Fondata da Bruno Leoni
a cura del Dipartimento di Scienze politiche e sociali
dell'Università degli Studi di Pavia
Editrice Giuffrè (fino al 2005)
dal 2006 Editrice Rubbettino
dal 2019 Editrice PAGEPress

Abstract


Autore:
Turco Giovanni

Titolo:
"La politica come dovere. Profili filosofici del pensiero politico di Carlo Francesco D´Agostino"

Carlo Francesco D’Agostino (1906-1999), man of learning and action, founded – in Rome – the Centro Politico Ita - lia no (Italian Political Centre), in 1943. In the years of the Italian constitutional assembly, he outlined a Project for a New Constitution, as an alternative to the emerging lines of the Italian constitution. From a philosophical perspective, this article analyses the foundations of D’Agostino’s philosophical thought, his critiques of liberalism and social modernism, and his approach to the issue of legitimacy and constitution. He was motivated by the view of politics as the science of the good, and hence, as a means to the common good. Politics requires knowledge of human nature and hence of his perfective development. In this sense law is the determination of what is just, and, thus, the ordering principle of the political community. Legitimate authority is primarily the exercise of a duty of care for the common good; the good is the foundation of freedom, not the other way around. In virtue of the natural sociability of man and of anyone’s debt towards one’s community, political responsibility – in its various forms – constitutes a duty of justice. Carlo Francesco D’Agostino was a subtle critic of both Christian democratic theory and liberalism. About the former, he complains about the assumption of liberty – in the modern sense of selfdetermination – as the criterion for (common) good and equality as a criterion for liberty. Concerning liberalism, D’Agostino identifies its fundamental fault in the pretence to govern the political community, while excluding the objecting knowledge of human nature (and of the political community itself). In this way, the denial of a capacity for truth to reason deprives liberty itself of any foundation.