, e il profilo della piramide tenderà verso una forma rettangolare.

![Fig. 7: Piramide delle età - Turchia 1985](image)

*Fonte: ONU, Demographic Yearbook, 1991.*

![Fig. 8: Piramide delle età - Italia 1901](image)

*Fonte: ISTAT, Censimento della popolazione.*
mostrerà ancora un ispessimento evidente in corrispondenza delle classi di età anziane.

Tuttavia, la struttura per età della popolazione turca al 2010 ha in sé un potenziale d’invecchiamento non trascurabile. Anche se la diminuzione della mortalità porterà sempre maggiori guadagni in termini di sopravvivenza dei più giovani, la caduta della fecondità contraeterà questo movimento. Inoltre la forte natalità dei decenni passati, che ha salvaguardato fino ad oggi una popolazione giovane, comporterà uno “scivoloamento verso l’alto” di queste classi numerose contribuendo a sua volta all’invecchiamento della popolazione. Si può prevedere che, nell’anno 2000, la Turchia farà ormai parte del raggruppamento di paesi che vivono il secondo stadio della transizione demografica, e sono caratterizzati da una fecondità e una mortalità moderate. All’interno di questa categoria intermedia la Turchia apparterrà al tipo 4 (14), il più vicino alla media mondiale. Alla stessa data, l’Italia si confermerà, come già nel 1985, ben ancorata ai tratti caratteristici della post-transizione, con una crescita praticamente pari a zero e a una popolazione molto invecchiata.

Il modo più semplice di individuare i cambiamenti prodotti nella struttura per età è quello di utilizzare un indicatore preciso e semplice, che misuri in modo sicuro il senso dell’evoluzione. Uno di tali indicatori è l’età mediana, la quale divide una popolazione in due gruppi di uguale consistenza.

Nel 1985, per l’insieme del mondo (15), l’età mediana è di 23,4 anni; intorno a questo valore, le fluttuazioni sono tuttavia forti.

L’Italia si conformava alla media di 35 anni, decisamente elevata, dell’Europa centro-occidentale, mentre la Turchia si attestava intorno ad un valore di 21 anni.

Il fatto che una metà della popolazione turca avesse, nel 1985, meno di 20 anni dimostra che esiste ancora un forte potenziale di crescita per i decenni a venire. Occorre però temperare quest’osservazione, ricordando come, in Turchia, vada prendendo campo un processo di invecchiamento che ha luogo sia “dal basso” (in ragione della diminuzione della fecondità) sia “dall’alto” (per via dell’aumento della longevità); è soprattutto il primo fattore il responsabile di una recente, sensibile evoluzione dell’età mediana nel 1990, come si desume da stime dell’ONU (16), essa era già salita a 22,5 anni, e potrebbe aumentare a 23,3 anni 1995, valore paragonabile a quello registrato in Italia all’inizio di questo secolo (23,9 anni).

(14) D. Now, Atlas de la population mondiale, op. cit.
(15) D. Now, Atlas de la population mondiale, op. cit.

È indubbio quindi che il processo d’invecchiamento sarà tratto comune del prossimo futuro demografico dei due paesi, sebbene con intensità molto diversa: appena avviato in Turchia, ormai fisiologico e inerziale in Italia.

Esistono diversi modi di definire l’appartenenza alla categoria delle persone anziane: il passaggio dalla maturità alla terza età varia nel tempo e nello spazio (17). Cionondimeno, l’età di 65 anni viene considerata come età limite in molti paesi, poiché è l’età del pensionamento.

