Abstract
Autore:
Bolech Cecchi Donatella
Titolo:
"Le rôle de l´Italie dans la crise de Munich"
The Munich Agreement was one of the highest moments in Mussolini’s policy, who could claim himself saviour of peace. It was in fact, thanks to his mediation on British request, that Hitler accepted to meet Chamberlain and Daladier at Munich to discuss the fate of Czechoslovakia, thus avoiding the war. Mussolini carne back from Munich persuaded that in a way the prestige he had gained would consent him a Four Power Directory, based on an Axis system, Rome-Berlin and London-Paris, the Axis Rome-London being the pivot of it. This system was meant to grant Italy great advantages in the Danubian sector at France’s expenses, thanks to British mediation. He failed nonetheless to understand that such a mediation would imperil British position in the Mediterranean, which after Munich had resumed a first class role in the defense of the Empire. He missed also that Munich had weakened Italy´s position in the Axis with Germany settling in the heart of Europe, thus furtherly limiting Italian influence.
Whilst in the countries taking part to the events of Munich we can speak of a myth of Munich, particularly strong in France as a negative complex and in Great Britain as an important element in the appeasement debate, such is not the case of Italy, where on the contrary it was a positive event under the aspect of Mussolini´s personal success and of Italy´s international role and where the short period between the conference and the outbreak of war, depriving very soon the agreement of its value, did not leave a lasting mark in the Italian conscience.
