Michele Bocchiola

Ruolo: Assegnista di ricerca
Email: m (dot) bocchiola (at) unipv (dot) it
Telefono: +39 0382 98 4265

 

 

Insegnamenti


Etica pubblica
Filosofia politica

Biografia


Dopo la laurea in Filosofia e scienze sociali (2002) e la laurea magistrale in Teorie Filosofiche (2004) presso l’Università di Pavia (2004), Michele Bocchiola ha conseguito nel 2008 il Dottorato di ricerca presso la Luiss ‘G. Carli’ di Roma.

Ha svolto attività di ricerca presso l’University of Reading (2003/2004), l’Harvard University (2006/2007) e l’University of Witwatersrand di Johannesburg (2009/2011). È autore di diversi saggi di filosofia morale e teoria politica, pubblicati su riviste nazionali e internazionali. È stato Managing Editor della rivista Philosophy and Public Issues (2011/2016).

I suoi interessi di ricerca spaziano dalla fondazione normativa della teoria politica contemporanea – in particolare nel pensiero di J. Rawls e di G. A. Cohen – alla metaetica – specialmente la teoria costruttivista nella filosofia pratica – a temi di etica applicata – quali le implicazioni filosofiche del concetto di privacy - e temi di etica pubblica - in particolare, la dimensione etica e politica del whistleblowing come strumento per la lotta alla corruzione e gli strumenti di accountability nelle istituzioni e nelle organizzazioni complesse.

Da novembre 2017 ha conseguito l’Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale al ruolo di Professore di II fascia nel settore concorsuale 14/A1 – Filosofia Politica.


Pubblicazioni


Books

Is Whistleblowing a Duty?, (w/ E. Ceva), Cambridge: Polity Press 2018

Privacy, Luiss University Press, Roma 2014

Essays

2020
• “The distinctiveness of Whistleblowing,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, DOI: 10.1007/s10790-020-09733-6, in press

• “Theories of Whistleblowing,” (w/E. Ceva), Philosophy Compass 15(1)

• “The Public Ethics of Whistleblowing” (w/E. Ceva). In: Introduction to Public Ethics, edited by Ed Hall and Andrew Sabl, Princeton: Princeton University Press, in press

• “Anti-corruption heroes or villains? A legal, ethical and policy review of the role of whistleblowing in the fight against corruption”, (w/E. Ceva & M.C. Vinciguerra). In: P. Heywood and A. Mungiu-Pippidi (eds.), A Research Agenda for Studies of Corruption, Elgar Research Agenda Series, 2020

2019
• “Personal Trust, Public Accountability, and the Justification of Whistleblowing,” (w/E. Ceva), Journal of Political Philosophy 27(2)

• “Compromessi e principi, Notizie di Politeia XXXV, 135

• “Il costruttivismo politico e l’idea di oggettività”, Notizie di Politeia XXXV, 134

2018
• “On the (Historical) Grounds of the Original Position.” In: E. Etieyibo (ed.), Perspective in Social Contract Theory, Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington DC

• “Choice and the objective demands of justice.” (w/C. Bagnoli). In: G. Pellegrino (ed.), Legitimacy, Democracy, and Disagreement, Rome, Luiss University Press

• “La specificità del whistleblowing,” Notizie di Politeia XXXIV, n. 129

2017
• “Audiatur et altera pars. Semel aut semper?,” Biblioteca della libertà LII, n. 219

• “L’approccio dell’etica pubblica allo studio della corruzione politica. Un’analisi normative” [The public ethics approach to the study of political corruption], (w/E. Ceva). In: P. Previtali, R. Procaccini e A. Zatti (eds.), Trasparenza e anticorruzione tra enforcement e risk management, Pavia University Press, Pavia

• “I miei dati non sono (solo) miei” [My data are not (only) mine], Il Mulino, n. 2

2016
• “Rawls ed Enoch su disaccordo e ragioni” [Rawls and Enoch on Disagreement and Reasons], Etica e politica XVIII, n. 1

2015
• “Neutralità della politica, parzialità delle ragioni” [Neutrality of politics, partiality of reasons], Ragion pratica, Vol. 2

• “I limiti della neutralità” [The limits of neutrality], Notizie di Politeia XXXII, n. 118

• “Review of Contractualism and the Foundations of Morality”, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Vol. 20

2014
• “Libertà senza privacy” [Freedom without privacy], Biblioteca della libertà Vol. XLIX

2013
• “On Justice and Other Values. G. A. Cohen’s Political Philosophy and the Problem of Trade-offs”, (w/ F. Zuolo), Philosophical Papers 42(1)

• “Milanovic On Global Inequality and Poverty”, Global Policy 4(2)

• “La posizione originaria tra contratto e costruzione” [The original position between contract and construction], Biblioteca della libertà XLVIII

• “Ronald Dworkin. Verità: normativa, non metaetica” [Ronal Dworkin. Truth: normative, not metaethical]. In: A. Besussi (ed), Verità e politica, Carocci, Roma

• “Il contrattualismo morale e il problema dell’oggettività” [Moral contractualism and the problem of objectivity]. In C. Bagnoli (ed.), Che fare?, Carocci, Roma