Nel 1985, in Turchia, coloro che avevano già festeggiato il sessantacinquesimo compleanno rappresentavano solo il 4 per cento della popolazione, mentre, in Italia, la fascia di età era già rappresentata in proporzione superiore al 13 per cento. Il confronto fra i due paesi rispecchia fedelmente i valori medi registrati, alla stessa data, per le aree in via di sviluppo da un lato, ossia 4,2 per cento, e per le aree industrializzate dall’altro, ossia 11,5 per cento (18). In Turchia la popolazione anziana risultava poco rappresentata, come diretta conseguenza di livelli di fecondità ancora elevati e di una mortalità infantile in rapido calo; in Italia, essa costituiva già una frazione importante. Occorrerà attendere il 2030, orizzonte delle proiezioni, perché in Turchia la classe degli « over 65 » giunga a sfiorare il valore registrato nel nostro paese nel 1985. Allo stesso modo, si assestarà su valori analoghi a quelli italiani dal 1985 la quota dei « grandi anziani », persone di età superiore ai 75 anni (5 per cento circa) e dei giovani fino ai 19 anni (28 per cento circa).

Purtanto, benché oggi le persone anziane non rappresentino, in Turchia, una parte importante della popolazione totale, conviene non perdere di vista il fatto che esse possono costituire in prospettiva un contingente numeroso e crescente; questo trend è comune a tutti quei paesi in cui, recentemente, si è verificato un forte calo della fecondità e un rapido innalzamento della probabilità di sopravvivenza fino alle età avanzate (19).

Come influiscono le tendenze demografiche descritte sul carico sociale che la comunità è chiamata ad affrontare? Si è soliti definire « indice di carico sociale » o « indice di dipendenza » il rapporto fra la popolazione « a carico » (giovani e anziani) e la popolazione attiva, convenzionalmente considerata come appartenente alla fascia dei 15-64 anni. In Turchia, in una prima fase corrispondente al momento di massima espansione demografica, il rapporto di dipendenza è andato via via crescendo: nel 1970, ogni 10 persone in età di lavoro ne avevano oltre 8 e a carico. Negli anni successivi, il segmento di popolazione più numeroso, cioè la classe di età giovanile, ha fatto il suo ingresso nella vita attiva, e di conseguenza l’indice di carico sociale è andato diminuendo sino a raggiungere nel 1985 un valore pari al 68 per cento, ossia uguale a quello registrato in Italia all’inizio del ventesimo secolo.

L’indice di carico sociale può essere utilmente scisso in due rapporti, riferiti ciascuno a un segmento di popolazione « a carico »: i giovani e gli anziani (Fig. 11). In Turchia i giovani costituiscono il fardello più oneroso per la popolazione attiva, quantunque il loro peso sulla comunità sia decrescente dal 1970. L’invecchiamento è tuttora lungi dall’avere importanti ricadute economiche e sociali: l’indice di dipendenza della popolazione anziana oscilla, nell’arco di quarant’anni, dal 0 all’8 per cento, mentre in Italia il fenomeno è di tale intensità che il rapporto fra trasessantacinquenni e popolazione in età centrale è aumentato fino a raggiungere attualmente il 20 per cento.

![Fig. 11: L’indice di dipendenza in Italia e in Turchia.](image)


dipendenza giovani

dipendenza anziani

Giovani (0-14) e anziani (65 anni e oltre) per cento adulti (15-64 anni). Fonte: ONU, Demographic Yearbook, 1991.

(18) D. NOUM, Atlas de la population mondiale, op. cit.,
3. **Osservazioni conclusive.**

Il processo di modernizzazione del sistema demografico sperimentato dalla Turchia è molto più tardivo, benché più rapido, di quello sperimentato dall'Italia. I due paesi si configurano così come tipicamente rappresentativi di un sistema « giovane » in avanzata fase transizionale e tendenzialmente in forte espansione l'uno, e di un sistema « maturo », tendenzialmente stazionario in quanto prossimi alla crescita, l'altro.

Si è visto che il livello della fecondità espresso dalle donne turche è poco meno del triplo di quello espresso dalle donne italiane che, tra l'altro, è il più basso del mondo (3,5 contro 1,5 figli per donna). Inoltre, soprattutto a causa del forte dislivello nella mortalità infantile, la durata media della vita di un turco è di oltre 12 anni inferiore a quella di un italiano.

Le differenze nella fecondità, ma anche nelle probabilità di sopravvivenza, determinano profili profondamente differenti nella struttura per età: nel 1985 aveva meno di 20 anni quasi la metà della popolazione turca ma solo il 28 per cento di quella italiana.

Il potenziale espansivo che la Turchia ha via via accumulato in termini di popolazione riproduttiva è tale che, se anche l'incisiva politica di pianificazione familiare perseguita dal governo sortisse gli auspiciati effetti di ridurre il tasso di fecondità totale al valore attuale a garantire la crescita zero (2,4 figli per donna) entro al 2015, cioè nel giro di vent'anni, nel 2025 la popolazione del paese salirebbe a quasi 90 milioni di abitanti, ossia aumenterebbe di 33 milioni. All'aumento concorrerebbe pertanto, occorre precisare, anche la spiccata tendenza decrescente della mortalità, soprattutto nelle età infantili.

In Italia, al contrario, dove la mortalità in termini di probabilità di sopravvivenza fino alle età più anziane è difficilmente comprimibile in misura rilevante, poiché la speranza di vita ha già raggiunto valori molto più bassi di quelli che si può ritenere il limite « biologico » dell'esistenza, e dove le classi feconde si vanno via via riducendo per effetto della contrazione delle nascite, anche se nel 2015 il numero medio di figli per donna assumesse un valore pari a quello di sostituzione, nel 2025 l'ammontare della popolazione sarebbe al massimo di 59 milioni di abitanti. Se la ripresa della fecondità fosse inferiore, cioè se il TFR salisse a 1,7 figli per donna, la compagine demografica si troverebbe decurtata di circa 1,5 milioni di individui.

Pertanto la Turchia e l'Italia, che ora rappresentano un peso demografico equivalente, nell'ipotesi che movimenti migratori non interverranno a modificare la dinamica naturale, potrebbero fra trent'anni trovarsi l'una pari a una volta e mezza l'altra.
Summary — The present essay tries to outline a comparative picture of the Turkish and Italian demographic situations.

The process of modernisation of the Turkish demographic system developed much faster than the Italian one, but at later times. The former, therefore, represents a typical instance of a ‘young’ system, now in an advanced transitional phase and characterised by a tendency towards continuous population growth. The latter, in contrast, is an example of a ‘mature’ system, virtually stationary in that it is almost reaching the point of zero-growth.

It has been shown how in Turkey fertility rate is three times higher than in Italy (3.5 against 1.3 children per woman — the Italian fertility rate being the lowest in the world). Moreover, life expectancy at birth in Turkey is more than 12 years shorter than in Italy, owing primarily to great discrepancies in infant mortality rates.

Differences in the fertility rates, as well as in the probabilities of survival, of the two countries determine profound differences in their age structures: in 1985 almost 50% of the Turkish population was under 20 and only 4% was over 65. Conversely, the Italian population included 28% of people under 20 and 13% over 65. In 1985, moreover, the dependency ratio in Turkey equaled the one registered in Italy at the beginning of the century (60%). In Turkey the large proportion of young people represents a great potential for future growth, despite a tendency towards a rise of the average age of the population due to both diminishing fertility and increasing longevity. It is therefore possible that in thirty years' will be one (Turkey) bigger than the other (Italy) one and a half times.
TURKEY AND ITALY: TWO INITIATIVES UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

by TURGUT ÇORATEKİN

In my intervention I wish to mention two initiatives, one Turkish and one Italian, both taken at the level of European co-operation under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

These two initiatives, although taken separately, have been on some specific points complementary to each other.