2012
• “Liberalism, Containment, and Education”, Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 2(1)

2010
• “Costruttivismo e ontologia morale” [Constructivism and moral ontology], Notizie di Politeia Vol. XXVI, n. 100

• “Il rifiuto liberale della diversità culturale” [The liberal rejection of cultural diversity], Filosofia e questioni pubbliche 1

• “Vere tu es Cohen Absconditus”, (w/F. Zuolo). In: A. Besussi e E. Biale (ed.), Fatti e Principi. Una disputa sulla giustizia, Aracne, Roma

2008
• “Principi senza fatti. Riflessioni sulla critica di G. A. Cohen a J. Rawls” [Principles without fact. Reflections on G. A. Cohen’s criticism to J. Rawls], (w/F. Zuolo), Teoria politica, vol. 1

2006
• “Moral Mediator in HCI”, with E. Bardone and L. Magnani. In: Claude Ghaoui (ed.), Enciclopedia Of Human Computer Interaction, IGR, London


Submitted for peer review
2020
• "Should the whistle blow on harmless wrongdoings?"

Edited Journal Issues
• “Illiberal views in Liberal States,” Philosophy and Public Issues (New Series) 6(1)

• “The Philosophy of Punishment,” Philosophy and Public Issues New Series 5(1)


Works in preparation

Essays

The grounds of obligatory whistleblowing

Corruption: its moral basis and political implications

The Burden of the Burdens of Judgments

Backward-Looking Objectivity


Books

Beyond Privacy. Data Property in the Age of Communication
This book project draws on some of the conclusions of my previous works on the concept of privacy, and it applies its findings to the thorny issue of data protection and property. Against the drawbacks of a traditional understanding of privacy – understood as a condition of solitude (at the individual level) or intimacy (at the social level) –, I elaborate on more recent notions of privacy as control over the information that third-parties possess about someone. I argue that the idea of privacy-as-control-over-information is sound, but it might not be enough to effectively protect the personal data, especially with the emergence of new communication technologies because it is not always possible to determine who is actually in control of what piece of information, and whether a certain piece of information is a real threat to one’s privacy.
The main hypothesis is that personal data could be effectively protected when a suitably specify notion of ‘proprietary rights’ is applied to them. To this aim, the book considers whether (i) personal data are the kind of things we can own, and (ii) we can own personal data in the same way we own other material things. The property of personal data, in this sense, should not be confused with the idea of ‘intellectual property’ – the monopoly of intellectual creations assigned to designated owners by the law. To own personal data means to exercise property rights over strings of information, which we generate through the interaction with computers, smartphones, and other electronic devices without being aware.


Office Powers: Time, Institutional Change and Accountability
Accountability mechanisms–a system of procedural and substantive rules–have the aim is to make available and transparent to the general public the explanatory reasons and the justificatory grounds of the actions and decisions that public officials make on behalf citizens. As such, accountability mechanisms limit administrative discretion and avoid arbitrariness. However well-designed, accountability mechanisms might be ineffective when public officials face unforeseen and unprecedented circumstances–like, for example, the emergence of a new information technology–where the law remain silent and shared social moral norms have not yet developed. Situations of this kind might expand public officials’ power beyond their mandate, entrusting them the power to model and inform institutional design to answer the new challenges they face.
Surprisingly, notwithstanding the growing debate on accountability in the social sciences, there is a significant lacuna in the current debate about the temporal dimension of accountability mechanisms as far as the future decision is concern. While historians have produced important studies of how accountability mechanisms have developed in modern and contemporary institutions, political philosophers have neglected the impact of time lags between present choices (which reflect current values and cost/benefit analysis) and future outcomes (whose justification might vary with the passing of time and evolution of society). This book aims to discuss the temporal dynamic of accountability by investigating the impacts that accountability mechanisms have on institutional design.

Subjective Disagreement, Objective Trade-offs
The focus of the book is the role, origin and nature of disagreement about fundamental moral values and first principles of justice in contemporary pluralist societies. There are three kinds of disagreement that ought to be considered: (i.) disagreement on what values are fundamental; (ii.) disagreement on how to trade-off fundamental values against non-fundamental values; (iii.) disagreement on the application of subjectively balanced values to a given social and political reality. In the contemporary debate, these kinds of disagreement are taken either as an inevitable feature of human social interaction (the liberal position), or as a mere mistake in the identification of the truths of the matters about morality and politics (the realist position). Others, seeking middle ground between the two approaches, try to focus what all or most of the moral, religious, political and philosophical doctrines have in common, in order to set up social and political institutions acceptable from different perspectives (the public-reason or Rawlsian position).
My contention is that the solutions provided by standard theories are not satisfactory. The reason of their shortcomings is in part due to the fact that they do not consider the second kind of disagreement: how to trade-offs fundamental values against non-fundamental ones. My hypothesis is that, although people subjectively disagree about what is of general value in life (the disagreement of the first kind), an objective balance among values can be found by regulating the trade-offs between what one, subjectively, consider of fundamental values and what everybody else, collectively, consider of fundamental values. This goal can be achieved by developing a suitably specified form of constructivism – a metanormative view according to which a procedure of practical reasoning and attitudes-formation can objectively justify trade-offs among values.