But before talking about them, let me say a few words on the pan-European role which is increasingly falling to the Council of Europe among other institutions in an ever-changing Europe. The Council of Europe, in fact, is faced with an important question: can it promote enough political will and summon up all the energy it needs to bring together all the countries of Central and Eastern Europe around the same political design of a single Europe, bound by democracy and the respect of human rights? This is the only possible way for Europe to become a vast area of democratic security. But in countries and societies which were cut off for decades from democracy, human rights and the rule of law, learning about these concepts in all their details is a very difficult and burdensome task. For this purpose the Council of Europe is ready to share its experience and implant in these countries democratic and legal know-how. In this connection the Council of Europe set up in 1989 a specific programme of co-operation and assistance with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

There concepts which are promoted by the Council of Europe are of a universal character and extend beyond geographical borders of Europe. Furthermore they are independent of the level of social and economic development, of any religious or philosophical opinion. The Council of Europe strives to give them the fullest implementation internally and to promote them outside of Europe as well, specially in the neighbouring regions for the sake of peace and stability.

In view of this the co-operation programmes of the Council of Eu-

Secretariat of the Council of Europe.
rope could also, under certain conditions, be expanded to other countries, in particular the Central Asian Republics formerly part of the Soviet Union, on condition that they intend to develop democratic institutions and a western-model of society based on secularism, individual rights and democracy.

In this context, I am now coming to the Turkish initiative. When Turkey assumed the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, between May–December, 1992, the then Chairman of the Committee, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mr. Hikmet Çetin, together with the Secretary General, Madame Catherine Lalumière, paid a visit to three of these republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and Georgia in July 1992. They sought on the spot, from the Presidents, Governments and Parliaments of these countries, information about their political and economic situation and the ongoing reforms. In their talks, the political leaders of these countries confirmed to the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary General their commitments to create a genuinely democratic society on the basis of the rule of law and respect for human rights. All wished to have contacts with the Council of Europe in this context, albeit to varying degrees according to their country’s respective geographical and cultural situation.

Following this visit a special session of the Committee of Ministers took place in Istanbul on 10–11 September 1992, with the participation of representatives of all countries formerly part of the Soviet Union, including the Central Asian Republics.

In his conclusions of the meeting, the Chairman of the Committee of Ministers specifically referred to the Central Asian Republics in the following terms:

«In order to enhance stability in the region, we considered that it would be appropriate to establish and develop contacts with these republics under flexible and practical arrangements for the purposes of their democratic reforms. These contacts would be aimed at ascertaining their desire for co-operation and contributing by programmes of assistance to their political reforms as these develop, subject to the Council of Europe’s possibilities and making available its specific experience (legal and constitutional expertise, training for staff in the legal, administrative and media fields, relations between parliamentarians, specific cultural projects)». Following the Istanbul meeting, the Committee of Ministers has decided to embark on a limited co-operation in the fields of democratic institution-building and the protection of human rights, first with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Now I am passing to the Italian initiative. At the invitation of the Italian Government, a conference for the constitution of the Commission for Democracy through Law was held in Venice in January 1990. In May 1990, following the decision of the Committee of Ministers the Commission was formally established as a Part Agreement of the Council of Europe. The Commission is also known as the «Venice Commission».

The European Commission for Democracy through Law is a consultative body which co-operates with the member States of the Council of Europe and with non-member States, in particular those of Central and Eastern Europe. Its own specific field of action is the guarantees offered by law in the service of democracy. It fulfils the following objectives:

- the knowledge of their legal systems, notably with a view to bringing these systems closer;
- the understanding of their legal culture;
- the examination of the problems raised by the working of democratic institutions and their reinforcement and development.

The Commission gives priority to work concerning:

- the constitutional, legislative and administrative principles and techniques which serve the efficiency of democratic institutions and their strengthening, as well as the principle of the rule of law;
- the public rights and freedoms, notably those that involve the participation of citizens in the life of the institutions;
- the contribution of local and regional self-government to the development of democracy.

However, the Commission is not simply a forum where ideas about democracy are exchanged, it is a workshop where East and West together seek legal solutions to political problems, tailored to the requirements of individual countries. It is a specialized body comprised of experts in the field of law and political sciences. Thus eminent figures from the world of law and politics come together to take up and find appropriate solutions to urgent matters. At present the president of the Commission is a well-known person to Italian University circles, Mr. Antonio La Pergola.

The Venice Commission jointly organized with the Turkish authorities a colloquy in Istanbul in October 1992, on the topic of «constitution making as an instrument of democratic tradition», Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan participated in the colloquy. As a follow-up to this colloquy, the Venice Commission co-sponsored in November 1992, with the CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, a seminar in Perugia (Italy) on Constitutional law devoted to the Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union. Then the Venice Commission actively contributed to the elaboration of the constitutional law of Kyrgyzstan.
UNA COSTANTE DELLA POLITICA ITALIANA: IMPERO TURCO E MONDO ISLAMICO DAL RISORGIMENTO AL FASCISMO

di DANilo VENERUSO

È noto che, dalla fine del Settecento, la questione della « decadenza turca » diviene un *locus communis* della politica e della diplomazia europea.

Con lo storicismo romantico dell'età della Restaurazione, essa assume ulteriori e più complesse sfaccettature. Con una serie di passaggi un po' sbrigativi ed affrettati, che non documentano certo una volontà di approfondita conoscenza, la « decadenza ottomana » viene associata alla « decadenza islamica ». Poiché si considera che uno dei dati fondamentali dell'esperienza musulmana sia appunto l'identificazione tra religione e politica, già nella prima metà dell'Ottocento « questione d'Oriente », « decadenza ottomana » e « decadenza islamica », per la pubblicistica, la politica e la diplomazia del tempo non sono che sinonimi intercambiabili.

La questione d'Oriente nei termini cui ora abbiamo accennato entra così a far parte dello stesso patrimonio risorgimentale, attraverso l'opera di Cesare Balbo « Le speranze d'Italia » (1844). Pubblicata subito dopo l'opera altrettanto fortunata sul primato morale e civile degli italiani di Vincenzo Gioberti, e nel medesimo contesto, essa mette in rapporto il risorgimento italiano con il risorgimento della cristianità attraverso un elemento comune che è lo sfruttamento della decadenza ottomana che per lui è sinonimo della decadenza islamica, allo scopo di « tornare all'idea semplice e primitiva della partizione intiera o poco meno che intiera dell'impero ottomano in province delle nazioni presenti cristiane ». Per Cesare Balbo, non bisogna avere più « scrupoli » a conservare in vita l'impero ottomano, il « grande moribondo » della politica internazionale. Si presenta infatti alla « cristianità » un'« occasione » irripetibile, di cui essa ha il dovere di approfittare: « smembrato, scaduto, infiacchito, uno stato non è più conservabile ».

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D'altra parte, non è neppure in potere del declinante impero otto-
manno arrestare questa decadenza: «la inarrestabile civiltà cristiana lo
decise, o piuttosto la Provvidenza, destinando questi popoli asiatici,
come già gli americani, a ritirarsi e forse spegnersi a poco a poco, la-
sciando luogo alle generazioni cristiane» (1).

Tramontata la concezione cattolico-liberale del Balbo, non tra-
monta però la sua concezione della «questione d'Oriente». Essa rima-
ne anzi un dato costante dalla politica estera del nuovo stato unitario,
ancorché ormai aclizzato e secolarizzato. Così nel 1878 il presidente
del consiglio Cairoli e il suo ministro degli esteri Corti sono aspramen-
ti criticati proprio perché esitano a impegnarsi nei meandri della
d«questione d'Oriente» (2).

Dopo Adua (1º marzo 1896) la politica espansionistica italiana,
tornata mediterranea, individua nel Mediterraneo orientale la direzio-
ne fondamentale della sua espansione. La «penetrazione com-
merciale» diventa la formula attraverso cui si attua la prima fase di questa
espansione. Solo dopo che questa è avviata, si attuerà il secondo sta-
dio definitivo dell'espansione italiana in quelle regioni: la conquista
politico-militare. Così si procede alla conquista della Libia e del Dode-
caneso, davanti alle coste turchi tra il 1911 e il 1912 (3). La conquista
del Dodecaneso, non più restituito all'impero ottomano nonostante il
dettato della pace di Ouzy dell'ottobre 1912 (4), indica con chiarezza
che, dopo la guerra italo-turca per la Libia, la diretrice dell'espansio-
ne italiana si rivolge ora direttamente al corpo stesso anatolico. Non
sono passati che pochi mesi dalla conclusione della pace di Ouzy,
quando il ministro degli esteri di San Giuliano rivolge alla corona e al
presidente del consiglio Giolitti un memorial per aprire i negoziati
onde ottenere dal governo ottomano zone privilegiate da sfruttare nel-
la penisola anatolica, tra il Dodecaneso e Cipro (21 gennaio 1913). Le
trattative vengono tese per le lunghe non soltanto per la comprensibi-
le resistenza del governo turco, ma anche per la concordanza degli
appetiti delle potenze marittime da una parte e degli imperi centrali
nell'altra (5).

Lo scoppio della guerra costituisce l'occasione attesa da esteri cir-

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(3) Cfr. M. PETTICHELLI, L'Italia in Asia minore. Equilibrio mediterraneo e ambizio-
(4) Cfr. M. PETTICHELLI, op. cit., passim, particolarmente pp. 15-42; R.A. WEBSTER,
(5) Cfr. M. PETTICHELLI, op. cit., passim, particolarmente pp. 15-42; R.A. WEBSTER,
(6) Cfr. D. VENERUSO, Problemi coloniali nell'Italia prefascista, Parma, Edizioni
universitarie Casamore, 1971, pp. 59-60 e 70-86.
(7) Cfr. M. TOSCANO, Storia diplomatica della guerra mondiale. II. Gli accordi di
S. Giovanni di Moriana, Milano, Giulio, 1936.
sto problema, cfr. anche G. SALVEMINI, Fattispecie Tripolitine, in L'Unità, a. 1, n. 1, 16
dicembre 1911, pp. 3-4; cfr in G. SALVEMINI, Come siamo andati in Libia ed altri scritti
dal 1900 al 1915, a cura di A. TORRESI, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1967, pp. 117-125; E. Rossii,
Storia di Tripoli e della Tripolitania dalla conquista araba al 1911, a cura di M. NALINO,

L’elemento comune di questa politica avveduta è costituito da Carlo Sforza, sottosegretario agli esteri con Nitti e addirittura ministro con Giolitti. Diplomatico colto e aperto, conosce tra l’altro molto bene il mondo ottomano ed islamico per essere stato lungi anni a Istanbul. Egli da una parte abbandona ogni idea di impossessarsi di territori in Asia Minore e dissuade inoltre i governi ad appoggiare militarmente e diplomaticamente l’offensiva greca per liquidare ciò che resta dall’indipendenza turca dopo la prima guerra mondiale (1921). Al contrario della maggior parte dei politici europei, prevede il successo della reazione nazionale di Kemal Atatürk, perché si accorge del rovesciamento dei rapporti di forza tra la Grecia e la Turchia e anche del risveglio nazionale turco che si associa al contemporaneo risveglio islamico (9).

A questa politica di prudenza nei confronti del mondo ottomano rigenerato da Kemal Atatürk si attiene anche la politica estera fascista, che si rassegna ora a riconoscere una sostanziale neutralità tra lo stato turco e il mondo islamico (10). Certo, all’espansionismo mediterraneo fascista disgiace rimpiantere alla tradizionale direzione anatolica e mediorientale. Mussolini, che in tante cose si sente erede del vecchio nazionalismo, nel 1926 si rivolge minacciosamente contro la Turchia. Questa volta però Gran Bretagna e Francia non sono più le potenze filoelleniche e antiturchi del 1919-1923. Specialmente la Gran Bretagna si sente investita del compito di difendere l’indipendenza e la sovranità degli stati che fanno parte della società delle Nazioni, in una prospettiva che sta abbandonando la tradizionale distinzione tra le medie potenze europee (meritevoli comunque di protezione) e popoli non europei, per i quali poteva benissimo passare la falsa eliminatrice a vantaggio delle grandi potenze.


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